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Foreword
“Society” is increasingly viewed and treated as 
a “network” rather than “structure” (let alone a solid 
“totality”): it is perceived and treated as a matrix of 
random connections and disconnections and of an 
essentially infinite volume of possible permutations.1
If contemporary cultural studies and sociology are ruled by any struc‑
turing principles rendering order to otherwise nebular character of the 
disciplines, this may be the idea of fluidity permeating every possible 
field of social life and cultural production. A cognitively informed and 
intellectually dexterous observer may purport to immobilize a single, 
isolated snapshot of cultural reality but this action will result in 
providing an illusory, simplified representation. In this way, scholarly 
perception of culture emerges, as Chris Jenks declares, “from the noun 
‘process,’ in the sense of nurture, growth and bringing into being.”2 
Ontologically speaking, both society and culture are processes in statu 
nascendi — their natures unveil themselves as the dynamics of social 
becoming.3 This statement, to put it otherwise, demonstrates that socio‑
cultural realities resemble constantly evolving networks of interper‑
sonal phenomena chief among which are processes of interaction and 
communication undertaken by knowledgeable agents. Moreover, this 
inherent dynamism is also experienced as the dialectic of continuity 
and change which is typical of the supposedly static and systemic 
character of norms, values and signs of culture.
1 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Times. Living in the Age of Uncertainty (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2007), p. 3.
2 Chris Jenks, The Analytic Bases of Cultural Reproduction Theory, in Cultural 
Reproduction (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 3.
3 Piotr Sztompka, Society in Action. The Theory of Social Becoming (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1991), p. 95.
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The principal aim of this work is to reflect upon the processes of 
socio ‑cultural change from the perspective of trust and uncertainty 
conceived as correlates to evolving forms of socio ‑cultural organisations. 
It is postulated that technological, economic and political transforma‑
tions (as embodied by industrialisation, the spread of free markets 
and democratisation) are factors whose impact is instrumental as far 
as the development of interpersonal trust relations is concerned. In 
other words, modernisation paves the way for changes taking place in 
the selection of cultural elements (e.g. ideologies, values or discourses) 
which makes social reality appear as an organised, predictable and, 
therefore, trustworthy system. The same cultural repertoire of trust 
is applied to the collective process of coping with social traumas and 
uncertainties, such as the loss of domestication or the erosion of tradi‑
tions, which come in the wake of technological, economic or political 
change.
Modernisation processes produce two distinct kinds of trust cul‑
tures, that is cultural systems sustaining and reinforcing personalised 
trust relations. The former is associated with the cultural “regime” of 
pre ‑modernity in which trusting is based upon structural resources, 
such as fixed role expectations, established interaction patterns and the 
unquestionable authority of tradition. This model of trust culture is best 
illustrated by the institution of the “Kula Ring” which denotes a system 
of ceremonial, ritual activities aiming at the exchange of symbolic arte‑
facts among tribal, stateless communities of the Triobriand archipelago. 
The latter system is related to (late) modernity in which trusting is 
based upon the individual’s personal reflexivity and agency, that is 
the ability to make informed choices under conditions of ideological, 
normative and axiological multiplicity. This latter model of trust culture 
is typical of informational networks in which reciprocity is a project in 
progress that needs to be negotiated and implemented by all parties 
engaged in online interactions.
The aforementioned argument is conceptually divided into six 
chapters. Four of them comprise methodological and theoretical prob‑
lems referring to both uncertainty and trust as well as social ontology 
(the structure/agency dichotomy). The theoretical and methodological 
remarks are concluded by the model of “theoretical performance” which 
is introduced as an original methodological framework for cultural 
analysis. The remaining two chapters are interpretative projects aiming 
to analyse modernisation processes from the perspective of the applied 
methodological framework and its conceptual toolbox.
From a strictly theoretical point of view, the work is based upon 
a firm intellectual belief that the idea of trust may be defined as a phe‑
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nomenological coefficient to societal interactions with Other(ness). In 
this sense, trusting, as Piotr Sztompka observes, resembles a kind of 
“bet” placed upon contingent and chronically unpredictable actions 
performed by other individuals.4 In this way, trusting constitutes a core 
element of “ontological security,” a term coined in order to emphasise 
that contingency management is instrumental in coping with the 
reality inhabited by myriads of unpredictable Others equipped with 
diversified political and economic agendas.5 Consequently, the cultural 
discourse of trust is very often conceptualised as a vernacular of social 
productivity, a category whose intellectual origins can be traced as far 
back as to the legacy of political theories centred upon the notion of 
civil society and the related idea of civic culture. The discourse of trust 
becomes a vital tool enabling a more informed insight into the cultural 
significance of modern democratic and multicultural orders in which 
the political construct of civil society is founded upon the mechanisms 
of multilateral reciprocity and solidarity conceived as distinct forms of 
the public good.
When approached from a strictly methodological perspective, the 
work addresses the dichotomy of agency and structure which is con‑
ceived here as a starting point for synthetic conceptualisations, such 
as Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory, aiming to provide a more 
holistic outlook on the ontology of socio ‑cultural realities. These theo‑
ries are applied to formulate an original methodological framework 
that sees socio ‑cultural processes in terms of iterative “theatrical perfor‑ 
mances.” In this context, modernization processes (and the transfor‑
mation of trust cultures) can be subsumed within a cognitive model 
suggesting that cultural processes may be conceived as a specific form 
of “theatrical performances.” The theatrical performance is, thus, con‑
ceptualised as a constitutive element of socio ‑cultural ontology com‑
prising the existence of the stage (the spatial and temporal dimensions 
of interpersonal interaction), the text (the totality of structural resources 
from which individuals draw during the performance), the principal 
actors granted dominant roles in the process of cultural reproduction 
and, last but not least, the audience which observes cultural processes 
but is not empowered to alter them.
In the context of the delineated theatrical framework, the realm of 
traditional, pre ‑modern community may be interpreted as a distinct 
form of trust culture in which networks of moral obligations are an‑
4 Piotr Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer‑
sity Press, 1999), p. 25.
5 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self ‑Identity. Self and Society in the Late Mod‑
ern Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 243.
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chored in the structural (or textual) properties of dramaturgic events. 
Actors of the pre ‑modern cultural stage — as we learn from Bronisław 
Malinowski’s observations of the Kula Ring communities — are seen 
as being united by robust, non ‑negotiable social ties and fixed inter‑
personal relationships fostering durable trusting expectations. Thus 
formed trust culture is rooted in structural underpinnings of cultural 
reproduction, that is in the existence of stable textual devices (mythical 
texts) which create the common plane of morality and, therefore, foster 
the shared axiology of social interaction.
Modern socio ‑cultural orders are furrowed with entirely different 
mechanisms rendering the creation of trust cultures. Their distinctive‑
ness is anchored in the “phenomenology of modernity”6 stressing the 
incredible impact of human agency which runs rampant in social 
organisations of the contemporary era. The realm of (late) modern cul‑
ture is characterised by the demand for making relatively autonomous 
(agential) choices which function as an unavoidable coefficient of living 
in the times of individualisation. The era of individualisation connotes 
a model of social organisation in which structural constraints of social 
class, nationality or gender are becoming increasingly remote from the 
individual practice of making everyday life choices. Hence, the idea 
of individualisation, as Ulrich Beck proclaims, results in the demise 
of “standard,” clear ‑cut biographies. Facing the lack of palliative and 
stabilising impact of solid structures (such as tradition, for instance), 
human identities resemble individual projects, agential narratives 
constructed, so to speak, ab ovo.7
In the era of individualisation, trust mechanisms also resemble 
projects that need to be completed in the process of interpersonal 
communication and negotiation with other actors. As opposed to the 
aforementioned order of traditional pre ‑modernity, in which trusting 
relations are deeply related to the stabilising authority of cultural 
texts, the emergent realm of modernity postulates the agency of trust 
which becomes anchored in individualised actors’ competences. This 
is facilitated by processes of globalisation which, as the theatrical 
framework sees it, foster a new model of societal interaction uniting 
myriads of strangers who at the point of interpersonal communica‑
tion remain absent and elusive. In this specific case, reciprocity in not 
6 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford Univer‑
sity Press, 1990), p. 137.
7 Ulrich Beck, “The Reinvention of Politics: Toward a Theory of Reflexive Mod‑
ernization,” in Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern 
Social Order, eds. Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994).
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granted by any reliable axiology of interaction but, on the contrary, is 
furrowed with uncertainties and perils inscribed in the chaotic nature 
of communication networks. This networked environment of trust 
gives rise to an essentially fragmented model of subjectivity which, as 
Scott Bukatman teaches us, may be defined in terms of the “terminal 
identity.”8 Trusting relations are inscribed in the network of territorially 
distant and physically absent Others who remain shrouded in the aura 
of uncertainty since from the onset their interactions are simulated and 
mediated by hyperreal technologies of information processing. Online 
reciprocity constitutes the foundation for a novel form of trust which 
becomes vested in the abstract qualities of a system by which the very 
interaction becomes mediated. 
8 Scott Bukatman, Terminal Identity. The Virtual Subject in Postmodern Science 
Fiction (Durham DC and London: Duke University Press, 1993).

Chapter One
The Concepts of Trust and Uncertainty:  
Intellectual Origins and a Scope  
of Theoretical Applications 
This focus on the changing nature of trust in mod‑
ernizing societies is indeed not surprising given the 
extraordinary importance of a universal basis of 
trust in modern, democratic societies. The emphasis 
in modern societies on consensus, the ideology of 
pragmatism, problem ‑solving, and technocratic ex‑
pertise, as well as conflict management (as opposed 
to ideological fission), are all founded on an image 
of society based on interconnected networks of trust 
— among citizens, families, voluntary organizations, 
religious denominations, civic associations, and the 
like.1
The concept of trust has won almost universal acclaim as a cognitive 
tool enabling a more informed insight into the cultural foundations 
of modern, multicultural societies. In this specific context, the notion 
can be applied as a shorthand for cultural productivity, a pragmatic 
strategy of existence in the mercurial reality inhabited by myriads of 
elusive Others. As a consequence, the idea of reciprocal trust runs 
parallel with the advent of scholarly interest in human agency: to trust 
is to place a phenomenological bet on the contingent and autonomous 
actions performed by other individuals. To vest trust, to put it other‑
wise, is to bracket off uncertainties and contingencies associated with 
the evasive presence of the Other.2
 1 Adam B. Seligman, The Problem of Trust (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1997), p. 14.
2 See Tadeusz Sławek, U ‑bywać. Człowiek, świat, przyjaźń w twórczości Williama 
Blake’a (Katowice: Wydawnictwo UŚ, 2001), p. 126.
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Much indebted to the language of societal interaction as it may be, 
the term is also endowed with a purely cultural significance stressing 
that the totality of axiological and normative elements of culture may 
enhance or, contrariwise, deplete the individual readiness to vest trust 
in other people. In this sense, the emergent idea of “trust culture” is 
tantamount to a realm of public sphere in which agents work in conjunc‑
tion with one another in order to construct a relatively stable network 
of interpersonal ties and common axiological obligations. Hence, the 
idea of trust is often related with civic activism and cooperation taking 
place on arenas of contemporary civil societies. In this case, the concept 
of civil society is usually defined as a tissue of voluntary, non ‑profit 
associations which are relatively independent from state policymaking 
and the economic rationale of free markets. This autonomy, in turn, 
makes them being subjected to horizontal relationships based on trust, 
rather than vertical structures of political power or cost ‑benefit ratio‑ 
nality. The discourse of trust, consequently, binds the notions of civil 
society and human agency with the potentiality of achieving collective 
objectives in spite of perceived uncertainties or contingencies.
The main aim of this chapter is to provide some introductory 
methodological remarks to the idea of trust as it is reflected within the 
spheres of cultural (cultural studies), sociological and political theories. 
Hence, the chapter makes an attempt to discuss the methodological and 
historico ‑intellectual origins of trust theories as well as to comment 
briefly on the range of contemporary academic discourses embracing 
the interplay between trust and uncertainty.
Towards an Anti ‑Materialistic Approach
The discourse of trust — to put it in a more methodological nomen‑
clature — has paved the way for a new understanding of cultural 
productivity. It is a new idea suggesting that culture (predominantly 
its axiological and normative aspects) cannot be perceived only from the 
vantage point of economic relations and the concomitant inequalities in 
the distribution of financial assets as well as other utilities in societies. 
In this kind of methodology, culturally reinforced trusting relations are 
seen as being constructive as far as political and, even more importantly, 
economic foundations of the modern social order are concerned.3
3 See Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. Culture Matters. 
How Values Shape Human Progress (New York: Basic Book, 2000).
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The productivity of trusting relations shows, as Robert D. Putnam 
and Francis Fukuyama observe, that culture cannot be reduced to 
matter of false consciousness in a way suggested and ideologically 
reinforced by Marxist theorists. Bonds of trust foster the development 
of axiological obligations, loyalties and shared solidarities that may 
enhance human performance (both individual as well as collective) 
with respect to political and economic spheres of life and production.4 
In this way, contemporary trust theorists postulate an anti ‑materialistic 
methodology in which economic processes are rooted in shared val‑
ues and norms constituting the cultural repertoire of interaction and 
cooperation.
To put it historically, a methodological foundation for this anti‑ 
materialistic approach can be found in the interpretative perspective 
on the nature of social and economic change developed by Max Weber. 
Having assumed an inherently individualistic approach to the ontology 
of socio ‑cultural reality, Weber tries to construct his sociology on the 
basis of human agency and action:5
Sociology […] is a science which attempts the interpretative 
understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at 
a casual explanation of its course and effects. In “action” 
is included all human behaviour when and in so far as 
the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it. 
[…] Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective 
meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individu‑
als), it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby 
oriented in its course.6
The centrality of social action in the Weberian project of interpreta‑
tive sociology can be attributed to the fact that the category of acting 
agents is used as a hermeneutic tool employed in analyses of collective 
(trans ‑personal) phenomena. Much systemic and structural as they may 
be, collectivities should not be conceived as prior to individual actions 
4 See especially James S. Coleman, The Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, 
MA.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990); Robert D. Putnam, 
Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton Uni‑
versity Press, 1993); Francis Fukuyama, Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Pros‑
perity (New York: Free Press, 1995).
5 Bert Adams, Rosalind A. Sydie, Classical Sociological Theory (London, Thou‑
sand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 77.
6 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. T. Parsons 
(New York: The Free Press, 1997), p. 88. Emphasis mine.
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and autonomous acts of interpretation.7 Collective phenomena (social 
groups and classes, discursive formations or ideologies) are products of 
human interaction and emerge only as a result of the initial, formative 
awareness postulating that a number of interacting agents perceive 
themselves as sharing some kind of modus vivendi.
Collectively shared perceptions and actions are indicative of the 
formation of “status group,” a term employed to describe communi‑
ties composed of individuals who are in a position to recognise the 
commonly shared axiology of social interaction. In this context, the 
central point in Weber’s anti ‑materialism is the fact that status groups 
are not necessarily created by means of having common economic 
interests beforehand. The initial criteria of a status group member‑
ship are arbitrary and cannot “be imposed by prior economic facts.”8 
As a result, the formative rules of membership may be established 
by means of cultural attributes delineating such components of an 
individual’s identity as: gender, language, religion, race or lifestyle. In 
other words, and contrary to the mainstream of Marxist theory, it is 
the process of collective identity formation that explains the rise of 
a collective group interest which, in turn, may be re ‑defined in terms 
of economic opportunities or utilities.
Members of status groups share, to use Jürgen Habermas’s terminol‑
ogy, a form of communicative rationality that results in the creation 
of the “status honour,” a specific type of common axiology combined 
with a perception of a common modus operandi. In this inherently 
cultural understanding, axiological and normative elements of culture 
are not seen as illusory reflections fuelled by the uneven distribution 
of production means. On the contrary, culture — by creating the com‑
monly shared axiology of societal interaction — provides individuals 
with cognitive, interpretative frameworks of their day ‑to ‑day routines 
as well as incentives to act. These cultural models of collective actions 
are, in turn, formative as far as the economic base is concerned. As 
Anthony King observes:
The economy does not precede status groups. On the con‑
trary, the economy itself is constituted in the first instance by 
a complex hierarchy of status groups interacting and competing 
with each other. These groups are formed through interaction 
in which a particular kind of status honour is established. 
7 George Ritzer, Sociological Theory (New York: McGraw ‑Hill, 2011), pp. 124—125.
8 Anthony King, The Structure of Social Theory (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004), p. 124.
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[…] Crucially, the existence of status groups oriented to 
a particular status honour produces the material conditions 
in any era. […] The nature of these groups and their relationship 
to each other determines the character of the supposedly autono‑
mous economic base.9
Needless to say, this anti ‑materialistic approach is especially evident 
in Weber’s seminal text on the formation of Western free market 
capitalism.10 In this specific case, the systemic nature of modern, free 
market capitalism is conceptualised, to cut a long story short, from 
the perspective of individual, value oriented actions which remain 
profoundly anchored in the common status honour conceived in terms 
of the protestant ethics.
The Weberian ideas of cultural effectiveness and productivity 
permeate the discourses of trust, uncertainty and risk. The concept of 
trust — as far as its applications to the spheres of economy and politics 
are concerned — teaches us that the common axiology of interpersonal 
relations may serve as a “lubricant that makes the running of any 
group or organization more efficient.”11 In this sense, trusting relations, 
norms of solidarity and reciprocity may serve as a kind of cultural 
asset — a vital element of status honour, to use Weber’s terminology 
one more time — which enhances human agency and renders possible 
the introduction of changes into the worlds of politics and economy.
The theory of trust predicts that individual and collective identi‑
ties are forged in the course of interpersonal negotiations of norms 
and values within significant status groups and thus formed cultural 
templates of collective action are major resources in the dissemination 
various cultural assets (norms, values and symbols). These processes 
are especially evident in the global culture of the contemporary, mul‑
ticultural world. As Samuel Huntington comments on the nature of 
exchange between actors performing on the arena of post ‑Cold War 
global society:
In the post ‑Cold War world, the most important distinctions 
among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. 
They are cultural. […] People define themselves in terms 
of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs and 
 9 King, The Structure of Social Theory, p. 126. Emphasis added.
10 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. T. Parsons 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958).
11 Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption. Human Nature and the Reconstruction 
of Social Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), p. 16.
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institutions. […] People use politics not just to advance their 
interests but also to define their identity.12
Consequently, the nature of global society is forged on the basis of 
cultural differences and similarities which are seen as resources en‑ 
abling our survival in the uncertain reality of the global world stage on 
which a huge number of institutional and non ‑official actors compete 
in order to pursue their political and economic interests.
The contemporary discourses of uncertainty and risk are also based 
upon the dissolution of the base and superstructure dichotomy. From 
this particular perspective, the advent of the “risk society” becomes 
tantamount to the radical implosion of the orthodox premises of 
historical materialism. From the perspective of risk studies, the in‑
herent dynamism of late modernity is not anchored in the economic 
rationale of class struggle, but in cultural responses to uncertainties 
and contingencies associated with the process of technological mod‑
ernization. Thus, the central political issue of modernity is no longer 
associated with the legitimisation of economic inequalities inscribed 
in the model of class society but, contrariwise, with providing solid, 
discursive grounds for explaining and justifying the societal distribu‑
tion of unintended consequences of technological development. Since, 
as Ulrich Beck postulates, “poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic,”13 
the social distribution of uncertainty and risk goes well beyond the 
industrial, inherently exclusive schemata of wealth distribution. In 
other words, the all ‑inclusive character of uncertainties in the age of 
risk society manifests itself as the inability of living without experienc‑
ing contingencies. Hence, human life resembles an incessant activity 
of risk selection which, as Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky teach 
us,14 is endowed with an inherently cultural dimension suggesting 
that uncertainty aversion is a function of possessed value orientations. 
Therefore, from the perspective of cultural theories of risk, culture one 
more time establishes its hegemony over the world of economy: as an 
element of modern economy, risk management is susceptible to such 
intangible phenomena as commonly shared expectations concerning 
moral order.
12 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World 
Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 21.
13 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity? (London, Thousand Oaks 
and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992), p. 36.
14 This idea is more extensively discussed at the end of this chapter. See Mary 
Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture. An Essay on the Selection of Technological 
and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
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Theories of Trust and Their Methodological Origins
The origins of contemporary trust theories can be traced as far back 
as to the advent of a new ontology of socio ‑cultural reality which is 
founded upon “soft variables,” that is explanatory tools facilitating 
a more detailed insight into cultural aspects of social systems. In this 
case, socio ‑cultural realities are conceptualised as dynamic matrixes 
consisting of interpersonal relationships and other mutually oriented 
actions fostering the purposeful exchange of cultural resources (such 
as signs, values and norms) which result in the collective construction 
of the inter ‑subjective universe, the Lebenswelt of cultural existence. As 
Piotr Sztompka puts it:
At the ontological level there is a turn away from “hard,” 
organic, holistic, or systemic images of society, toward the 
“soft” field image of social fabric seen as a fluid and constantly 
moving pattern, a matrix of human actions and interactions. 
At the epistemological level there is the corresponding turn 
away from structural explanations invoking “hard” variables 
— like class position, status, economic situation, demographic 
trends, settlement patterns, technological development, 
organisational forms — toward the cultural explanations 
focusing on “soft” intangibles like meanings, symbols, rules, 
values, norms, codes, frames, and forms of discourse.15
In the context of the aforementioned turn towards “soft variables,” 
the idea of trust remains deeply inscribed in the “second theory of 
action,”16 an idea postulating that human agency cannot be perceived 
through the objectified prism of technical or economic rationality 
delineating the figure of self ‑centred and overly utilitarian homo oeco‑
nomicus but, in a contrary manner, in the context of the interactive 
homo reciprocus, an individual who remains shrouded in the aura of 
reciprocal communication constituting a form of interpersonal rational‑
ity of cultural descent.
At the ontological level there is a shift from the image of action 
seen as purely rational, constantly calculating, consistently 
15 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), pp. 1—2.
16 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory.
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maximising profit and minimising cost (homo oeconomicus), 
toward the richer picture including also emotional, tradi‑
tional, normative, cultural components: value orientations, 
social bonds, attachments, loyalties, solidarities, identities.17
The discourse of trust refers to axiological and normative bonds and 
shared perceptions of reality. It stresses the development of relatively 
stable “imagined communities” as Benedict Anderson aptly calls the 
phenomenological sense of attachment to a social grouping which is 
expressed by the subjective affirmation of its inner axiology and other 
elements of group culture (ideology, beliefs, habits).18
Moreover, the idea of trust gestures towards the concept of “moral 
community.” As opposed to more institutionalised forms of sociality, 
in which interpersonal cohesion and societal bonds are attained due to 
the existence of inner regulatory bodies, moral communities are far less 
formalised and depend upon the existence of reciprocal moral obliga‑
tions as well as ethical habits which are not enforced by a formally 
empowered defined party (the state or other regulatory bodies).19 As 
Bronisław Misztal concludes:
This idea of society has less to do with formal organisation 
than with a sense of belonging, trust and responsibility, and 
duties towards others who share our values, interests and 
goals.20
In a way, moral communities could be conceptualised in terms of 
specific “imagined communities” consisting of mutual and multilateral 
trust relations since from the very onset they are founded upon a gen‑
eralised expectation that confidence vested in contingent actions of the 
Other should be reciprocated. The idea is, nevertheless, firmly embed‑
ded within the humanities. One may recall Alexis de Tocqueville’s idea 
of “the habits of the heart” referring to the ideological and cultural 
underpinnings of complex social and political systems.21
17 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory.
18 See Benedict Anderson, Wspólnoty wyobrażone: rozważania o źródłach i roz‑
przestrzenianiu się nacjonalizmu, trans. S. Amsterdamski (Kraków: Wydawnictwo 
Znak, 1997).
19 Cf. Francis Fukuyama, Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New 
York: Free Press, 1995), p. 7.
20 Bronisław Misztal, Trust in Modern Societies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 
pp. 206—207.
21 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. II (New York: Knopf, 1945), 
p. 8.
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Trust: From a Psychological Disposition  
to a Cultural Construct
The concept of trust, as far as its academic understanding is concerned, 
is by no means easy to define. From the perspective of humanist 
methodologies, the notion has undergone a process of change from its 
psychological understanding as an individualised orientation towards 
a cultural conceptualisation as a networked and profoundly trans‑ 
personal phenomenon. This methodological transformation renders 
perceiving trust as a kind of generalised expectation deeply inscribed 
in the cultural repertoire of norms and values which characterise 
social groups, local communities or societies. This change of our own 
understanding of trusting relations is, moreover, intrinsically related to 
historical transformations in socio ‑cultural systems. It seems, as Barbara 
Misztal observes, that “the present ‘discovery of trust’ […] seems to be 
a classic case of Minerva taking flight at dusk.”22 In other words, the 
contemporary problems with social individualisation have facilitated 
the development of academic interest in systemic and cultural aspects 
of trust.
The individualistic approach to the problem of trust is quite similar 
to a commonsensical view on this matter suggesting that the term 
represents a kind of goodwill based upon mutual understanding and 
respect. Indeed, the psychology of individualised trusting disposi‑
tions is formed upon a claim that trust can be perceived in terms of 
a personality feature representing an individual’s general orientation 
(or an attitude) towards the external social world. The psychological un‑
derstanding of the problem postulates that the term may be conceived 
as “the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit 
another’s vulnerability.”23 Consequently, trusting becomes related to 
situations of unpredictability and risk in which an actor cannot entirely 
predict, let alone calculate, the Other’s response.
On the other hand, the cultural approach to the issue of trust is 
based upon a firm conviction that trusting dispositions are in fact 
“path dependent,” which means that they are rooted in the common 
cultural heritage, the shared reservoir of norms and values adopted by 
22 Barbara Misztal, ”Trust and Cooperation: the Democratic Public Sphe‑
re,” Journal of Sociology, The Australian Sociological Association 37, no. 4 (2000), 
p. 371.
23 Charles F. Sabel, “Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in 
a Volatile Economy,” Human Relations 43 (1993), p. 1133.
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a community as its prescribed code of conduct.24 In this context, trust is 
perceived in terms of a generalised cultural expectation, a normatively 
formulated imperative stating the generally accepted cultural code of 
interpersonal exchange and postulating norms of reciprocity. The path 
dependency postulate, in turn, opens a possibility of debating upon 
the idea of “trust culture” conceived as a conglomerate of cultural 
and macro ‑social phenomena on which agents may formulate their 
individual bets of trust.25
This cultural understanding of trust — historically speaking — may 
become subsumed within a more general, diachronic debate referring 
to the “grand transition” from the pre ‑modern (the realm of pre‑ 
industrial and traditional social organisations) towards highly complex 
social systems of industrialised modernity.26 In this specific context, the 
ideas of trusting and reciprocity have been extensively discussed with 
reference to four dominant themes illustrating the turmoil of cultural 
crisis associated with the aforementioned transition. These discourses 
comprise: (1) the concept of “lonely crowd,” (2) the “iron cage” of 
rationality theme, (3) the discourse of axiological anomie, (4) and the 
“revolt of masses” theme. The concept of trust culture has evolved on 
the critical background of these themes in which it serves as a kind of 
cultural remedy providing a new equilibrium to the otherwise chaotic 
nature of the transformation towards industrialised modernity.27 Let us 
discuss these theoretical applications in greater detail.
David Riesman’s lonely crowd theme is founded upon the idea 
of atrophy inflicting traditional moral communities in the wake of 
modernisation and the rise of mass social organisations.28 This con‑
cept gestures towards the theoretical legacy of Ferdinand Tönnies’s 
formative distinction between emotionally based community (Gemein‑
schaft) and economically rational society (Gesellschaft) which serves as 
a paradigm of social changes resulting in the development of modern 
social orders. This social transformation, to put it synthetically, works 
as a kind of automatic dissolution emotionally ‑based interpersonal 
relationships (typical of the pre ‑modern Gemeinschaft) and the resultant 
rise of individualised society of atomised and interest seeking agents 
24 See Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, p. 88; Barbara Misztal, Trust 
and Cooperation, p. 373.
25 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory, p. 119.
26 Marek S. Szczepański and Kazimierz Krzysztofek, Zrozumieć rozwój: od 
społeczeństw tradycyjnych do informacyjnych (Katowice: Wydawnictwo UŚ, 2002), 
pp. 33—39.
27 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory, pp. 3—7.
28 David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).
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(the Gesellschaft) which takes place as a consequence of modernisation 
processes.29
In the era of lonely crowds, modern social organisations increase 
— which is discussed in the last chapter — demands for civic trust 
whose existence is actualised in the public sphere of voluntary associa‑
tions. In this context, bonds of spontaneous sociability and multilateral 
cooperation function as a vivid source of emotional self ‑organisation, 
a new Gemeinschaft. The role of civil society is especially important in 
post ‑traditional social orders in which the implosion of old interper‑
sonal bonds is in league with the rise of human reflexivity designating 
the ability to form one’s identity, as it were, single ‑handedly out of the 
potentially infinite range of possible life scenarios.
The “iron cage” theme occupies a vast intellectual territory stretch‑
ing from Max Weber’s insights into the nature of modern bureaucracy 
to Zygmunt Bauman’s elaboration of reification conceived as an una‑
voidable coefficient to technological modernization. The term depicts 
the processes of instrumentalization of interpersonal relationships 
that pave the way for a culture which is based upon the destruction 
of human agency and, by extension, human dignity.30 The metaphor 
brings about a dystopian (perhaps even an Orwellian) theme of a ter‑
rorised Self facing the overtly and overly developed machine of modern 
institutions. This idea was aptly reproduced by Anthony Giddens who 
speaks about the “juggernaut of modernity”:
For these images I suggest we should substitute that of the 
juggernaut — a runaway engine of enormous power which, 
collectively as human beings, we can drive to some extent 
but which also threatens to rush out of control and which 
rends itself asunder. […] The juggernaut of modernity is 
not all of one piece, and here the imagery lapses, as does 
any talk of a single path which it runs. It is not an engine 
made up of integrated machinery, but one in which there is 
a tensionful, contradictory, push ‑and ‑pull of different influ‑
ences. Any attempt to capture the experience of modernity 
must begin from this view.31
29 Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Association (London: Routledge and Ka‑
gan Paul, 1955).
30 Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. T. Parsons (New 
York: The Free Press, 1997); Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cam‑
bridge: Polity Press, 1989).
31 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1990), p. 139.
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The image of a runaway engine seems to mingle the opportunity 
and risk sides of modern civilisation. It designates the socio ‑cultural 
formation that intertwines the unprecedented pace of technological 
development with the unpredictable scope of potential catastrophic 
consequences. The ubiquity of risks gives rise to a new kind of trusting 
expectations which, unlike those inscribed in the realm of traditional 
cultures, originate from the proximity of abstract system constituting 
the “iron cage” of (late)modern social systems. Furthermore, this type 
of criticism stresses the importance of trusting relations conceived as 
a form of social relationships that goes far beyond the bureaucratised 
rationale of formal institutions. In this sense, the grammar of trust is 
vital to the cooperation with strangers and Others taking place within 
non ‑institutionalised settings with few formal rules and regulations of 
conduct.
The discourse of normative and axiological anomie — founded by 
the formative text Suicide written by Émile Durkheim — subsumes mo‑
dernity within the idea of moral chaos, the critical loss of equilibrium 
leading to the culture in which common axiology is not complementary 
with accessible means of achieving individual and collective goals.32 
The very idea of anomie, consequently, indicates the essential lack of 
commonly shared moral beliefs. From this perspective, trusting rela‑
tions are seen as being left in a moral no man’s land: relatively stable 
communities undergo a process of dissolution and individuals perceive 
themselves as being placed in an environment that is totally at odds 
with their preconceived ideas, accustomed habits or viewpoints.
Last but not least, there is the theme of the “revolt of the masses,” 
which was initiated by José Ortega y Gasset and later developed by 
Dwight Macdonald. This discourse stresses the negative effect of mas‑
sive urbanisation, industrialisation and the concomitant rise of mass 
society and culture. As a consequence, the rise of mass society seems to 
be tantamount to the demise of sociality and robust trusting relations. 
As Macdonald remarks:
For the masses are in historical time what a crowd is in 
space: large quantity of people unable to express themselves 
as human beings because they are related to one another 
neither as individuals nor as members of communities — 
indeed, they are not related to each other at all, but only to 
something distant, abstract, nonhuman: a football game or 
32 Émile Durkheim, Suicide. A Study in Sociology, trans. J.A. Spaudling (London: 
Routledge, 1951).
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bargain sale in the case of the crowd, a system of industrial 
production, a party or a State in the case of the masses. The 
mass man is a solitary atom, uniform with and undifferenti‑
ated form thousands and millions of other atoms who go 
and make up “the lonely crowd,” as David Riesman well 
calls American society.33
Indeed, the concept of mass culture denotes processes in which sociality 
implodes, as Jean Baudrillard aptly concludes, into the inert and empty 
void of mass society.34 Here, mass society represents an aggregate of 
atomised individuals who become united and socially tied only in the 
framework of media simulation which captures them in opinion polls 
as a politically coherent electorate possibly capable of a constructive ac‑
tion. In this specific context, trusting relations — as scholars elaborating 
on the idea of social capital observe — also implode into the network 
of relations taking place among socially absent individuals interested 
only in mass media events.
The legacy of aforementioned discourses has paved the way for 
a theoretical frameworks and models aiming to delineate stable foun‑
dations of trusting relations conceived in terms of all ‑encompassing 
moral obligations of cultural descent. Hence, trust cultures are seen as 
systemic phenomena comprising of five interrelated social and cultural 
processes.35 First of all, this is the normative coherence which — after 
the fashion of Durkheimian studies on anomie — depicts a feeling of 
existential security experienced as a consequence of expectations that 
other people would follow pre ‑existent norms or orientate themselves 
at well ‑known values. The second factor contributing to the rise of 
positive trust cultures is the stability of socio ‑cultural systems which 
is experienced when “the network of groups, associations, institutions, 
organisations, and regimes is long ‑lasting, persistent, and continuous.”36 
The counterpoint here is the notion of insecurity associated with a radi‑
cal and traumatic change which destabilises many sectors of society, 
disrupting daily routines and making life less predictable. The third 
factor is related to the transparency of cultural institutions. In order 
to vest trust in other actors, individuals must rely on information 
33 Dwight Macdonald, A Theory of Mass Culture, in Critical Theory and Popular 
Culture, ed. J. Storey (London: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 32.
34 See J.S. Epstein and M.J. Epstein, Fatal Forms: Toward a (Neo)Formal Sociologi‑
cal Theory of Media Culture in Baudrillard. A Critical Reader, ed. D. Kellner (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1994), pp. 140—142.
35 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory, pp. 122—125.
36 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory, p. 122.
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concerning their cultural habitat — they need to understand the cul‑
tural meaningfulness of supposedly naturalised and obvious actions 
or ritual interactions. The fourth dimension refers to the familiarity 
of social world: in the mass society of solitary strangers, in the urban 
sea of indifferent strangers, it is difficult to place well ‑informed bets of 
trust. The last factor gestures towards the accountability of other people 
and institutions — distrust becomes a logical response to situations 
in which others’ actions are perceived as arbitrary and completely 
coincidental.
A Variety of Trust Theories  
and the Rip Van Winkle Effect
Philosophically speaking, modern conceptualisations of trust seem to 
spring from criticisms directed against the Hobbesian conceptualisation 
of human nature and his idea on the origins of sociality and political 
organisations. As early as in the era of the Enlightenment, the philo‑
sophical circle of the Scottish Moralists predicted that the productivity 
of post ‑feudal social organisations could not only be anchored in the 
panoptical authority of the state conceived as the ultimate regulator 
of social life. The emergent philosophical and political discourses of 
European modernity — as the second chapter of this thesis wishes to 
elaborate upon — attempt to delineate social orders of modernity in 
terms of aggregated networks of civic engagement regulated by the vir‑
tue of “mutual benevolence” constituting, as it were, a moral equivalent 
of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” of free market capitalism. The quality 
of mutual benevolence, in turn, was conceived as a moral virtue which 
is similar to the contemporary conceptualisation of interpersonal trust 
conceived as the core value of civic culture and a factor taking part in 
the creation democratic regimes. From this perspective, theories of trust 
are vital for academic discourses attempting to “convert the Hobbesian 
state of nature from something that is nasty, brutish, and short, into 
something that is more pleasant, more efficient, and altogether more 
peaceful.”37
The idea of trust, as far as contemporary academic discourses are 
concerned, should be regarded in terms of a nebular field of interrelated 
37 Kenneth Newton, “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy,” In‑
ternational Political Science Review 22, no. 2 (2001), p. 202.
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and intersecting paradigms. This concept has permeated diverse dis‑
ciplines in the humanities in which it serves as a conceptual category 
facilitating our understanding of dilemmas referring to the intrinsic 
mechanisms governing the social order in modern, multicultural 
democracies. In this specific context, the variety of theories of trust 
may be represented by three closely intertwined discourses: (1) the 
concept of civic culture, (2) the idea of civil society, (3) economic and 
sociological studies concerning social capital.38
The theoretical perspectives on the notion of trust are related to the 
cultural conceptualisation of democratic regimes conceived in terms of 
civic agency and citizenship. Trusting relations (as well as the whole 
constellation of related terms including such concepts as mutuality, 
empathy, reciprocity, solidarity, toleration and fraternity) are very often 
subsumed within the discourse of civic activism.39 Consequently, the 
notions of civic culture and civil society have been coined in order to 
provide conceptualisations of cultural underpinnings of contemporary 
democratic orders. A fully fledged democracy, as Giddens observes, 
depends on “the fostering of a strong civic culture which emphasises 
trust, mutual obligation, equal worth and responsibility.”40 In this 
specific context, the idea of policymaking is not only represented by 
the matrix of institutional and systemic phenomena — such as legal‑ 
rational mechanisms of state bureaucracies — but, first and foremost, 
by the agential commitment to common values indicating moral pe‑
rimeters of trust among citizens participating in the construction of 
democratic order.41
From this perspective, the concepts of civic culture and civil society 
have gained universal acclaim in the wake of pro ‑democratic move‑
ments as well as anti ‑communist revolutions that permeated Eastern 
and Central Europe. What was glimpsed after the collapse of com‑
munist systems (and the concomitant “Soviet Bloc mentalities”) was 
a need for the re ‑creation of cultural foundations of democracy. The 
idea standing behind this assumption stressed the impossibility of 
implementing a fully ‑fledged democratic order only by means of pro‑
moting changes in political institutions, without introducing elements 
of a robust civic culture. It means that virtues of democracy cannot 
be left behind in a societal no man’s land: their functioning depends 
on the creation of a peculiar arena of interpersonal discourse which 
38 Cf. Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory, pp. 7—9.
39 See Newton, “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy,” p. 203.
40 Anthony Giddens, The Runaway World (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 95.
41 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little Brown, 1965).
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is relatively independent from state institutions and free markets. As 
a consequence, the concept of trust was subsumed under the notion 
of civil society conceived as a moral tissue of mutually reciprocated 
solidarity, an area of civic learning where cultural values of democratic 
regime may flourish. As Jeffrey C. Alexander comments on the moral 
aspect of civil society:
Civil society is the arena of social solidarity that is defined 
in universalistic terms. It is the we ‑ness of a national com‑
munity, the feeling of connectedness to one another that 
transcends particular commitments, loyalties, and interests 
and allows there to emerge a single thread of identity among 
otherwise disparate people.42
In this sense, trust emerges as a moral resource as well as a remedy 
for cultural problems (riddles of collective policymaking) associated 
with the implementation (and reproduction) of axiological foundations 
of democratic orders. Consequently, trust remains a vital element of 
civic culture: it is perceived as a kind of moral resource facilitating 
the creation of the public good and minimising the risk of free riding. 
Since public goods are, by definition, collective utilities beneficial to 
all citizens, their accumulation requires robust trusting expectations 
stating that no individual would restrain themselves from participating 
in this corporate endeavour.
The idea of trust becomes central to various studies dedicated to 
the concept of social capital. The term denotes the productivity — both 
economic and political — of interpersonal social ties and recipro‑
cal obligations. Moreover, the theory of social capital has helped to 
bridge the gap between individual, subjectively assessed perception 
of self ‑interest as well as the collective objectives significant for the 
development of a whole community. The ability to present oneself as 
a trustworthy person is constructive and productive as far as networks 
of social interactions are concerned: it promotes the culture of general‑
ised reciprocity whose stocks can be accumulated in a similar fashion 
to economic capital on the marketplace.43 The theory of social capital, 
to put it otherwise, indicates that trusting relations and robust trust 
cultures are not only purely axiological, moral phenomena. On the 
contrary, they represent hard ‑working and active forces engaged in 
42 Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Citizen and Enemy as Symbolic Classification: On the 
Polarizing Discourse of Civil Society,” in Cultivating Differences, eds. M. Lamont, 
M. Fournier (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), p. 2.
43 See John Field, Social Capital (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).
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shaping political, economic, and technological environments. As James 
S. Coleman comments on the practical and collective value of social 
capital:
Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, 
making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its 
absence would not be possible. […] Unlike other forms of 
capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations be‑
tween actors and among actors. It is not lodged either in the 
actors themselves or in physical implements of production.44
The accumulation of social capital is, therefore, deeply inscribed in the 
propensity of a culture to produce long ‑lasting and mutual bonds of 
solidarity and reciprocity. In other words, stocks of social capital are 
anchored in trust cultures as the generalised potentiality to vest trust 
in the Other. As a consequence, the theory of social capital seems to 
debunk the Marxist assumption concerning the formative character of 
the economic base over the cultural superstructure. It is the cultural 
propensity of trusting that function as a factor determining the struc‑
ture of economic relations.
The discourse of trust is indicative of a whole array of processes and 
phenomena associated with the development of modern democracies 
which could be conceived as moral communities founded upon the 
existence of horizontal social ties representing implicit reservoirs of in‑
terpersonal solidarity and loyalty. However, a democratic order is, first 
and foremost, forged by civic activism, the ability of self ‑governance 
and self ‑regulation typical of a community united by a shared perim‑
eter of values. This is especially postulated by the tradition of “civic 
republicanism” which “underscores the idea of citizenship as a mode 
of social agency within the context of pluralistic interests.”45 In this 
context, robust trust cultures and emergent social capitals become 
transformed into the potential of undertaking collective actions aiming 
at the revival of public sphere and the renewal of political institutions.
Let us take a closer look at the springy resilience with which 
American communities of the Early National and Revolutionary 
Period bounced back from the inertia of the bygone colonial years. 
What became significant of that times was the unparallel ability of 
societal self ‑organisation and social activism combined with the qual‑
44 James S. Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” Ameri‑
can Journal of Sociology 94 (supplement) (1988), p. 98.
45 Peter Dahlgren, “Doing Citizenship. The Cultural Origins of Civic Agency 
in the Public Sphere,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 9, no. 3 (2006), p. 269.
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ity of moral revival rendering axiological coherence to an aggregate 
of otherwise disinterested and indifferent individuals. This “Rip Van 
Winkle” effect — to put it in nomenclatures of contemporary theo‑
ries — becomes related to the creation of stable trust cultures: passive 
subjects of the Queen began to recognise themselves in terms of active 
citizens, autonomous agents whose multilateral cooperation (reinforced 
by norms of reciprocity) paved the way for a new social order as well 
as a new nation.46 In this sense, the process can be perceived in terms 
of a spontaneous outburst of civic agency in which active citizens 
are the primary cultural actors performing their roles on the stage of 
deliberative policymaking. As Peter Dahlgren observes:
While nobody anticipates that all citizens will become em‑
bodiments of republican virtues, there are no doubt different 
levels of anticipation as well as different notions as to what 
portion of citizenry needs to manifest such virtues in order 
to constitute a critical mass — in different societies and at 
various points in history.47
This spontaneous cascade of civic activism — the “Rip Van Winkle 
effect” — represents the reservoir of social agency which is construc‑
tive as far as social change is concerned. In this sense, networks of 
civic cooperation and solidarity constitute a powerful moral resource 
which acts as a bottom ‑up process of cultural change. The virtues of 
citizenship, to put it otherwise, constitute a critical mass of civic agency 
manifesting itself as a major factor of history ‑making.
The Interplay Between Trust and Uncertainty:  
Two Theoretical Perspectives
The theory of trust remains closely related to diverse discourses of 
uncertainty and risk. From this perspective, the social effectiveness of 
trusting relations is determined by the ability to provide specific solu‑
46 Washington Irving, Rip Van Winkle, in The Norton Anthology of American 
Literature, eds. N. Baym, W. Franklin (New York: Norton and Company, 1994), 
pp. 897—909.
47 Dahlgren, “Doing Citizenship. The Cultural Origins of Civic Agency in the 
Public Sphere,” p. 270.
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tions concerning problems of uncertainty encountered in daily routines 
of individuals.48 The attitude of trust fulfils its palliative function with 
reference to the observed complexity and unpredictability of external 
world. To trust means, consequently, to bracket off risks and contingen‑
cies of everyday life. As Deborah Lupton observes:
Trust presupposes awareness of risk, offering reliability 
in the face of contingent outcomes and thereby serving to 
minimise concern about possible risk.49
This explanatory relation between trust as well as uncertainty consti‑
tutes the common denominator of cultural and sociological approaches 
purporting to conceptualise risk awareness from the perspective of 
humanist methodologies. Discourses on uncertainty can be conceptu‑
ally divided into two dominant theoretical frameworks: 1) the cultural 
perspective represented first and foremost of a cultural anthropologist 
Mary Douglas, and 2) macro ‑sociological theories devised by Ulrich 
Beck and Anthony Giddens.50
The central idea of the cultural perspective on uncertainty suggests 
that risk perception could be perceived as a cultural mechanism foster‑
ing axiological orders by means of delineating conceptual, normative 
and axiological boundaries between the realms of Sameness and Other‑
ness. From this essentially functionalist perspective, moral distinctions 
are perceived as being derived from the boundary between human 
body and the world of external objects. In other words, Douglas’ 
cultural standpoint is based upon seeing the body as a model of any 
social system, including a body politic:
The body is a model which can stand for any bounded sys‑
tem. Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are 
threatened or precarious. The body is a complex structure. 
The function of its different parts and their relation afford 
a source of symbols for other complex structures.51
48 See especially Niklas Luhmann, “Familiarity, confidence, trust: problems 
and alternatives,” in Trust: Making and Breaking Corporate Relations, ed. D. Gambetta 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory; Niklas Luh‑
mann, Risk. A Sociological Theory (New Brunswick and London: Aldine Transaction 
Publishers, 2005).
49 Deborah Lupton, Risk (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 78.
50 Lupton, Risk, pp. 24—25.
51 See Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and 
Taboo (London: Routledge, 1969), p. 115.
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In this sense, uncertainty, risk and danger are basic elements of the 
human experience as well as individuals’ preoccupation with the 
integrity of their bodies and personalities. Problems of risk, by means 
of analogy, permeate social systems which are also regarded as being 
threatened by external dangers inflicting their moral (probably also 
functional) integrity. Much traditional as it may sound, this type of 
rationality is also typical of the contemporary cultural lexicon whose 
main function is to re ‑invent and re ‑define traditional concepts of taboo 
morality and represent them in a forensic discourse linking technologi‑
cal hazards with moral blame. 
The idea of risk could have been custom ‑made. Its universal‑
ising terminology, its abstractness, its power condensation, 
its scientificity, its connection with objective analysis, make 
it perfect. Above all, its forensic uses fit the tool to the task 
of building a culture that supports a modern industrial 
society.52
The aforementioned forensic use of technological hazards makes un‑
certainty a powerful tool of social and political criticism oriented at 
contemporary corporate cultures. In this context, the cultural theory 
of risk predicts the emergence of “green political movements” and the 
associated ecological discourse which uses the concept of uncertainty 
in order to wage an ideological war against entrepreneurs and gov‑
ernment regulatory bodies responsible for the devastation of natural 
resources.53 Consequently, members of environmentalist movements 
consider corporations and hierarchies of political authority in terms 
of the Other whose immoral, irresponsible behaviour causes that “risks 
unleashed by the fathers are visited on the heads of their children, 
even to the nth generation.”54 Risk awareness becomes perceived as 
a strategy of achieving moral cohesion and solidarity among environ‑
mentalist communities whose integrity becomes safeguarded by the 
forensic mechanism of blaming the Other. 
The cultural perspective on risk brings the theory of uncertainty 
and the discourse of trust (conceived here as a root of political activ‑
ism) within one interpretative horizon. Social experience of uncertainty 
52 Mary Douglas, Risk and Blame. Essays in Cultural Theory (London: Routledge, 
1992), p. 15.
53 Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture. An Essay on the Selec‑
tion of Environmental and Technological Dangers (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1983).
54 Douglas, Risk and Blame, p. 26.
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becomes a way of legitimising moral and political principles typical of 
a given community. What follows is a form of a cultural feedback loop: 
norms of solidarity and reciprocity are crystallised around commonly 
shared political objectives which, in turn, arise from the perception 
that actions triggered by the Other may destabilise cultural axiology 
inherent in a particular community.
The European perspective on uncertainty — developed almost 
simultaneously by Beck and Giddens — is concerned with the 
macro‑structural as systemic nature of social change, rather than 
micro‑structural and messo ‑structural processes of political activ‑
ism. The theoretical scope of this approach refers to both trust and 
uncertainty as experiential correlates to the great transition that 
is currently taking place within the established orders of Western 
modernity. The categories are automatically subsumed within the 
purely evaluative reflection on modernisation and its consequences 
for agents conceived both collectively (societies, nation states, cor‑
porations) or individually. The main aim of these theories is, then, 
to provide a conceptual framework for — or its phenomenology, as 
Giddens postulates — the late industrial era in which risk is seen in 
terms of the globalisation and overt institutionalisation of negative 
consequences of the enlightened discourse of modernity. Hence, risk, 
as Beck proclaims, becomes:
[A] systemic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities 
induced and introduced by modernisation itself. Risks, as 
opposed to older dangers, are consequences which relate to 
the threatening force of modernisation and to its globalisa‑
tion of doubt. They are politically reflexive.55
This concept, consequently, is related to the notion of “reflexive 
modernisation” stressing political and discursive mechanisms which 
conceptualise uncertainties and contingencies as side products of social 
development, negative consequences of naïve optimism vested in the 
postulates of scientific objectivism and imperative of progress.
Furthermore, Beck and Giddens purport to conceptualise the era 
of late modernity in terms of individualisation processes resulting in 
the creation of a new model of “reflexive biography” responding to 
processes of uprooting traditional, structural constraints of human 
agency. The individualisation process gives rise to “the disintegration 
of certainties of industrial society as well as the compulsion to find 
55 Beck, Risk Society, p. 21.
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and invent new certainties for oneself and others without them.”56 
The advent of late modernity — to put it otherwise — gives rise to 
a condition of “cultural disembeddedness” in which an acting agent 
becomes deprived of existential support rendered by collective cultural 
phenomena. As opposed to the pre ‑modern social order, in which 
agents are reflexively entangled within pre ‑existent requirements of 
culture, the cultural order of late modernity paves the way for the 
agential conceptualisation of human biographies. As a result — as it 
is stressed later in this dissertation — it is tantamount to the demise 
of standardised identities which were crystallised around class, gender 
or race commitments:
Seen from one angle it means freedom to choose, and from 
another pressure to conform to internalised demands, on the 
one hand being responsible for yourself and on the other 
being dependent on conditions which completely elude your 
grasp.57
As a consequence, the process of individualisation postulates the re‑ 
construction of human biographies on the foundations of relatively free 
choice and agential reflexivity. However, on the other hand, the process 
is related with new forms of psychological vulnerability.
The theoretical multiplicity of uncertainty and trust theories — to 
conclude these introductory remarks — is inscribed in the functional 
complexity of modern societies in which problems of multicultural 
policymaking are in league with the increased societal sensitiveness 
to uncertainties of everyday life. Hence, trusting relations are usually 
perceived as functional elements of civil societies in which they may 
serve as a vital component of social capital facilitating collective actions 
and civic activism. A positive culture of trust is, in turn, indicative 
of the “Rip Van Winkle effect” describing a cascade of civic agency 
facilitating the re ‑construction of public spheres.
56 Beck, “The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Mod‑
ernisation,” in Reflexive Modernisation: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern 
Social Order, eds. U. Beck, A. Giddens, S. Lash (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 14.
57 Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck ‑Gernsheim, The Normal Chaos of Love (Cam‑
bridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 7.
Chapter Two
Agency and Structure in the Discourse  
of Cultural Studies
Now is my way clear, now is the meaning plain;
Temptation shall not come in this kind again.
The last temptation is the greatest treason:
To do the right deed for the wrong reason.1
The problem of human autonomy is far and away one of the most 
inspiring issues within the humanities. Not only does it constitute an 
organising principle within a number of taxonomies referring to social 
and cultural theories, but it also provides scholars with an opportunity 
to leave behind well ‑entrenched dilemmas of ontology as well as epis‑
temology for the sake of insights into the ethics of human subjectivity. 
The array of moral considerations referring to the notion of autonomous 
and knowledgeable choices can be subsumed within the binary opposi‑
tion between agency and structure designating contradictory processes 
of morphogenesis and structural determination. Individuals, therefore, 
are perceived as fragile and wavering entities whose agency seems 
to reside the “no man’s land” between the realm of social as well as 
cultural constraints and, on the other hand, their innate willingness 
to take action.
In this context, the potential to “do the right deed for the wrong 
reason” seems, as Thomas Stearns Eliot teaches us, to be profoundly 
intertwined within the basic construction of human selfhood in which 
agential drives to act are faced with structurally defined constraints 
and necessities. As opposed to commonsensical views on the mat‑
ter, the emergent cultural theory of morality is not anchored in the 
sphere of external moral constraints and the concomitant mechanisms 
1 Thomas Stearns Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), 
p. 47.
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of structural determination of human action. Morality remains deeply 
rooted in the faculty of an actor’s agency as well as reflexivity. It springs 
from the subjective motivation and applied hermeneutic strategies (or 
heuristics) facilitating the interpretation of ethical prerogatives. As 
a consequence, the initial act of commitment to values becomes a neces‑
sary but not sufficient condition of moral actions. What is more crucial 
is the motivation to comply with the interpersonal sphere of axiological 
regulations as well as an initial act of reflection about commonly shared 
norms and values.
Hence, the resultant “ethics of motivation” revolves around 
a premise designating human agency as being endowed with the 
capability of transgressing the boundaries of structurally reinforced 
morality by means of undermining or subverting imperatives implicit 
in pre ‑existent axiological and normative structures. In other words, 
the initial act of subordinating oneself to the external imperatives of 
ethical descent may turn morally ambiguous since it is the agential 
suspension of obedience2 with reference to the structural that actualises 
or, contrariwise, subverts the pre ‑existent axiological imperatives. To 
put it still otherwise, complying with the structural must run paral‑
lel with the faculty of free will in order not to leave an individual 
marooned in the ethical void.
The aim of this purely methodological chapter is to observe the 
theoretical legacies of sociology and cultural studies from the perspec‑
tive of an interplay between theories accentuating relative autonomy of 
human agency as well as conceptualisations based upon the postulate 
of structural determinism. Furthermore, in order to search for a more 
holistic ontology of human subjectivity, the chapter will refer to meth‑
odologies attempting to reconcile structuralism (and functionalism) as 
well as culturalism under the common denominator of contemporary 
sociological theories stressing the agential ‑structural duality.
The Ontology of Human Subjectivity
Theses attempting to delineate the ontology of socio ‑cultural realities 
presuppose anthropological and ethical postulates concerning both the 
origins of human subjectivity as well as its relation to Other(ness). It is 
2 See Sławek, U ‑Bywać. Człowiek, świat, przyjaźń w twórczości Williama 
Blake’a (Katowice: Wydawnictwo UŚ, 2001), p. 126.
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discernible in a great number of discourses purporting to combine so‑
cial ontology with the concepts of free will and responsibility. Needless 
to say, theoretical insights into social realities cannot be perceived as 
being totally neutral as far as their ethical and social ramifications are 
concerned. In this particular context, methodologies of the empirical 
humanities seem to be subjected to the rule of indeterminacy which, 
as Werner Heisenberg postulates, dissolves the rational confidence in 
a research worker as an unbiased spectator endowed with a comfortable 
vantage point from which the scrutinised reality could be observed and 
assessed without a risk of subjective short ‑sightedness.3 As opposed to 
the exact sciences, in which the indeterminacy principle is assumed 
as an epistemological premise, the humanities remain indebted to its 
basic postulates in statements referring to the ontology of the con‑
structed, socio ‑cultural world. In the latter context, the very idea of 
indeterminacy seems to diffuse the ontological grounds for the most 
cherished premise of positivist methodologies — the subject ‑object 
dichotomy. Not only does the presence of a scholar pose a threat to 
the objectivity of research procedures, but it also affects the reality 
which is being studied. By the same token, individuals assuming roles 
of the target objects of observation and theoretical exploration always 
remain responsive and reflexively entangled within the very process 
of cognition. Scholars, thus, are no longer comfortably withdrawn from 
the object of studies: their work becomes reciprocated and reflected by 
the socio ‑cultural reality. In other words, the very ability to understand 
the socio ‑cultural world remains susceptible to the formative, struc‑
turing presence of the Other; it is dependable upon the existence of 
“phenomena which are already constituted as meaningful.”4
Cognitive processes indicated by the introduction of Heisenberg’s 
postulate seem to intersect with the repudiation of the Cartesian cogito 
conceptualised in terms of a detached observer (and a creator) of the 
external reality. In this specific context, contemporary debates over the 
enigma of the subject stem from the legacy of critical conceptualisa‑
tions referring to the Cartesian model of human subjectivity.5 Many 
critical theories have aimed to re ‑conceptualise, to use Max Weber’s 
3 Werner Heisenberg, The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory (New York: 
Dover Publications, 1949); see also Stanisław Ossowski, O osobliwościach nauk 
społecznych (Warszawa: PWN, 1983), pp. 183—185.
4 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Struc‑
turation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), p. 284.
5 Wojciech Kalaga, Nebulae of Discourse. Interpretation, Textuality and the Sub‑
ject (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, New York, Paris, Wien: Peter Lang, 1997), 
pp. 157—159.
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terminology, the “ideal type” of a solipsistic and coherent agent whom 
cognitive capacities situate in a position of antecedence with regard to 
the external reality:
[T]he subject is constituted in the Cogito ergo sum, where sum 
renders a being anterior to the reality perceived and thought 
by it, a reified individual, an origin and sole source of its 
own conscious action, complete in its unity and coherence.6
Interestingly enough, the pristine formula of Cartesian subjectivity 
seems to pay its theoretical debts to the medieval concepts of homun‑
culi perceived in terms of idealised representations of human agents 
by followers of the alchemy.7 Such abstract marionettes, however, are 
not placed in the flow of social experiences. Consequently, they become 
deprived of their own identities as well as biographies, and do not 
possess any conceivable mode of existence than the experimental situ‑
ations conceived entirely by an alchemist who has previously brought 
them to life.
This dissolution or displacement of the Cartesian conceptualisa‑
tion of human subjectivity (or agency) implies, first and foremost, that 
the inherently human potentiality of self ‑perfection and completion 
becomes actualised due to the formative, structuring presence of the 
Other. An agent becomes subdued to a “decentring and communicative 
vision in which the self becomes completed and perfected through 
the process of intersubjectivity, that is through ‘social relationship of 
communion and reciprocity.’”8 In a way, the solipsistic cogito remains 
somehow disabled; it represents a shadow of a man, rather than 
a living person. This implies that the individual cannot possibly exist 
beyond bonds of the interpersonal. The egocentric consciousness of the 
Cartesian subject becomes socialised and, as it were, returned to the 
field of the interpersonal and the dialogical which is fraught with the 
multiplicity of voices as well as cognitive perspectives. In this sense, to 
come back to Heisenberg’s ideas one more time, an act of observing the 
Other becomes instantaneously reciprocated by the Other’s responsive 
and formative counter ‑gaze. Such an essentially humanistic perspective 
on the ontology of human subjectivity implies the critical premise that, 
to recall Paul Ricoeur’s words, “the selfhood of oneself implies other‑
6 Kalaga, Nebulae of Discourse, p. 157.
7 Alfred Schütz, Collected Papers: The Problem of Social Reality (The Hague: Mar‑
tinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 59.
8 Ewa Borkowska, At the Threshold of Mystery. Poetic Encounters with Other(ness) 
(Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, New York, Paris, Wien: Peter Lang, 2005), p. 57.
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ness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought without 
the other.”9
The process of dissolving the abstract unity of the Cartesian subject 
may be perceived through the lenses of symbolic ‑interactive theories 
whose intellectual background renders making a leap towards the 
dichotomy of structure and agency possible. In this context, the centre 
of cognitive gravity may be attributed to systematic inquiries into the 
origins of human subjectivity which itself is conceived as an element 
entangled within the communicative structures of societal interaction. 
Hence, the aforementioned ideas of perfection and completion sug‑
gest a dynamic model of the Self which finds its actualisation in the 
sphere of interactive processes. Having assumed a cognitive, inherently 
symbolic nature of the Self, George Herbert Mead asserts that attempts 
at abstracting the Ego from the field of the Other would imply the 
construction of hypostases as untenable as squaring of the circle:
The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, 
but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other 
individual members of the same social group, or from the 
generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to 
which he belongs. For he enters his own experience as a self 
or individual, not directly or immediately, not by becoming 
a subject to himself, but only in so far as he first becomes an 
object to himself just as other individuals are object to him 
or in his experience; and he becomes an object to himself 
only by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward 
himself within a social environment or context of experience 
and behaviour in which both he and they are involved.10
From the perspective of symbolic ‑interactive theories, an autonomous, 
reflective agent becomes simultaneously reflexive, that is responsive to 
the structuring presence of the Other. The act of self ‑cognition logically 
presupposes the figure of the Other whose presence is formative as far 
as an agent’s self ‑knowledge is concerned. In this context, consequently, 
the Self is conceived as a cognitive capability existing in statu nascendi, 
in the inter ‑subjective process consisting of relations of interpersonal 
communication and reciprocity. The Self can be represented as a se‑
ries of symbolic processes assuming the relation between an active, 
 9 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. K. Blamey (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 3.
10 George Herbert Mead, “The Self, the I and the Me,” in Social Theory. The Mul‑
ticultural and Classic Readings, ed. C. Lemert (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), p. 221.
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perceptually oriented as well as reflective agent and the socialised 
looking ‑glass of the Other. Needless to say, such a dialogical construc‑
tion undermines the initial conceptualisation of the subject (the cogito) 
which — to follow contemporary attempts at dismantling the Cartesian 
subject — becomes debunked by the fact that “the idea of myself ap‑
pears profoundly transformed, due to my recognizing this Other, who 
causes the presence in me of its own representation.”11
The idea suggesting that an agent and agency are completed in 
the processes of societal interaction is deeply rooted in the history of 
philosophy. Its origins can be traced as far back as to the Aristotelian 
concept of zoon politikon — the resident of the interpersonal whose 
emotional, cognitive and personal development is determined by a pre‑ 
existent social surrounding.12 Such a relation of societal determination, 
to express its significance in the nomenclature typical of the symbolic‑ 
interactive theories, rests upon the presence of myriads of “significant 
others” who inscribe themselves upon a personality interacting with 
them. However, the role of personality ‑formation can be realised by the 
sphere of cultural phenomena and products which, as Roman Ingarden 
observes, retain the capability to mould individuals who are regarded 
as participants in culture.13
Such a post ‑Cartesian conceptualisation, nevertheless, seems to bear 
traces of generic relatedness to the contemporary attempts at disman‑
tling the internal coherence of the Self which becomes either dissolved 
in the field of the Other or is perceived as an internally diversified entity 
whose coherence implodes into the multiplicity of symbolic references 
constituting “[the] immense dictionary from which he draws.”14 These 
radical (post)structuralist or post ‑modern viewpoints have permeated 
the field of cultural studies and evoked the profound incredulity in 
human subjectivity conceived as the major source of agential drives. 
The standpoint is best represented by Catherine Belsey’s definition of 
human subjectivity:
“Identity,” subjectivity is thus a matrix of subject positions, 
which may be inconsistent or even in contradiction with one 
another. Subjectivity, then, is linguistically and discursively 
constructed and displaced across the range of discourses in 
11 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 9.
12 Jerzy Szacki, Historia myśli socjologicznej (Warszawa: PWN, 2004), pp. 28—29.
13 Roman Ingarden, Książeczka o człowieku (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 
1972), p. 37.
14 See Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in Modern Criticism and 
Theory: A Reader, ed. D. Lodge (London and New York: Longman, 1998), p. 170.
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which the concrete individual participates. […] The subject 
is constructed in language and discourse and, since the 
symbolic order in its discursive use is closely related to 
ideology, in ideology.15
Although the idea of disintegration is also evoked in symbolic ‑interactive 
theories, its realisation does not seem to postulate the ultimate dis‑
solution of human subjectivity. Paradoxically enough, Mead’s notion 
of the Self seems to enable the reconciliation of agency (and human 
subjectivity) with the structural. It is possible due to the assumption 
postulating that the Ego is actually constituted in the process of 
multilateral interpersonal interactions in which it may assume a form 
of a great collection of elements constituting the multiple personality 
(homo multiplex). This internalised disorder of human personality, to 
put the idea in a more philological manner, manifests itself as two 
intelligible substrata of human personality that become represented in 
language by the subject pronoun “I” and the object pronoun “Me.”16 
From this perspective, the subjective “I ‑self” retains the essential quali‑
ties of reflexivity as well as self ‑consciousness and can be represented, 
to use the language of contemporary psychology, as an ability to gaze 
into the internal universe of innermost experiences. The socially ob‑
jectified “Me ‑self,” in turn, represents the structuring presence of the 
Other which actualises itself as an ability to apprehend oneself from 
the perspective of different individuals. Nevertheless, a similar idea 
is conveyed by the concept of “the looking ‑glass self” developed by 
Charles Horton Cooley:
In a very large and interesting class of cases, the social refer‑
ence takes the form of a somewhat definite imagination of 
how one’s self — that is any idea he appropriates — appears 
in a particular mind, and the kind of self ‑feeling one has is 
determined by the attitude toward that other mind. A social 
self of this sort might be called the reflected or looking ‑glass 
self.17
15 Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London and New York: Routledge, 1980), 
p. 61. Quoted after W. Kalaga, “Culture and Signification,” in Britishness and Cul‑
tural Studies. Continuity and Change in Narrating the Nation, eds. K. Knauer, S. Murray 
(Katowice: Wydawnictwo Śląsk, 2000), p. 65.
16 Mead, “The Self, the I and the Me,” pp. 224—225.
17 Charles H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1930). Quoted after C. Lemert, ed. Social Theory. The Multicultural 
and Classic Readings (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), p. 185.
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This formative encounter with Other(ness) conveys an idea that reaches 
further into the abstract, than the process of assuming relations with 
different, personalised individuals. The Other seldom reveals itself as 
a tangible, individualised person. Its influence is experienced indirectly 
as an impact of collective social aggregates, such as overwhelming social 
masses, social and linguistic structures, and institutionalised apparat‑ 
uses. The same, however, is true for the Self: one may refer to signs and 
traces of the Ego which are communicated towards the sphere of the 
Other, such as particular acts of creative agency, actions or thoughts. 
Being a variation of the traditional dichotomy separating the internal 
from the external, the opposition between the Self and the Other can 
be represented as the antinomy between agency and structure.
Much central to the discourse of the contemporary cultural studies 
as it may be,18 the binary opposition of structure ‑agency does not pose 
a new dilemma in the humanities. It stems from the dialectic of objec‑
tivity and subjectivity that finds its direct predecessors, as far as the 
theoretical legacy of cultural studies is concerned, in the Durkheimian 
and de Saussurean traditions of structuralism and the Husserlean and 
Weberian schools of historicism and hermeneutic.19 Approached from 
a different perspective, the antinomy may be translated into two differ‑
ent methodological options.20 First of all, this is a model that explains 
individual actions and social practices by means of structural condi‑
tions of their occurrence. The second possibility, contrariwise, refers to 
socio ‑cultural structures as enigmatic and obscure entities which can 
be explained due to the systematic analysis of human actions.
The Theoretical Multiplicity within Cultural Studies
When approached from a perspective of traditional methodologies, 
cultural studies are often regarded as an eclectic and nebular field 
comprising a number of intersecting paradigms, viewpoints and po‑
litical interests, rather than a unified and homogeneous theory. This 
18 See Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms,” in Media, Culture and 
Society. A Critical Reader, eds. R. Collins et al. (London: Sage Publications, 1986), 
pp. 33—48.
19 Andrew Milner and Jeff Browitt, Contemporary Cultural Theory. An Introduc‑
tion (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 22—24.
20 Sztompka, Society in Action. The Theory of Social Becoming (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1991), pp. 3—4.
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evident heteroglossia implicit in the British and American cultural 
studies seems to emanate from the post ‑modern penchant for the insti‑
tutionalised plurality as well as deregulation which, in turn, gives rise 
to methodological pursuits enabling the transgression of established 
academic discourses.21 In a way, the discipline becomes indicative of 
the “decentralised concentration,” to use Manuel Castells’s apt, yet 
oxymoronic phrase denoting the model of social organisation and its 
dominant mode of production in the age of information society.22
The rhizome ‑like, essentially deregulated and heterogeneous char‑
acter of cultural studies seems to spring from the structural conditions 
embodied in the framework of the networked society. From a methodo‑
logical point of view, the discipline remains devoid of its epistemologi‑
cal centre of gravity and rests upon the possibility of amalgamating 
diverse discourses (each founded upon dissimilar methodologies and 
theoretical premises) under the label of the shared subject matter. 
Consequently, the condition of academic knowledge in the reality of 
information society gives rise to “baggy monsters”23 — networked and 
fluid discursive formations that know no sense of hierarchy since from 
the onset are designed as constellations of cognitive tools which seem 
equally valid in the process of unveiling socio ‑cultural realities. In this 
context, the realm of cultural studies could be subsumed within the 
possibility of constructing an intelligible “discourse about discourses,” 
to recall Michel Foucault’s phrase.24
Despite the epistemological polyphony of cultural studies, it is still 
possible to delineate its internal structure. Cultural studies are defined 
as “the social science of the study of the production, distribution, ex‑
change and reception of textualised meanings.”25 From the perspective 
of the definition cited above, there is little doubt that the discipline has 
been designed to cope with problems constituted at the intersection 
of culture, social systems and politics. In this way, cultural studies 
respond to a broad spectrum of issues referring both the functioning of 
21 Frederick Jameson, “Postmodernism and Consumer Society,” in The Cultural 
Turn. Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983 ‑1998, ed. F. Jameson (London and 
New York: Verso, 1999), pp. 2—3.
22 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 
p. 502.
23 See Claire Hobbs, “Perspectives on Culture and Cultural Studies,” in British‑
ness and Cultural Studies. Continuity and Change in Narrating the Natio, eds. K. Knau‑
er, S. Murray (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Śląsk, 2000), p. 47.
24 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan ‑Smith 
(London: Tavistock, 1974), p. 205.
25 Andrew Milner, Re ‑Imagining Cultural Studies: The Promise of Cultural Mate‑
rialism (London: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 5.
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social institutions (mass media broadcasters, political regulatory bod‑
ies, public and private education) as well as problems addressing the 
construction of knowledge by means of interpersonal communication 
and practices of signification. In other words, cultural studies reflect 
socio ‑cognitive processes through which individuals make sense of 
their social reality by way of constructing textual devices.
When approached from a methodological point of view, cultural 
studies are divided into two dominant modes of explanation (the 
structuralist and the culturalist) which, in turn, translate themselves 
into the agency ‑structure dichotomy. It means that the discipline is 
susceptible to bi ‑polar distinctions between inquires oscillating around 
the problems of structural determination of human activities in the 
field of discursive formations (or in language) as well as issues referring 
to individual and social praxes that manifest themselves as processes 
of interpersonal communication, societal negotiation of norms and 
values and, last but not least, conflicts over power and authority. The 
dominating paradigms within cultural studies, as Hall declares, reflect 
concern with agency and structure and the roles which these notions 
play in diverse studies of socio ‑cultural reality.26 Moreover, these two 
conceptual models offer solutions concerning, first and foremost, the 
ontology of socio ‑cultural world, the role of actions undertaken by 
individuals in its duration and the ultimate significance attached to 
the notion of human subjectivity.
The culturalist paradigm is based upon an idea postulating that the 
category of sensuous human activity becomes indispensable in order 
to understand the overall scope of cultural reproduction. In this sense, 
culture is regarded as a manifestation of human creative energy which is 
interwoven with the totality of human practices; it is a sphere in which 
human agency actualises itself in the course of deploying signs in order 
to provide the external reality with significance.27 Such a conception, to 
put it in a more philological manner, is etymologically intelligible since 
the Latin origin of the word “culture” suggests its essentially agential 
character as “the tending of something, basically crops or animals.”28 
This particular viewpoint paved the way for modern conceptualisations 
perceiving culture as a field of mental and spiritual perfection (cultura 
animi).29 Such idealist and evaluative perspectives on culture convey 
26 Hall, “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms,” in Media, Culture and Society. A 
Critical Reader, eds. R. Collins et al. (London: Sage Publications, 1986).
27 Hall, “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms,” pp. 36—39.
28 Raymond Williams, Keywords (London: Fontana Press, 1988), p. 87.
29 Antonina Kłoskowska, Kultura masowa. Krytyka i obrona (Warszawa: PWN, 
1980), pp. 9—13.
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agential ideas of self ‑perfection best rendered by Matthew Arnold’s 
statement addressing cultural production as “absorption in the best 
knowledge, the best ideas of their time.”30 In this context, the concept of 
spiritual development refers to the Romantic distinction between culture 
and civilisation. Whereas the former was perceived as drives towards 
“the sweetness and light,” the latter referred to activities oriented at 
tending of economic welfare and was seen as a totality of actions which 
are functional as far as human labour and production are concerned.31
Although the culturalist paradigm dispenses with the evaluative 
tendencies of former definitions and sees culture in essentially non‑ 
evaluative terms, it is still founded upon an idea that culture should 
be perceived as a sphere of manifestation of agential dispositions, 
a realm constructed by intelligible actions undertaken by individuals 
conceived as homo creator. As a consequence, the notions of culture and 
civilisation are subsumed within the doctrine of all ‑pervading cultural 
production which relates issues of symbolic culture to the material 
context of social existence. This theory aims at conceptualising the 
general field of cultural production regarded as a province of social 
practices which — in spite of being anchored in the socio ‑economic 
inequalities typical of modern, class ‑ridden societies — are perceived 
under the common denominator of social praxis. One may recall Hall’s 
observations referring to this theoretical viewpoint:
In its different ways, it conceptualises culture as interwoven 
with all social practices; and those practices, in turn, as 
a common form of human activity: sensuous human praxis, 
the activity thorough which men and women make history. 
[…] The experiential pull in this paradigm, and the emphasis 
on the creative and on historical agency, constitutes the two 
elements in the humanism of the position outlined.32
This essentially humanistic model of reasoning puts the onus on 
the historical agency or the processes of “historiocity” — as Alain 
Touraine33 defines shaping of socio ‑cultural realities by human ac‑
30 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. S. Lipman (Michigan: Yale Uni‑
versity Press, 1994), p. 48.
31 Such a conceptualization is also typical of German philosophy. Cf. F. Schil‑
ler, “On the Aesthetic Education of Man,” in Classical Readings in Culture and Civi‑
lization, eds. J. Rundell, S. Mennell (London and New York: 1998), pp. 85—94.
32 Hall, “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms,” p. 39. Emphasis added.
33 See Alain Touraine, The Voice and the Eye. An Analysis of Social Movement 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 9.
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tion — and may be inscribed within the historico ‑hermeneutic tradi‑
tion of humanistic interrogation represented by Max Weber. Weber’s 
hermeneutic sociology gave rise to the inherently humanistic strategy 
of constructing theories whose centre of gravity is attributed to the 
category of a sensuous and knowledgeable social action. History, and 
by the same token society and culture, constitutes an immense cosmos 
of subjectively intelligible actions undertaken by reflective individuals 
who are driven by dissimilar motivations of teleological, axiological, 
affective and traditional descents. Hence, it is impossible to deploy 
the mechanistic methodology of exact sciences in order to explore 
socio ‑cultural realities. The most appropriate form of cognition must 
entail empathy which is combined with interpretative understanding 
(Verstehen)34 in order to signal that social as well as cultural phenomena 
are deeply rooted in the phenomenology of human experience.
In the light of Weber’s theory, complex social and economic systems, 
such as capitalism or legal ‑rational bureaucracy, become deprived of 
their autonomous ontological status and are perceived in terms of social 
actions.35 As a result, methodologies should be based upon statements 
addressing processes of social and cultural “morphogenesis,” that is the 
emergence of structures from the realm of consciousness and human 
actions.36 Cultural artefacts, such as ideologies or discursive formations, 
are never “given” or pre ‑existent. Such entities are seen as consequences 
of informed human actions intelligible as far as one’s values, attitudes, 
or motivations are concerned. Structures, consequently, are perceived 
as being obscure or elusive and their significance can be unveiled due 
to a study of diverse agential processes that have paved the way for 
their constitution.
The tradition of structural thought, on the contrary, postulates an 
entirely different perspective on social and cultural realities. In this 
respect, it seems to follow the Platonic scepticism towards the reality 
of everyday experiences which “would be literally nothing but the 
shadows of the images.”37 The rigorous distinction between the essence 
34 Max Weber, Economy and Society, eds. G. Roth, C. Wittich, vol. 1 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), p. 4.
35 The most challenging and intellectually inspiring analysis of the origins 
socio ‑economic structure from the perspective of value ‑oriented actions is con‑
veyed in the classical treaty The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Cf. Max 
Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. T. Parsons (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958).
36 Margaret S. Archer, Realist Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach (Cam‑
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 166.
37 Plato, The Republic in The Portable Plato, ed. S. Buchanan (New York and 
London: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 547.
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and shadowy appearances gives rise to the structuralist thinking repre‑
senting the subject which remains marooned in the world of deceptive 
images, ideologies and false consciousness. From this perspective, the 
underlying theoretical structure of structuralism can be regarded as 
consisting of five constitutive elements: positivism, anti ‑historicism, the 
politics of demystification, theoreticism, anti ‑humanism.38
Structuralism revolves around a positivistic idea suggesting that 
socio ‑cultural reality is endowed with a set of underlying, objective 
principles which organizes human consciousness, nature, cognition 
and all forms of taking part in social life. Therefore, individuals become 
deprived of autonomy; their agency remains elusive and uncertain. 
People are compelled to exist in the universe of pre ‑conceived ideas, 
cause ‑and ‑effect relationships and objective facts. In this context, struc‑
turalism offers a complete contradiction of the Weberian culturalism: 
if the latter regards structural properties of socio ‑cultural reality as 
a kind of “theoretical surplus,” the former sees human consciousness 
as a counterproductive phenomenon driving people astray.39
The anti ‑humanist dissipation of human agency is a result of 
conceptualising socio ‑cultural reality as an entity sui generis, that is, 
endowed with a specific mode of existence rendering its relative au‑
tonomy from human actions possible. Having defined sociology as “the 
science of institutions, of their genesis and their functioning,” Durkheim 
(Ferdinand de Saussure’s academic mentor) proceeds straight forward 
to the first purely structuralist claim postulating that “the determining 
cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding 
it and not among the states of individual consciousness.”40 In this context, an 
appropriate approach to methodological problems should repudiate all 
idiosyncrasies or irregularities for the sake of constructing meticulous 
models capturing objective, repeatable relationships between a number 
of empirical facts.41 Hence, society and culture are perceived as “living 
38 Milner, Browitt, Contemporary Cultural Theory, pp. 96—98.
39 Tomasz Burzyński, The Surplus of Structure: Towards the Morphogenetic Ap‑
proach to Cultural Studies, in The Surplus of Culture. Sense, Common ‑sense, Non ‑sense, 
eds. E. Borkowska, T. Burzyński (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Pub‑
lishing, 2011), pp. 235—244.
40 Émile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, trans. S.A. Solovay, 
J.H. Mueller (New York: Free Press, 1938), pp. lvii, 110. Quoted after B.N. Adams, 
R.A. Sydie, Classical Sociological Theory (London: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 96—
97. Emphasis mine.
41 In the context of structural methodology, inherently personal deeds, such as 
attempts to commit suicide for instance, are perceived as consequences of external 
organization of society, not the internal arrangement of psychic dispositions. See 
Durkheim, Suicide. A Study in Sociology (London: Routledge, 1951).
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organisms” whose development resembles a process in which their 
hidden structural construction unveils further possibilities of change.
The legacy of Durkheimian structuralism indicates that society 
and culture may become conceptualised as two forms of autopoietic 
structures, that is systems whose internal coherence is attained due to 
the structuring principle of self ‑reference.42 Needless to say, the onto‑
logical as well as methodological logic that paves the way for the idea 
of autopoiesis remains contradictory with reference to the postulate 
of human agency. Both society and culture are conceived in terms of 
internally organised structures whose existence organises human life, 
as it were, from the outside. It seems that the most straightforward ap‑
plication of such a positivistic rationale, deeply rooted in the domains 
of biology and exact sciences, is the model of linguistic system as it 
is conceived by de Saussure.43 As Durkheim’s disciple, de Saussure 
postulates that symbolic culture constitutes a realm sui generis. This 
manifests itself as the internal organisation of langue, a term designat‑
ing an abstract, ideal system composed entirely of negative relations 
in which the meaning of a particular element is to be understood 
from the vantage point of the whole linguistic structure regarded as 
a coherent totality. From this perspective, the agential potentiality 
implicit in acts of making concrete linguistic utterances (the parole) is 
seen as a mere reflection, an ephemeral entity deprived of any mode 
of existence remaining independent of the pre ‑established system of 
collective experiences.
The main tenets of structuralism are outlined in the formative 
and seminal text, Primitive Classifications and Social Knowledge (1903), in 
which Durkheim and Marcel Mauss draw a pervasive sketch of the 
structural determination of social actions:
Society was not simply a model which classificatory thought 
followed; it was its own divisions which served as divisions 
for the system of classification. The first logical categories 
were social categories; the first classes of things were classes 
42 Francisco Varela, Principles of Biological Autonomy (New York: North Holland 
Press, 1979). After P. Frelik, Wild(er)ness of Technology, in The Wild and the Tame. 
Essays in Cultural Practice, eds. W. Kalaga, T. Rachwał (Katowice: Wydawnictwo 
UŚ, 1997), p. 114. The term “autopoiesis” has emerged as a popular expression 
adopted by new functionalist ‑structural discourses. See also N. Luhmann, The 
Autopoiesis of Social Systems, in Essays of Self ‑Reference, ed. N. Luhmann (New York: 
1990), pp. 1—20.
43 Ferdinand de Saussure, The Nature of Linguistic Sign, in Twentieth Century 
Literary Criticism. An Anthology, ed. D. Lodge (London: Longman, 1998), pp. 10—14.
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of men, into which these things were integrated. […] Thus, 
logical hierarchy is only another aspect of social hierarchy, 
and the unity of knowledge is nothing else than the very 
unity of collectivity, extended to the universe.44
The extra ‑personal organisation of social facts, thus, accounts for the 
intra ‑personal universe of human cognition. In other words, individu‑
als are perceived as running in the structuralist treadmill. Since their 
cognitive capabilities constitute a reflection of the pre ‑existent, objective 
status quo, the resultant actions, consequently, have no other conceivable 
impact upon the reality than reproducing the given structures.
The Durkheimian structuralism, thus, is a logical system of expla‑
nation whose centre of gravity can be attributed to the strategy of 
displacing human agency. Social facts are constructed by means of 
their relative position in the social system which, in turn, provides 
a conceptual matrix for individuals who act within its boundaries. 
In this sense, the dichotomous classification of appearance/essence 
is reconstructed in a novel theoretical guise — the commonsensical 
assumption that individuals are masters of their own deeds becomes 
automatically dispelled as an illusion or simulacrum produced by rei‑
fied minds.
The Theoretical Gestalt Switch
If their extreme or orthodox readings are assumed, the two aforemen‑
tioned paradigms fall victim to theoretical hypostases restraining us 
from getting a clear perspective on the ontology of the socio ‑cultural 
reality as well as the nature of human agency.45 It seems that a critical 
examination the paradigms reveals a critical mass of methodological ir‑
regularities, a vexing presence of “a persistent and recognised anomaly,” 
to use Thomas Kuhn’s terminology. Needless to say, the departure from 
the paradigms bears signs of a theoretical Gestalt switch and constitutes 
a radical process in which the well ‑trodden paths of humanistic inter‑
rogation become falsified.
44 Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Primitive Classification and Social Knowledge, 
in Social Theory. The Multicultural and Classic Readings, ed. C. Lemert (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2004), pp. 87—88.
45 See especially Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 2; Sztompka, Society 
in Action, pp. 92—93.
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Since, as Hall observes, “neither ‘culturalism’ nor ‘structuralism’ 
is, in its present manifestation, adequate to the task of constructing 
the theory of culture as a conceptually clarified and theoretically 
informed domain of study,”46 the development of conceptual as well 
as methodological apparatuses of cultural studies seems to run paral‑
lel to the model of non ‑cumulative science. What is needed, hence, 
is a theoretical about ‑face that will provide a combination of the 
formerly introduced assumptions, so that a novel “middle ‑of ‑the ‑road 
ontology of the constructed, constructing and historical world”47 may 
emerge.
The assumption of interpretative perspectives associated with 
culturalism may give rise to a methodological simplification in which 
the stress is laid on the dimension of human actions and subjective 
experience. This, at the same time, provokes the displacement of prob‑
lems concerning emergent structural properties to the hinterlands of 
theoretical discourses. Such a standpoint, nevertheless, promotes an 
idea that socio ‑cultural reality is generally disorganised, deprived of 
its solid structural core: “[T]he overall outcome of such revisions is 
a vision of a fluid, changeable social setting, kept in motion by interac‑
tion of plurality of autonomous and uncoordinated agents.”48 In the 
context of cultural studies, this kind of reasoning evokes the “illusion 
of egocentrism” which is caused by a malady of short ‑sightedness with 
reference to structural determinants of human actions.
Although some scholars are keen on by ‑passing this shortcoming 
by means of perceiving cultural production from the perspective of 
economic inequalities implicit in the class structure of industrial and 
post ‑industrial societies, their insight is limited to the material condi‑
tions of human existence.49 Such an overly materialistic perspective 
remains elusive as far as the ultimate character of cultural production 
is concerned: it refers to culture as an entity which remains reflexive 
of the pre ‑established structures of socio ‑economic opportunities. 
As a consequence, other structural determinants of social as well 
as cultural praxis are left behind as somewhat under ‑theorised no‑
tions. This is particularly true of non ‑material conditions of cultural 
reproduction (and social actions in general), namely the pre ‑existent 
46 Hall, “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms,” p. 43.
47 Sztompka, Society in Action, p. 53.
48 Zygmunt Bauman, “Sociological Responses to Postmodernity,” in Moderno 
et Postmoderno, eds. C. Mongradini, M.L. Manisaclo (Rome: Bulzoni, 1989), p. 142. 
Quted after P. Sztompka, Society in Action, p. 18.
49 This is especially true of theories postulated by Raymond Williams and 
Richard Hoggart.
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axiological, normative, ideological and interactive structures.50 Hence, 
the methodology of cultural materialism does not take into account 
such problems as pre ‑existent discursive formations, norms and values 
implicit in the cultural traditions as well as the structurally defined 
interactive options which diverse social groups are equipped with. 
These determinants constitute an overall basis for actions undertaken 
by individuals: agency is always anchored in axiological and normative 
constraints, economic incentives and disincentives, societal reservoirs 
of knowledge and, last but not least, in prospects of gaining support 
from other actors.
On the other hand, the discourse of structuralism gives rise to the 
fallacy of “collectivistic epiphenomenalism” which provides us with 
an equally deceptive image of an “oversocialised conception of man,”51 
a concept postulating that individuals do not resemble active subjects 
but, contrariwise, bearers of diverse linguistic and social structures 
that “speak” them and ”place” them in the pre ‑conceived, structural 
and autopoietic order. From this perspective, social norms, values, 
discursive formations and economic opportunities are perceived as 
internalised structural imperatives that force an individual to act in 
ways which are functional with reference to the socio ‑cultural system 
conceived as a coherent totality existing in the state of more or less 
settled equilibrium. As a result, such a conceptualisation provides little 
theoretical space for unexpected and spontaneous changes. It does not 
seem to reserve space for the fact that individuals “could have acted 
otherwise,” to use a phrase coined by Giddens.
The aforementioned theoretical Gestalt switch aims to repudiate 
the well ‑entrenched discourse of binary oppositions: the conventional 
distinction between individualistic and structural methodologies is 
perceived from a new perspective in which the old viewpoints collapse 
and give rise to a novel insight into the nature of socio ‑cultural reality. 
The emergent theories, in turn, are founded upon a firm belief that the 
dimensions of agency and structure may become synthesised in a form 
of a dialectic and holistic ontology.
50 Sztompka, Society in Action, pp. 124—125.
51 See Denis H. Wrong, “The Oversocialised Conception of Man in Modern 
Sociology,” American Sociological Review, no. 2 (1961), pp. 183—193.
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Towards the Dialectic Ontology  
of Human Subjectivity and Socio ‑Cultural Reality
If the contemporary social theory is ruled by any dominating tenden‑
cies in methodology, this is the idea that the binary opposition between 
structure and agency can be overcome for the sake of constructing more 
holistic hypotheses referring to the realm of the social and the cultural. 
The dichotomy itself (as it was delineated at the beginning of this 
chapter) may be derived from philosophical considerations concerning 
the relations occurring between the Self and the Other. From this per‑
spective, both the Cartesian conceptualisation of human subjectivity as 
well as theoretical stratagems attempting at dissecting and dismantling 
its coherence may be represented as the agency ‑structure dichotomy. 
A similar problematic will be evoked as a point of departure in the 
quest for a synthetic, dialectic ontology of the constructed world.
When perceived through the prism of either the Cartesian con‑
ceptualisation of human subjectivity or theories contradicting it, 
the structure ‑agency antinomy seems to be fallacious in the light of 
novel ontologies of the human subjectivity. In this sense, attempts at 
constructing univocal representations of the Self and society seem 
illusory. This is especially true of theories referring to the Self as an 
entity either remaining totally reflexive of the external environment or, 
conversely, being totally anterior to society and culture. As Wojciech 
Kalaga observes:
In the last instance, however, the actual being of the subject 
is rooted in its own interpretative activity: it is here that both 
meanings of interpretation — epistemological and ontologi‑
cal — come together and undergo a synthesis in the being‑ 
becoming of the subject. The subject is a self ‑interpreting 
subject in the very strong sense of that term: both with 
regard to its existential and its qualitative constitution.52
In the light of the paragraph quoted above, it becomes evident that 
the human subjectivity constructs itself in the course of acts of self‑ 
interpretation. Individuality is tantamount to the ability to refer to 
oneself in terms of a self ‑conscious, informed user of signification 
tools. Such a conceptualisation is also intelligible as far as psychological 
insights into human personality are concerned. In the latter context, the 
52 Kalaga, Nebulae of Discourse, p. 177.
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Self is regarded as the core element of personality and manifests itself 
as a cognitive process of gazing into the universe of our innermost 
experiences. However, the human constitution as zoon politikon does 
not allow for a theory which would totally place the origins of human 
subjectivity beyond the field of the social, the Other. In this sense, as 
Kalaga observes, agents may exist discursively even before the act of 
their birth as narratives constructed by others for whom they constitute 
significant persons. To conclude, one may refer to the Self in terms of 
an entity which oscillates between two universes: the internal realm 
of self ‑interpretation and the external sphere of discourse formation.
A comparable theoretical situation is delineated by the Heideg‑
gerian category of Dasein which expresses this dualistic ontology 
of human subjectivity in onto ‑hermeneutic terms.53 The subject is 
characterised by an inherent, agential drive towards interpretation 
and reflectively refers to itself as being placed in the reality that has 
previously been interpreted by others. From this specific perspective, 
subjects are seen as peculiar amalgamates of the Self and the Other, 
matrixes interpolating the internal or agential dispositions to act with 
the external or structural conditions associated with the formative 
presence of other individuals. The reflexive agents, therefore, are struc‑
tured by their significant relations with the Other, yet at the same time 
may re ‑create, re ‑interpret themselves by means of knowledge elicited 
from past experiences. A similar problem, to put it still otherwise, is 
signalled by “the concept of reversibility according to which the one 
that sees is also seen.”54 As a result, agents are ontologically positioned 
in the middle of the road between their own perceptions and the 
impressions induced by the formative influence of the social. This 
way of thinking also binds the ontological with the epistemological: 
to exist means to be reflectively aware that the Other is, so to speak, 
on the watch.
The discussion referring to the ontological status of human subjec‑
tivity constitutes a comfortable point of departure towards the debate 
concerning the dissolution of the agency ‑structure dichotomy in the 
methodological context of cultural studies. From this perspective, the 
ontological continuity between agency (the individual) and structure 
(the social, trans ‑personal) is postulated. Various signs and traces of this 
reasoning can be found in diverse theoretical endeavours. In this sense, 
to recall Cooley’s words, “[S]elf and society are twin ‑born, we know 
one as immediately as we know the other, and the notion of separate 
53 Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Kłopoty z przygodnością: powrót historyzmu, pp. 28—29.
54 Borkowska, At the Threshold, p. 58.
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and independent ego is an illusion.”55 In the light of this citation the 
levels of agency and structure become profoundly intertwined — the 
basic construction of socio ‑cultural reality seems to resemble a joint 
product of the two perspectives.
The synthesis of agency and structure rests upon five interrelated 
ontological premises: (1) structuralism, (2) creativism, (3) processualism, 
(4) possibilism, and (5) reflexiveness.56 In the light of cultural studies, 
these tenets (being essentially the pillars of post ‑functionalist sociolo‑
gies) constitute a basis for implementing a creative amalgamation of 
structuralism in its original Durkheimian and de Saussurean senses, 
and culturalism as it is postulated by Weber and the British tradition 
of cultural studies. The overall summary of the new dialectic theory 
is provided by Sztompka who argues that:
It is a world in which reflexive individuals are seen as 
creatures and creators as the same time, social wholes as 
fluid relational networks humanly made, but also affecting 
people, and historical processes as the stream of incessant 
interplay of emergence and determination, in the course 
of which both individuals and society undergo cumulative 
transformations.57
The first premise rests upon a new interpretation of structuralism which 
postulates the necessity of perceiving socio ‑cultural realities in terms of 
structures unveiling themselves as patterns (or regularities) that may be 
observed within diverse empirical phenomena (such as actions, interac‑
tions, communication channels). Structures are deprived of their objec‑
tive nature sui generis and, consequently, are conceptualised in terms of 
aggregates comprising organised social actions. Consequently, culture 
does not consist of structures — it only displays some regular patterns 
of symbolic actions which are undertaken in a relatively conscious 
manner. Methodologies should be concerned, first and foremost, with 
observing regularities in the socio ‑cultural reality without granting 
them any mode of operation which is pre ‑existent with reference to 
actions undertaken by agents. This line of explanation, consequently, 
follows from the dimension of human action towards the realm of 
emergent socio ‑cultural structures.
55 Charles H. Cooley, Social Organization (New York: Schocken Books, 1962), p. 5.
56 See Sztompka, Society in Action, pp. 51—86.
57 In this case, the notion of “structuralism” is not in league with the original, 
derived from Durkheim and de Saussure, understanding of the term. Sztompka, 
Society in Action, p. 86.
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The next premise refers to the dimension of creative drives implicit 
in agents perceived as participants in the socio ‑cultural environments. 
Individuals are inherently endowed with an impulse to act, with an 
energy to initiate actions, yet they encounter the external reality as 
a sphere of incentives and disincentives facilitating or restraining 
undertaken actions. In other words, people are, to a certain extent, 
constituted and constructed within social and linguistic structures. 
These systems, however, function as the main vehicles of intentional, 
reflective creativity typical of human beings. From this perspective, an 
individual resembles the homo creator, an entity that uses encountered 
circumstances or objects in order to produce innovations. Consequently, 
in the context of operating agents, any form of creation done ex nihilo 
constitutes an illusory idea.
The premise of processualism refers to the nature of changes taking 
place within society and culture. As a product of human action, history 
is conceived in terms of unpredictable social actions and, consequently, 
is deprived of its final objective. Nevertheless, historical changeability 
does not constitute a chaotic universe of phenomena that manifest 
themselves in a purely accidental manner. It can be characterised by 
a number of rules constituting its sequential logic. In this context, 
for instance, the rise of mass culture is logically necessitated by the 
development of great urban districts and the industrial organisation 
of production which, in turn, are determined by the advancement of 
agricultural technologies taking place in the times of late agrarian so‑
cieties. Yet, the stages of modernisation are not endowed with the final 
objective, the Hegelian end of history. In other words, despite hopes 
expressed by enlightened Western intellectuals, the underdeveloped 
countries face plenty of possible routes towards modernisation, not only 
the one that has been conceived ex post, on the basis of historical experi‑
ences of the West. Concurrently, the notions of “multiple modernities” 
and “reflexive modernisation”58 have been coined in order to put an 
emphasis on the non ‑linear, non ‑teleological process of socio ‑cultural 
development.
The premise of possibilism is based upon an assumption that ac‑
tions participating in the re ‑production of the common socio ‑cultural 
and historical habitat are simultaneously determined by their external 
circumstances. In a way, the assumption is a logical ramification of the 
aforementioned theses: individuals are creators of the external socio‑ 
cultural environment, their agential potentialities become accumulated 
58 See Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash, eds., Reflexive Moderniza‑
tion. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994).
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as patterns of historical changeability, yet history provides structural 
circumstances for human actions.
Selected elements of the aforementioned theses are evident in theo‑
retical projects represented in French, British and Polish intellectual 
traditions respectively by works of Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens 
and Piotr Sztompka. Their theoretical interrogation may shed further 
light on the enigma of cultural production as it is presented within the 
legacy of the British and American cultural studies. Moreover, these 
theories can provide us with innovative insights into the nature of 
cultural change, individual as well as collective identities and mecha‑
nisms of interpolating cultural production with authority and political 
power. The proposed theoretical perspectives constitute, nevertheless, 
a limited venture to construct a selection of the most conspicuous dis‑
courses embracing attempts at synthesising the dimensions of agency 
and structure into a coherent theorem.59
The Habitus and the Capitals 
Dialectic Tendencies in Pierre Bourdieu’s Theory  
of Social Practice and Participation in Symbolic Culture
Problems referring to the dimensions of agency and structure are 
evoked in diverse analyses concerning relations taking place between 
and social inequalities and the participation in symbolic culture. In this 
kind of conceptualisation, class affiliations are perceived as outcomes of 
actions undertaken with reference to cultural resources, such as values, 
norms (including norms of aesthetic judgement) and discourses. This 
particular methodology becomes indicative of Pierre Bourdieu’s theory 
which amalgamates the agential dimension of participation in symbolic 
culture with the structural aspect of social inequalities as they are 
observed within the boundaries of (post)modern capitalist societies. 
Consequently, the theory, as Milner and Browitt observe,60 assumes the 
paradigm of sociology of culture as a starting point and arrives at the 
realm of critical theory that bears marks of generic resemblance with 
the legacy of the Frankfurt school.
59 This line of constructing theories is indicative of perspectives postulated by 
such scholars as: Walter Buckley, Amitai Etzioni, Alain Touraine, Margaret Archer, 
Norbert Elias and Charles Tilly.
60 Milner, Browitt, Contemporary Cultural Theory, p. 86.
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Bourdieu’s theory utilises a conceptualisation of social structure as 
a system of unequal social positions which are distinguished by means 
of evaluating an individual’s access to economic assets, education, po‑
litical power and social prestige. When perceived from a more cultural 
point of view, social positions are instrumental as far as patterns of 
participation in culture are concerned. The latter term, as Wojciech 
Świątkiewicz puts it, refers to the overall plane of human agency with 
reference to cultural products. Therefore, it originates in internalising 
the most fundamental values, norms and discourses which are typical 
of a given cultural heritage.61 The analytical category of participation 
in culture, thus, refers to the mechanisms through which individuals 
make sense of their social environment and express their thoughts in 
symbolic manners.
Having assumed the dimension of social structures and social 
inequalities as the starting point of his theory, Bourdieu conceptualises 
participation in culture in terms of an outcome of symbolic ‑oriented 
actions undertaken by individuals who act within sets of values and 
cognitive styles conceived here as the habitus. The term, to put it oth‑
erwise, designates the sphere of axiological, normative and symbolic 
devices that enable (or restrain) individuals in the course of their at‑
tempts to gain positions within social structures. The concept of habitus 
represents a system of durable dispositions of socio ‑cultural descent, an 
internalised objectivity, structuring individuals who enter the arena of 
cultural production. Frequently, Bourdieu uses the term “class habitus” 
in order to point out that members of the same social class tend to 
share the same repertoire of cultural competences and abilities to deal 
with the symbolic. In this way, the ultimate outcome of human actions 
undertaken in the field of the symbolic (for instance, within the realm 
of institutionalised education) depends on an individual’s ability to 
convert the advantage of social position (the class habitus) into a form of 
cultural currency constituting a valuable asset in a given institutional 
setting.
At the first glance, Bourdieu’s theory seems to reproduce the clas‑
sical Marxist ‑structuralist schemata in which an economically defined 
class position is the main determinant of actions taking place in the 
symbolic. Yet, this theory goes beyond the notion of economic deter‑
minism and provides a conceptual space for referring to individuals as 
informed performers of meaningful actions resulting in the reproduc‑
61 Wojciech Świątkiewicz, Uczestnictwo w kulturze, in Encyklopedia Socjologii. Su‑
plement (Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 2005), p. 362; see also Wojciech Świątkiewicz, 
Zróżnicowanie społeczne a uczestnictwo w kulturze (Katowice: Wydawnictwo UŚ, 1984), 
pp. 45—50.
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tion of axiological, normative and symbolic imperatives inscribed in 
the very idea of the habitus:
The theory of practice as practice insists, contrary to 
positivist materialism, that the objects of knowledge are 
constructed, not passively recorded, and, contrary to intel‑
lectual idealism, that the principle of this construction is the 
system of structured, structuring dispositions, the habitus, 
which is constituted in practice and is always oriented towards 
practical functions.62
In this sense, the category bridges the gap between objective structures 
and subjective agency. In the light of Bourdieu’s theorem, the category 
of the habitus is regarded as being simultaneously structured and struc‑
turing. It provides the axiological and symbolic anchorage for human 
activities (structural determination) which needs to be reproduced 
by individual or collective actions (human agency). The operation of 
perceiving the habitus in terms of a methodological tool aiming at the 
synthesis of subjective agency and structural determination becomes 
possible as a result of referring to patterns of participation in cultural 
production as forms of cultural resources which must be mobilised 
by individuals’ actions in order to gain access to diverse positions 
in social structures. In other words, the category relates objectivism 
to subjectivism: it designates the sphere of potentialities, rather than 
structurally intelligible constraints or necessities.
Such a non ‑deterministic interpretation of the concept becomes em‑
phasised by the notion of “cultural capital” indicating that the agential 
ability to participate in culture is an asset used by actors operating on 
arenas of modern societies. In this sense, the return which individuals 
gain from investing cultural capital is unequally distributed and is 
determined by the factor of human agency, not only by the influence 
of class position.63 In a number of cases, for instance, the reproduction 
of cultural capital depends on the capacity to engage in various forms 
of social networks (fraternities, occupational organisations, tertiary 
organisations, etc.). Hence, the return which agents gain from investing 
cultural capital is seen as a function of the willingness to accumulate 
social capital by means of participating in social networks constituting 
62 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1992), p. 52. Emphasis mine.
63 See Pierre Bourdieu, “Le capital social: notes provisoires,” in Actes de la 
recherché en sciences socials (1980), p. 2. After J. Field, Social Capital (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 16.
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a kind of a support community for individuals in their plight for more 
privileged positions within social structures.
The concept of the structuring and structured habitus provides us 
with a first theoretical attempt to dismantle the illusory opposition 
of agency and structure. Bourdieu’s discourse, however, is narrated 
from the perspective of structural determinants which constitute 
a preparatory field of assets that become actualised by the creative 
powers of individual agency. This idea, as it is delineated in the next 
point, becomes criticised by Giddens whose attempts at synthesizing 
agency and structure assume an idea of a knowledgeable and reflexive 
individual as a starting point of his discourse.
The Synthesis of Agency and Structure  
in Anthony Giddens’s Theory of Structuration
Notwithstanding his apparent gift for eclecticism, the structure of Gid‑
dens’s theoretical output revolves around the axis of harsh criticism 
targeted at positivistic methodologies conceptualising both society and 
culture in terms of organisms comprising pre ‑established, structures 
that determine (and automatically dissolve) individual agency. At the 
same time, however, his thought remains persistently indifferent to 
diverse possibilities of perceiving subjects who — following the Car‑
tesian model of human subjectivity — retain the role of sole creators 
and constructors of the external socio ‑cultural reality. What becomes 
contested, consequently, is the will to subordinate the external reality 
by means of delineating a totalising discourse promoting an univocal 
but angled viewpoint.
The centre of gravity of the theory can be attributed to a strategy 
aiming at diluting binary oppositions that conceptually organise human 
cognition in general and social theory in particular. In this context, 
Giddens’s project binds subjective agency and objective structure into 
an inseparable discourse developed under the label of the “theory of 
structuration.”
The theory of structuration was worked out as an attempt 
to transcend, without discarding altogether, three promi‑
nent traditions of thought in social theory and philosophy: 
hermeneutics or “interpretative sociologies,” functionalism 
and structuralism. Each of these traditions, in my view, 
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incorporates distinctive and valuable contributions to social 
analysis — while each has tended to suffer from a number 
of defined limitations.64
The ontology of socio ‑cultural reality resembles, as Giddens teaches 
us, a twofold, two ‑dimensional alloy of agency and structure which 
becomes conceptualised in terms of the “duality of structure.”65 As 
opposed to the legacy of classical structural and functional theories, 
which refer to socio ‑cultural (linguistic) structures in terms of objective, 
self ‑referential entities, this viewpoint proclaims that structures cannot 
possibly exist beyond the dimension of human action. It means that 
structure is “the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively 
organizes; the structural properties of social systems do not exist 
outside of action but are chronically implicated in its production and 
reproduction.”66 As a result, the methodology dispels the “imperialism 
of the object” by means of referring to social and cultural structures 
as organised patterns of human action:
Social structures seem to have a fixed, object ‑like character 
only as long as we observe them from the point of view 
which leaves aside the dynamic processes of action in and 
through which structures are continuously sustained and 
recreated.67
By the same token, social actors are also perceived in an overtly 
dualistic manner. Individuals are socially conditioned and structured 
which becomes manifested by the fact of their entanglement within 
a number of structured environments or networks. These may be 
economic, cultural or political systems and institutions constraining 
human actions by means of imprinting their own rules and regula‑
tions upon human action and interaction. Yet, at the same time, the 
constraining structures are perceived as regular action patterns, which 
dispels their objective, superintended character. In this type of analysis 
structural properties are dependable upon human agency. Structures of 
capitalist market (e.g. the stock exchange) would collapse if it was not 
for the daily exercise of activities performed with respect to rules and 
64 Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (London: 
McMillan, 1981), p. 26.
65 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, pp. XX—XXI.
66 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 374.
67 See E.C. Cuff, W.W. Sharrock, and D.W. Francis, Perspectives in Sociology (Lon‑
don and New York: Routledge 2002), p. 318.
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regulations inscribed in the rationale of free ‑market economy. In other 
words, the structuration theory postulates that human engagement is 
instrumental as far as the (re)production of the common social and 
cultural environment is concerned.
Such a perspective on the societal world rests upon a premise 
postulating that socio ‑cultural structures simultaneously constrain and 
enable human activity which, as regards the theory of structuration, 
becomes represented as a bi ‑polar classification of rules and resources. 
In this context, rules define actions in axiological and normative termi‑
nologies and are seen as normative elements playing pivotal role in the 
emergence of social practices. Resources, on the other hand, account for 
the overall agential potentiality of human action and can be perceived 
as “structured properties of social systems, drawn upon and repro‑
duced by knowledgeable agents in the course of their interaction.”68 
Resources, to put it briefly, constitute the aspect of humanly created 
structures which enable individuals in their operations by means of 
granting them power as well as capacity to act within axiologically 
and normatively regulated environment.
The No Man’s Land of Social Theory:  
The Third as a Space Between Agency and Structure
The dichotomy of structure and agency, as it is claimed in the first 
point of this chapter, stems from the dialectic of the Self and the Other. 
From this ontological perspective, human agency may be juxtaposed to 
social and cultural structures which can be represented as the category 
of otherness. Hence, the theoretical legacy of social theory as well as 
cultural studies can be perceived from the vantage point of debates 
between the discourses of agency and structure conceived in terms 
of cognitive, methodological tools aiming to explore socio ‑cultural 
realities. However, novel insights into the ontology of the constructed 
world seem to undermine this well ‑entrenched dichotomy and pro‑
vide a theoretical scope for in ‑depth syntheses of the aforementioned 
dimensions. In this context, the conceptual apparatus based upon the 
juxtaposition of the Self (or Agency) and the Other (or Structure) is com‑
pelled to oblivion. The antinomy constituting its cornerstone becomes 
displaced by the introduction of a discourse which binds agency and 
68 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 15.
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structure into an alloy whose components can hardly be separated. As 
a consequence, the true ontology of the socio ‑cultural reality is to be 
found within the space of the Third:
The tissue of the Third never ceases to grow through same‑
ness and alterity. Reified as presence, as the Other of the 
Other, gaze, friendship, memory, partner, judge, etc. or dis‑
simulated as difference, synthesis, conflict, absence, context 
or void, the Third inhabits the in ‑between of binarity.69
The tissue of the Third, as the passage above teaches us, manifests 
itself as an area assuming the guise of a synthesis combining sameness 
and alterity. Within the fields of social theory and cultural studies, as 
we learn from Piotr Sztompka’s theory of social becoming, the Third 
manifests itself as a methodological and ontological space in which the 
traditional oppositions of the humanities implode into an amalgama‑
tion of the individual and the structural. In this specific context, the 
ontology of the constructed world resembles an inseparable fusion of 
the individual and the collective, the agential and the structural, the 
autonomous and the dependent.
The theory, as a consequence, opposes the commonsensical point 
of view suggesting that society is a mere aggregate of individuals and 
their personalities; culture, in turn, is an umbrella term for the total 
sum of signifying practices and acts of communication that have been 
recorded within the boundaries of a social organisation. The standpoint, 
however, debunks also the exact opposite of the aforementioned meth‑
odological claim according to which society and culture are endowed 
with some objective, trans ‑personal properties that cannot possibly 
become reduced to the level of operating individuals.
The synthetic paradigm delineated by Sztompka opts for the third 
solution to the ontology of socio ‑cultural environment:
In the model of social becoming, the levels of structure in 
operation and of agents in actions will be treated neither 
as analytically separable nor as mutually reducible. Instead 
a third, intermediate level will be postulated, and it will be 
claimed that it represents the only true substance of social 
reality, the specific social fabric. If we think of any empirical 
event or phenomenon in a society, anything that is actually 
happening, is it not always, without exception, a fusion of 
69 Wojciech Kalaga, “Introduction. Between the Same and the Other,” in The 
Same, the Other, the Third, ed. W. Kalaga (Katowice: Wydawnictwo UŚ, 2004), p. 10.
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structures and agents, of operation and action? Show me 
an agent who is not enmeshed in some structure. Show me 
a structure which exists apart from individuals. Show me 
an action which does not participate in societal operation. 
Show me societal operation not resolving into action. There 
are neither structureless agents nor agentless structures.70
The only entity which purports to be a theoretically plausible phenom‑
enon is neither of individual nor structural descent. It is “the unified 
socio ‑individual field,”71 the third level of reality which seems to occupy 
the unexplored no man’s land of traditional sociology, the theoretically 
heterodox in ‑betweeness of the totality and the individuality.
Since the category of the unified socio ‑individual field provides an 
alternative with reference to the classical discussion between agency 
and structure, it also dissolves the “illusions of egocentrism and reifica‑
tion” which are salient as far as our understanding of the traditional 
humanities is concerned. In this context, the illusion of egocentrism is 
perceived as a firmly established and institutionalised hypostasis refer‑
ring to individuals in terms of omnipotent constructors of social and 
cultural realities. Human cognitive capabilities structure us and make 
us think of themselves as independent, integral and self ‑contained 
entities who possess an existence which remains independent of other 
people. However, this assumption is liable to crumble. This problem, 
to analyse it from a historical perspective, is indicative of the Freudian 
threefold model of human personality which leaves little doubt as far as 
the empirical validly of separating the Id, the Ego and the Superego in 
the course of human actions is concerned. Thus, delineating a pristine 
model of human behaviour is simply impossible, since every human 
action presupposes a joint influence of the unconscious and the social 
exerted upon the Self. A similar dilemma has been posed by behav‑
ioural genetics, a branch of contemporary psychology attempting to 
provide models of human ontogenesis in order to classify the impacts 
of heredity and environment upon the development of an individual. It 
is claimed that there is no technical, methodological possibility to sepa‑
rate human agency from the influences of heredity and environment 
in the constitution of psychological dispositions measured for a single 
individual.72 As a consequence, the classical dilemma, conveyed by the 
70 Sztompka, Society in Action, pp. 91—92.
71 Sztompka, Society in Action, p. 94.
72 See Jan Strelau, „Różnice indywidualne: opis, determinanty i aspekt 
społeczny,” in Psychologia. Podręcznik akademicki: Psychologia ogólna, ed. J. Strelau 
(Gdańsk: GWP, 2000), pp. 662—667.
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binary opposition of nature and nurture,73 remains debunked and dis‑
placed. From this perspective, the construction of human subjectivity 
is seen as a joint product of actions undertaken by individuals within 
the field of heredity as well as environmental or social dispositions. 
Nevertheless, a similar claim was made by Cooley who succeeded in 
expressing the formulae of behavioural genetics in a more humanistic 
manner:
The individual is not separable from the human whole, but 
a living member of it […] as if men were literally one body.74
The illusion of reification is also substantial as far as the progress of 
social thought is concerned. The legacies of structural and functional 
theories make us think of collective entities in terms of great, supra‑ 
individual systems towering above us and often assuming oppres‑
sive attitudes towards agents. However, such entities as bureaucratic 
apparatuses, states, socio ‑economic formations are nothing else than 
aggregates of organised social actions that take place within the inter‑
personal sphere between operating individuals. The reality sui generis 
exists only in the eye of the beholder: both society and culture are 
humanly created, they actualise themselves in human actions and by 
acts of behaviour. Linguistic systems can be described as self ‑referential 
systems endowed with an unnerving tendency to refer to nothing else 
than to themselves. Yet, this social institution has no other mode of 
existence than through concrete utterances made by men and women 
and conveyed to other people via face to face interactions or by any 
other conceivable way of communication. If it was not for the parole, the 
dimension of langue — which is the primary concern of the structural 
linguistics — would be left behind in the societal void.
The theory of social becoming is founded upon distrust towards 
the aforementioned ways of conceptualising human subjectivity. The 
subject does not implode into the multiplicity of external structures, 
yet, on the other hand, is not anterior to the social and the cultural 
either. Its ontological status is, then, situated in the space of thirdness 
rendering keeping balance between the structural and the agential 
possible. As a result, human action is always subjected to a twofold 
73 The dilemma refers to the work Hereditary Genius. An Inquiry into Its Laws 
and Consequences, which was published by Sir Francis Galton in 1869. The publica‑
tion has gained a substantial recognition as the first empirical study concerning 
the process of inheriting of complex cognitive dispositions.
74 Charles H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1964), p. 35.
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determination: it becomes regulated “from above” by influences of the 
environment and is subjected to control exerted over it “from inside” by 
the intra ‑personal potentiality of understanding and self ‑interpretation. 
Yet, the dimensions of the external and the internal are not structur‑
ally incorporated into the subjectivity. Rather manifest themselves as 
historical processes in which humanly constructed structures gain the 
trans ‑personal mode of existence and constitute the foundation for 
a second wave of praxis.
To conclude, the distinction between structure and agency consti‑
tutes a basic axis of differentiation rendering possible a more informed 
insight into methodologies of cultural studies. Its functioning, to put it 
briefly, unveils two distinct strategies applied in order to conceptualise 
human subjectivity as it operates within the systemic and structural 
qualities of the socio ‑cultural reality. From these two perspectives, an 
individual may be perceived as a reified object of structural deter‑
mination or, contrariwise, an active subject whose actions manifest 
themselves as moments of agency, elements taking part in constructive 
processes of cultural morphogenesis. The synthesis of the contradictory 
methodological views results in novel ontologies of cultural reality in 
which creative agents are actively engaged in the re ‑production of 
axiological, normative, economic and discursive structures. Cultural 
systems, in turn, may be conceived as rules and resources facilitating 
or restraining human agency. This synthetic viewpoint, as the next 
chapter wishes to unveil, is productive as far as theories of trust are 
concerned: in this sense, trusting relations are seen as being placed 
in the middle of the road between individual agency of vesting trust 
and inter ‑personal structures consisting of persistent and normatively 
regulated networks of reciprocity and mutual confidence.

Chapter Three
Beyond the Logic of Rational Calculation 
Trust and Uncertainty as the Elements  
of Culture
This was fascinating to Henry. He poked about 
with a bit of a stick, that itself was wave ‑worn and 
whitened and a vagrant, and tried to control the mo‑
tions of the scavengers. He made little runnels that 
tide filled and tried to crowd them with creatures. 
He became absorbed beyond mere happiness as he 
felt himself exercising control over living things. He 
talked to them, urging them, ordering them.1
What saves us is efficiency — the devotion to ef‑
ficiency.2
Our understanding of trust and uncertainty seems to be greatly 
indebted to a methodology facilitating the dissolution of the bipolar 
distinction between agency and structure. Any act of entrustment the 
Other cannot be seen as floating free within the societal (or struc‑
tural) void. The agency of interpersonal trusting relations rests upon 
the existence of relatively stable axiological and normative structures 
constituting the cultural reservoir of reciprocity. On the other hand, 
when the structural coefficient to interpersonal relations seems to be 
fragile and wavering, the initial act of granting or reciprocating trust 
is fraught with uncertainty associated with intangible and essentially 
elusive presence of the Other.
The ideas of efficiency and rationality are usually subsumed within 
the notion of modernity and become conceived in terms of social as 
well as technological progress. In this context, the evolution of modern 
1 William Golding, Lord of the Flies (London: Faber and Faber, 1999), p. 65.
2 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness (Wrocław: KOG, 2003), p. 14.
68 Beyond the Logic of Rational Calculation
socio ‑cultural systems is usually regarded as an outcome of scientific 
progress and the dissemination of empirical expertise. Modern civilisa‑
tions are, thus, perceived through essentially Weberian lenses as the 
provinces of technical and bureaucratic self ‑perfection, the realms in 
which human actions are evaluated and, to a certain extent, appropri‑
ated by the ideals inscribed in the rationalised logic of techne.3
The concepts of efficiency and rationality are often applied to the 
sphere of interpersonal relations and cultural norms or values that 
sustain their societal productivity. From this particular perspective, 
however, the devotion to efficiency and rationality cannot be expressed 
in terms of technological proficiency in which human cognitive capa‑
bilities constitute a comfortable vantage point from which the world 
of inanimate object can be scrutinised and evaluated. The rationality 
implicit in the societal world, as Zygmunt Bauman observes, cannot as‑
sume an impersonally sophisticated form of technical formulas.4 Hence, 
theories gesturing towards the notion of trust seem to propose a new 
idea of efficiency which becomes rooted in Jürgen Habermas’s project 
of “communicative rationality,” the consensus ‑keeping mechanism 
allowing for the construction of a stable world of horizontal interper‑
sonal ties.
The main aim of this chapter is to discuss the notions of trust as 
well as uncertainty conceived as cultural resources and indispensable 
existential coefficients to the personalised encounters with Other(ness). 
Vesting trust in the Other becomes regarded as an intelligible existen‑
tial strategy, a cognitive mechanism enabling bracketing off risks and 
contingencies of everyday life and, consequently, facilitating living on 
the cultural arena of civil society. Trust cultures are, thus, perceived 
as moral resources making possible the construction of interpersonal 
and dialogic relations without a need for panoptical scrutiny on behalf 
of terrorizing structures of political authority. In this sense, the dis‑
course of trust constitutes a solution to the dilemmas of contemporary 
multicultural society. It is a remedy for the general indeterminacy of 
social encounters with the Other taking place within the realm of the 
public debate in which horizontal social ties gain the upper hand over 
the languages of political hierarchies and the economic rationale of 
free markets.
3 See Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 
eds. H.H. Gerth, C. Wright Millis (London: Routledge & Kagan Paul, 1967), 
pp. 196—198.
4 Cf. Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1989).
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The Problem of Trust  
and a New Cultural Scenario for European Modernity
Looking backward in history, one can observe that the discourse of trust 
constitutes an issue which has always remained profoundly intertwined 
within the intellectual panorama of modernity. Its origins can be traced 
as far back as to the European Enlightenment and its philosophical 
enquires into the coming of a new social order from the turmoil of 
crisis that disturbed calcified structures of medieval feudalism. From 
the perspective of ongoing cultural as well as political changes, the 
discourse of trust was conceptualised under the label of civil society 
which was seen as a remedy for the disintegration of well ‑settled 
structures of feudalism with the concomitant decline of confidence in 
the Church conceived as the supreme guarantee of moral order. At the 
onset of the European modernity (perhaps also at the very beginning 
of a new European identity5), the ideas of solidarity and interpersonal 
reciprocity were subsumed within a model of the citizens’ civil society 
founded upon social commitment as well as voluntary cooperation of 
relatively autonomous, knowledgeable agents, rather than the absolute 
and panoptically organised mechanisms of surveillance and coercion.
The problems of reciprocity as well as trust emerge as conceptual 
sub ‑categories of a cultural debate concerning the construction of 
modern order conceived as a social project in statu nascendi. As Adam 
B. Seligman observes:
However, the sense remains that trust, or at least its percep‑
tion, is indeed very modern. It is articulated in early modern 
political theory, both by proponents of modern natural law 
(Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke) and by its detractors (Hume, 
Smith).6
In the context of enlightened political philosophies, the discourse of 
trust becomes almost automatically subsumed within a broader con‑
ceptual category of civil society which constitutes an alternative in 
contradistinction to the political proposition formulated by adherents 
5 The European Enlightenment aimed at the establishment of a new politi‑
cal discourse that could provide a common moral denominator for the bricolage 
of national states which had been socially disintegrated after years of religious 
warfare. See N. Davies, Europe. A History (London: Pimlico, 1997), p. 7.
6 Seligman, The Problem of Trust (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 
p. 31.
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of the European absolutism. These two competing proposals are based 
upon dissimilar premises of John Locke’s and Thomas Hobbes’s phi‑
losophies concerning the ontological status of an individual.
Firstly and perhaps most importantly, the notions of trust and 
civil society are greatly indebted to the discourse of the Other. In this 
theoretical framework, the concepts become associated with inter‑ 
personality and inter ‑subjectivity, the emphatic and communicative 
attitude towards the humanly ‑created world that exists beyond the 
boundaries of the reasoning Self. Thus, the axiological foundations of 
civil societies are based upon the critical recognition that the Other is 
granted similar laws and responsibilities as the Self, which makes both 
of them being endowed with an identical predilection for impressing 
will upon the collectively constructed habitat. As a result, interpersonal 
relations between individuals are horizontal as well as symmetrical: 
their participants are obliged to trust the Other since from the onset 
they all exist in the shared axiological and normative reality.
Such a perspective is in league with the early modern inquires 
into the sphere of bilateral relations between the Self and the Other 
which were conceptualised under the common denominator of “moral 
sentiments” or “natural benevolence.” What was glimpsed at the end 
of the feudal era is an idea concerning the productive nature of civil 
society. It means that highly effective political organisations need not 
be based upon the rationale of vertical, petrified structures that are 
typical of aristocratic courts. Moreover, societal progress can be fostered 
by the development of horizontal interpersonal ties binding individu‑
als regardless of their position within institutionalised structures of 
authority, political power or economy.
The Scottish thinkers of the eighteenth century predicted 
the very existence of society on something very close to 
what we have been defining as trust (though to be sure in 
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary of the eighteenth century there 
is no clear distinction between trust and confidence, which 
are treated as virtual synonyms).7
The aforementioned argument is far from maintaining that civilisa‑
tions cannot entirely be founded upon panoptical structures of coercion 
towering above an oppressed and reified individual. A structure of 
authoritarian domination, as we learn from the history of mediaeval 
7 Peter Johnson, Frames of Deceit: A Study of the Loss and Recovery of Public and 
Private Trust (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994). Quoted after Selig‑
man, The Problem, p. 31.
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Europe, purports to constitute a plausible model of societal organisa‑
tion. However, the evolution of political as well as economic structures 
of modern Europe can be seen as a result of the development within the 
cultural imponderables, such as solidarity and trust, that are indicative 
of civil society.8
The concept of civil society remains greatly indebted to the legacy 
of Locke’s insights into the progress from the realm of the natural 
towards the reign of the social. The philosophy positioning society in 
terms of an evolutionary necessity rendering the departure from the 
immoral disorder of nature possible, constitutes the salient element 
of post ‑Renaissance speculations concerning the idea of general order 
and belongs to the avant ‑garde of the rationalist pursuit of structuring 
principles in the societal universe. The profound feeling of certitude 
associated with the notion of lawfulness as well as tireless attempts 
at finding a golden means that could facilitate keeping balance be‑
tween human natural dispositions and social (or civil duties) might 
be regarded as crucial cultural factors that contributed to the rise of 
interest in reciprocity and trust conceived as general axioms of human 
behaviour.
Despite the fact that the philosophical discourse of modernity seems 
to be greatly indebted to the ideas associated with the transgression of 
the natural for the sake of the social, one must observe that this civilis‑
ing process cannot be proved by historical or socio ‑anthropological 
evidence. Therefore, Locke’s and Hobbes’s philosophies purport to 
be a cognitive or intellectual experiments aiming at providing stable 
foundations for two dissimilar conceptions of state and authority.9 Fur‑
thermore, these theories resemble meticulously constructed stratagems 
attempting at separating society from its political subsystem. Hence, 
on the one hand, the models provide us with an intriguing postulate 
suggesting the precedence of sociality over the political organisation. 
However, on the other hand, this intellectual subterfuge has a strictly 
political objective that remains veiled behind its philosophical façade: 
its fundamental aim is to outline such social origins of political author‑
ity that are not derived from politics itself. Thus, such an operation non‑
plusses Hobbes’s and Locke’s readership by its theoretical subterfuges 
and simultaneously constitutes the pivotal element of propaganda that 
paved the way for the calcification of either absolutist regimes (Hobbes) 
8 The hypothesis has been empirically verified by scholars constructing mod‑
ern theories of social capital. See especially Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Fukuyama, 
Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press, 1995.
9 Jerzy Szacki, Historia myśli socjologicznej (Warszawa: PWN, 2006), pp. 60—63.
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or the emergence of liberal authority realised under a sign of civil 
society (Locke).
From the perspective of Locke’s political philosophy, the cause‑ 
and ‑effect relation between human natural dispositions as well as the 
innate willingness to participate in social organisation constitutes the 
cornerstone upon which a theory of liberal democracy has been built. 
That assumption, moreover, constituted an important political gesture 
aiming to criticise Hobbes who, to put it succinctly, laid stress upon 
the concept of supreme force, the commanding primus inter pares aspir‑
ing to the rank of an omnipotent donator and manager of laws and 
norms of culture. In Hobbes’s view, social compact paves the way for 
the election of the Leviathan, an authoritarian force rendering social 
order by the virtue of subordination. Society, in turn, is regarded as 
a fragile construction which otherwise would fall apart because of 
the inner tension of human wickedness.10 If Hobbes’s society is ruled 
by any structuring principle, this is the imperative of obedience to 
the unquestionable will of a sovereign: any attempt to undermine his 
authority constitutes, in this kind of discourse, a step taken towards 
the abominable rule of nature.
The concept of a state assuming the form of an absolute authority 
towering above a single individual remains emphasised by the very 
iconic representation of the Leviathan as an artificial man comprising 
myriads of Liliputian, human ‑like figures.11 This symbolism suggests 
that a sovereign’s body constitutes the framework of all existence 
that is conceivable within the boundaries of a state. Such a metaphor, 
moreover, clearly gestures towards the rationale of absolutist monarchy 
in which the centralised body politic, as it were, single ‑handedly coor‑
dinates actions undertaken by other parts of the societal tissue. This 
particular insight into the theory of the modern political regime, much 
ideologically backward as it may sound, can be seen as a forerunner of 
the totalitarian conceptions of national state which stress mechanisms 
of coercion used in order to attain perfect homogeneity and complete 
moral equilibrium. In a very Hobbesian manner, Bauman outlines the 
constitutive axiological as well as normative components of a totalitar‑
ian state:
10 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth 
Ecclesiastical and Civil (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968).
11 For a detailed analysis of this issue, please refer to: Claire Hobbes, Hobbes 
and the Body Politic, in Word, Subject, Nature. Studies in Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Century Culture, eds. T. Rachwał, T. Sławek (Katowice: Wydawnictwo UŚ, 1996), 
pp. 106—115.
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They [national states — T.B.] laud and enforce ethnic, reli‑
gious, cultural homogeneity. They are engaged in incessant 
propaganda of shared attitudes. They construct joint histori‑
cal memories and do their best to discredit or suppress such 
stubborn memories as cannot be squeezed into shared tradi‑
tion. They preach the sense of common mission, common 
fate, common destiny. They breed, or at least legitimise and 
give tacit support to animosity towards everyone standing 
outside the holy union.12
Consequently, Hobbes’s point of view seems to provide a simplified 
representation of society conceived in terms of homogeneous aggre‑
gates that head towards complete unification and standardization. The 
reign of the Leviathan becomes indicative of a society that remains 
composed of reified individuals whose agency becomes dissolved due 
to the all ‑pervading influence of a sovereign. Moreover, this specific 
model does not allow for the possibility of regarding nations as com‑
munities of Others who are granted comparable discursive positions 
in public debates.
Contrary to Hobbes’s postulates, the idea political agency stands at 
the fountainhead of Locke’s philosophy concerning diverse problems 
of law, lawfulness and authority in the uncertain, heterogeneous 
reality constructed by individuals who are driven by dissimilar inter‑
ests. The general outline of Locke’s political Weltanschauung becomes 
founded upon the virtue of profound belief suggesting that the state 
of nature is in fact the state of the social which manifests itself by the 
inborn predilection for socialization (appetites societatis). Such a con‑
ceptualisation, to put it otherwise, bears traces of generic relatedness 
to Aristotle’s good faith in an individual conceived as the zoon politikon 
— a person whose psychic dispositions may become actualised only 
in his/her relation to a polis, a trans ‑individual, political entity.13 The 
state of nature, as a result, does not convey the idea of the ever‑ 
present interpersonal disharmony, the bellum omnia contra omnes, that 
is nevertheless indicative of Hobbes’s conceptualisation. Thus, this 
particular philosophical model may be attributed to a postulate that 
the state of nature may be characterised with the existence of social 
bonds in their rudimentary forms. In this way, Locke’s philosophical 
12 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, in Global Culture, Nationalism, 
Globalization and Modernity, ed. M. Featherstone (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 
p. 154.
13 Arystoteles, Etyka nikomachejska, trans. D. Gromska (Warszawa: PWN, 1956), 
pp. IX, 9, 1169b and I, 7, 1097b.
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model leads to the establishment of a more liberal and democratic 
political order. Since human beings are naturally benevolent, it is, 
logically speaking, unnecessary to detain them in the “iron cage” of 
authoritarianism or absolutism.
Such an essentially optimistic perspective on the natural state of 
mankind becomes emphasised, to conclude this argument, by Locke’s 
profound belief in the utilitarian conception of man — an individual 
is endowed with a cooperative, perhaps benevolent, personality and is 
eager to work in conjunction with the Other as soon as it goes hand 
in hand with a profit/loss calculation. Hence, moral virtues are deeply 
rooted in a specifically human aptitude for rationalisation, the talent 
whose significance has given rise to the idea of homo oeconomicus. This 
line of thinking, however, is endowed with certain limitations which 
the following paragraphs seek to unveil.
From Homo Oeconomicus to Homo Reciprocus
Locke’s considerations paved the way for Adam Smith’s early liberal 
doctrine. In the latter context, the notion of innate interpersonal 
sympathy is a function of self ‑interest and is subsumed within the 
boundaries of so ‑called “propriety,” an essential element of civic virtue. 
This characteristic has its origins in the figure of the Third whose 
presence is a source of internalised morality capable of structuring 
relationships between the Self and the Other. As Smith teaches us:
We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine 
any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it. 
If, upon placing themselves in his situation, we thoroughly 
enter into all the passions and motives which influenced it, 
we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation of his 
supposed equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into his 
disapprobation and condemn it.14
The idea of “impartial spectator” is derived from Smith’s theory of 
the free market and constitutes, needless to say, a predecessor with 
reference to the concepts of the “looking ‑glass self” and the “me ‑self” 
14 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 
1982), p. 110.
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developed respectively by Charles Horton Cooley and George Herbert 
Mead. Similarly to economic rationality of the “invisible hand,” the 
realm of civil society depends on the authority of a generalised “spec‑
tator” who scrutinises interpersonal relations and renders obligation‑ 
fulfilment and cooperation possible.
Before we make any proper comparison of opposing inter‑
ests, we must change our position. We must view them from 
neither our own place nor yet from his, neither with our own 
eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the eyes 
of the third person, who has no particular connection with 
either, and who judges impartially between us.15
The impartial spectator does not have to assume a form of real public 
or an institution scrutinising one’s deeds performed on the arena of the 
social. The discourse of civil society conveys a revolutionary represen‑
tation of a political commonwealth which is governed and structured 
by the rationale of internalised morality that steers individuals towards 
public good. Smith’s philosophy, to conclude, gestures towards the 
interpersonal construction of a common axiology of social exchange 
which, as the organisation of free markets teaches us, structure indi‑
viduals without the necessity of institutionalised control.
The conception of civil society conceived as a means of restoring 
social order without introducing the figure of the Leviathan gestures 
towards dilemmas of a public good accumulation illustrating diverse 
inter ‑personal conflicts restraining the cooperative attainment of so‑
cially productive objectives. Locke’s and Smith’s considerations paved 
the way for a whole array of theories attempting to provide an answer 
to the most challenging entrapment hidden in the otherwise progres‑
sive concept of civil society. The problem is purely practical and 
concerns the measures to be taken in order to motivate autonomous 
individuals to repudiate their own portion of political freedom for the 
sake of the community and its overall prosperity. In the context of 
civil society, the duration of social order is to a large extent a function 
of individuals’ willingness to participate in all sorts of collaborative 
enterprises that do not seem to convey direct profits for particular 
partakers, but are indispensable for the survival of a community 
conceived as a coherent trans ‑personal entity. The dilemma gestures 
towards investing in public goods which constitute societal resources 
that do not belong to any particular agent contributing to their ac‑
15 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 135. Emphasis mine.
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cumulation, but, at the same time, are beneficial as far as a given 
community is concerned.16
As far as civil society is concerned, the theory of public goods 
must be based upon insights into the nature and dynamics of collective 
action. At this point, collective endeavours are conceptualised in terms 
of theoretical premises referring to cultural conditions under which 
autonomous individuals become willing to work in conjunction with 
one another (the transgression of self ‑interest) without the necessity of 
establishing a terrorizing “third party” — the authoritarian regime. 
Nevertheless, the mechanisms of collective action are furrowed with at 
least two kinds of perils. The participation in the creation of a public 
good is often endangered by “free ‑riding”: the subjective perception of 
self ‑interest motivates egoistically rational individuals to benefit from 
actions undertaken by others. Another dilemma illustrates a situation 
when cooperation cannot become actualised due to the lack of mutual 
reciprocity as well as trust. While quoting from David Hume’s work, 
Robert D. Putnam recalls the following words:
Your corn is ripe today: mine will be so tomorrow. Thus 
profitable for us both, that I should labour with you today, 
and that you should aid me tomorrow. I have no kindness 
for you, and know you have as little for me. I will not, 
therefore, take any pains upon your account; and should 
I labour with you upon my own account, in expectation of 
a return, I know I should be disappointed, and that I should 
in vain depend upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you to 
labour alone. You treat me in the same manner. The seasons 
change; and both of us lose our harvest for want of mutual 
confidence and security.17
The parable suggests that human autonomy (and agency) does not 
necessarily transfer itself into well ‑organised structures of collaborative 
actions. Human inborn predilection for rationality often causes distrust 
towards the Other who is conceived in terms of a self ‑centred homo 
oeconomicus. In this specific context, collective actions resemble a kind 
of entrapment set against rational actors. As Putnam comments on the 
16 See James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA.: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 315—318.
17 David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, quoted after R. Putnam, ”The 
Prosperous Community. Social Capital and Public Life,” The American Prospect On‑
line 30 (Nov. 2002), p. 1. Available at: www.prospect.org/web/printfriendly ‑view?
id=5175.
77From Homo Oeconomicus to Homo Reciprocus
situation delineated by Hume: “failure to cooperate for mutual benefit 
does not necessarily signal ignorance or irrationality or even malevo‑
lence, as philosophers since Hobbes have underscored. Hume’s farmers 
were not dumb, or crazy or evil; they were trapped.”18 A remedy for this 
kind of entrapment is related to the development of robust structures 
of mutual reciprocity, solidarity as well as trust. This viewpoint signals, 
to put it otherwise, that instrumental rationality has its own limitations 
and the process of cooperation depends upon such intangibles as trust 
and reciprocity. Hence, the shift of paradigm associated with the rise 
of academic interest in trust may be represented by the assumption of 
the personality model of, to use Howard Becker’s illustrative notion,19 
homo reciprocus, rather than the utilitarian, classical understanding of 
an individual as the homo oeconomicus.
From the perspective of the tragedy of the commons, the discourse 
of civil society becomes, first and foremost, an ethical edifice. As 
a socio ‑political category, this term is endowed with cultural connota‑
tions and, as Seligman observes, “it was this moral sense that assured 
mutuality, compassion, empathy, and so a basis for human interaction 
beyond the calculus of pure exchange.”20 Consequently, the notion of 
civil society has become associated with diverse forms of horizontal 
societal ties — such as public spheres and the robust tissue of as‑
sociational life — that form and reproduce themselves in a certain 
distance from the strict, vertical order of bureaucratic hierarchies and 
the economic calculus of free markets. In this sense, civil society is 
widely discussed as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
emergence of modern, democratic societies. This observation can be 
traced as far back as to the work of Alexis de Tocqueville who was 
among the first scholars to recognize that the vivid associational life 
constitutes an unparalleled arena for civic learning.
In their political associations the Americans, of all condi‑
tions, minds, and ages, daily acquire a general taste for 
association and grow accustomed to the use of it. There they 
meet together in large numbers, they converse, they listen to 
one another, and they are mutually stimulated to all sorts 
of undertakings. They afterwards transfer to civil life the 
notions they have thus acquired and make them subservient 
to a thousand purposes.21
18 Putnam, “The Prosperous Community,” p. 1.
19 See Howard Becker, Man in Reciprocity (New York, 1956), p. 1.
20 Seligman, The Problem of Trust, p. 110.
21 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Book 2, Ch. VII.
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In the light of the passage quoted above, reciprocity and trust must be 
structurally institutionalised in order not to become meaningless terms 
whose analytical significance may be valid only at the level of theory. 
The tissue of associational life is seen in terms of the crucial condition 
for the construction of trust cultures.
The discourse of civil society, consequently, unveils its dissimilar‑
ity with reference to the languages of political hierarchies and free 
markets. The latter is based upon the all ‑pervasive reign of self ‑interest 
and the rational, often numerical, calculus which is best conveyed by 
Smith’s ideas concerning the rational nature of social bond within the 
framework of advanced societal division of power: “[I]t is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect 
our dinner, but their regard to their own interest.”22 Yet, at the same 
time, the structuring principles of civil societies are different from the 
rationale of institutionalised political hierarchies where this economic 
rationale is somehow reproduced and becomes transformed into the 
sphere of interpersonal relations. This observation is especially evident 
in the case of the courtly culture where, as Norbert Elias teaches us, 
the competitive, quasi ‑economic calculation gains the upper hand over 
disinterested reciprocity as well as trust. Let us adduce his remarks in 
extenso:
The court was a kind of stock exchange; as in every good 
society, an estimate of the “value” of each individual is 
continually being formed. But here his value has its real 
function not in the wealth or even the achievements of 
ability of the individual, but in the favour he enjoys with 
the king, the influence he has with other mighty ones, his 
importance in the play of courtly cliques. All this, favour, 
influence, importance, this whole complex and dangerous 
game in which physical force and direct affective outbursts 
are prohibited and a threat to existence, demands of each 
participant constant foresight and exact knowledge of every 
other, of his position and value in the network of courtly 
opinion; it exacts precise atonement of his own behaviour to 
this value. Every mistake, every careless step depresses the 
value of its perpetrator in courtly opinion; it may threaten 
his whole position at court.23
22 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (London: Everyman’s Library, 1991), p. 13.
23 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 
p. 476.
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This peculiar position of civil society, its thirdness with reference to 
the discourses of markets and institutionalised hierarchies suggests, to 
conclude this sub ‑chapter, that this particular form of societal organisa‑
tion is founded upon a distinct type of cultural currency. If the two 
other institutional settings depend on an economic or legal ‑rational 
rationalisation, the realm of civil society tends to be founded upon 
multilateral moral commitments. As a consequence, the devotion to 
efficiency becomes replaced by the attachment to values of purely com‑
municative or dialogical origin.
Towards the Notion of Trust:  
The Limits to Rationalisation
The realm of civil society is furrowed with uncertainty as to other 
people’s willingness to cooperate for a community’s sake. This is, in 
the main, related to the absence of straightforward economic incen‑
tives facilitating interpersonal cooperation as well as strict, calcified 
in a form of legal ‑rational hierarchies, structures of authority. The 
autonomous and rational character of individuals entering the arena 
of civil society, as demonstrated in Locke’s political philosophy, proves 
that norms and values ensuring the effective collaboration for the sake 
of the public good accumulation seem to convey problems and dilem‑
mas as untenable as squaring of the circle. In the context of collective 
as well as communicative action, the sphere of civil society resembles 
a fragile construction which is liable to crumble as a result of individu‑
als’ unwillingness to act for the sake of a community.
Contemporary sociology and social psychology have developed 
a series of experimental situations purporting to convey cognitive 
models illustrating perils of cooperate actions as they tend to manifest 
themselves in the practice day ‑to ‑day life. The thing which these models 
have in common is attempts to delineate the rationale of interpersonal 
cooperation, especially with reference to situations in which the overall 
result depends on the participants’ readiness to take part in the collective 
endeavour in spite of experienced uncertainty as to actions performed 
by the Other. The most common experimental situation has been 
conceptualised as the “prisoners’ dilemma game” and constitutes an 
attempt to delineate the limits to human rationality as it is manifested 
in interpersonal as well as communicative events. From this specific 
perspective, “the prisoners’ dilemma game,” as Douglas D. Heckathorne 
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aptly concludes, “has become a paradigm for the cases where collectively 
irrational outcomes result from individually rational actions.”24 Despite 
its off ‑putting logical and mathematical interpretations, this cognitive 
model is of great value as far as the progress of knowledge in the hu‑
manities is concerned. Its elucidation provides us with some practical 
insights into the idiosyncrasies of encounters with the Other that cannot 
be subsumed within the boundaries of purely instrumental rationality.
This mind ‑game provides us with an extreme situation of two 
prisoners detained in separate prison cells and deprived of any pos‑
sibilities to communicate with each other. The isolated individuals are 
charged with a serious felony but the prosecutor has obtained only 
evidence enabling to launch a lawsuit for committing a petty crime. As 
a result, the authorities decide to mock the detainees by granting them 
an opportunity to regain freedom in return for providing a testimony 
entirely incriminating the other defendant. At the same time, the indi‑
viduals are fully aware of the fact that the person who remains silent, 
while the other decides to cooperate with the authorities, will suffer 
from a severe punishment. A slightly less negative outcome is experi‑
enced when the two defendants simultaneously decide to plead guilty. 
However, on the other hand, if they remain silent, the punishment will 
be minimal due to the light weight of collected evidence.25 Although the 
model predicts that vesting trust in the Other (and remaining silent) 
is the most successful strategy of dealing with this sort of situation, 
the partakers become defeated by the feeling of uncertainty as to the 
inmate’s behaviour and, consequently, lose the game. Needless to say, 
the situation reconstructed by the “prisoners’ dilemma game” is in 
league with the problem conveyed by Hume’s rustic parable: in both 
cases rationally thinking individuals are entrapped by the very ability 
to think in a supposedly logical and reasoned manner.
Pathological and penitentiary as the mind ‑game may be, its in‑
terpretation shows that within the realm of inter ‑personality, where 
a single individual’s fate depends on the Other’s decisions as well as 
actions, the overall success is related to the willingness to assume an at‑
titude of trust towards other individuals. The prisoners would achieve 
more if they vested a great deal of mutually held trust and decided to 
remain silent. Yet, this situation provides us with a yet another, and 
far more crucial as far as the problem of trusting is concerned, insight 
into the nature of human cooperation in interpersonal situations. The 
traditionally conceived rationality often leads us astray and trust 
24 Douglas D. Heckathorne, “Collective Sanctions and the Creation of Pris‑
oner’s Dilemma Norms,” American Journal of Sociology, no. 3 (1988), p. 539.
25 See John Field, Social Capital (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 21.
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seems to be the only possible solution to dilemmas occurring when 
public goods are being accumulated. Although the model delineates 
an extreme situation of physical isolation, its interpretations remain 
valid also in real life: risks inscribed in encounters with Otherness 
are consequences of the impossibility to obtain knowledge referring 
to other individuals — we are often forced to act in the circumstances 
of psychological estrangement.
The “prisoners’ dilemma game” offers a coherent conceptual frame‑
work for a variety of situations where trusting becomes a remedy for 
uncertainty and risk associated with the elusive presence of the Other. 
From this specific perspective, it is illustrative of a variety of cases in 
which, as David Lewis and Andrew J. Weigert’s telling phrase asserts 
us, “trust begins where prediction ends.”26 In this context, trusting 
seems to gain the upper hand over the virtue of rational calculation 
— vesting trust allows for taking diverse imponderables as well as 
intangibles into account which, by their very nature, remain resist‑
ant to attempts at quantifying them. In this sense, the discourse of 
trust must be based upon a different conception of an agent than the 
conceptualisation adopted within the classical liberal economy.
The discourse of trust, consequently, is greatly indebted to a dia‑
logical, post ‑Cartesian conceptualisation of an individual who always 
remains shrouded in reciprocity and communication. The act of vesting 
trust seems to give rise to an agent who places oneself in a realm 
of multilateral relations in which trusting, as Ihab Hassan observes, 
“requires dispassion, empathy, attention to others and to the created 
world, to something not in ourselves.”27 This kind of readiness to 
enter dialogical relations is, nevertheless, counterproductive within the 
spheres of market and legal ‑rational hierarchies where an individual 
succumbs oneself to the ability of calculation and making use of the 
Other’s mistakes for one’s subjective objectives. That is why the virtue 
of trust best actualises itself in communicative and dialogical relations 
typical of the arena of civil society.
In order to gain better, more detailed understanding of the sig‑
nificance of trust in the framework of civil society, one has to assume 
Habermas’s dichotomous distinction between instrumental as well 
as communicative rationalities.28 The sphere of economy and human 
26 David Lewis and Andrew J. Weigert, “Trust as Social Reality,” in Social 
Forces, no. 4 (1985), p. 976.
27 Ihab Hassan, “Beyond Postmodernism: Toward the Aesthetic of Trust,” Jour‑
nal of Theoretical Humanities, no. 1 (2003), p. 7.
28 See Jürgen Habermas, Teoria działania komunikacyjnego. Racjonalność działania 
a racjonalność społeczna (Warszawa: PWN, 1999); Habermas, ”Technika i nauka 
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labour is determined by economically legitimised values of technical 
efficiency that are founded upon the necessity of facilitating human 
performance with respect to the world of inanimate objects. Conse‑
quently, the worlds of technology and labour become dominated by 
the subject ‑object relation according to which a knowledgeable agent 
exerts power and authority over the sphere of inanimate, non ‑human 
artefacts. This kind of rationality aims at, to use the Heideggerian 
nomenclature, “enframing” the outside world. Such an appropriative 
attitude enables human beings to adopt a “transcendental vantage 
point” which allows to gaze into the nature of the external reality 
with the detached objectivity of a scientist.29
This opposition between the reasoning subject and the natural or 
technical object becomes, as Ulrich Beck proclaims, dissolved with the 
advent of the risk society. What was glimpsed towards the end of 
twentieth century was the fact that the world of human ‑made artefacts 
does not resemble an isolated realm which remains totally subordinated 
to the powers of human creativity but, contrariwise, it may reflexively 
re ‑organise the world of human relations.30 In this sense, technological 
risks are currently becoming important factors of social and political 
mobilisation resulting in the redefinition of social inequalities and the 
rise of a new model of social stratification based upon the distribution 
of undesired outcomes of technological progress.
According to Habermas, the realm of human interactions constitutes 
a province of rationality which is devoid of the objective, instrumental 
logic and consists of values that refer to interpersonal agreement, re‑
sponsibility as well as reciprocity which can be attained in the course 
of communicative, dialogical situations.31 Therefore, their structuring 
principles can be subsumed within the sphere of symbolic communi‑
cation taking place in a reality of everyday interpersonal interaction. 
Hence, the communicative rationality postulates the establishment 
of “ideal speech situations” whose basis is the stable, symmetrical 
universe of interpersonal relations which is founded on the reciprocal 
comprehension of inter ‑subjective reality. Let us listen to Habermas’s 
point of view:
Pure intersubjectivity is determined by a symmetrical 
relation between I and You (We and You), I and He (We 
jako ideologia,” in Czy kryzys socjologii? ed. Szacki (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1977), 
pp. 342—395.
29 Habermas, Kłopoty z przygodnością: powrót historyzmu, pp. 14—15.
30 See Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
31 Habermas, Teoria działania komunikacyjnego, pp. 639—640.
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and They). An unlimited interchangeability of dialogue 
roles demands that no side be privileged in the performance 
of these roles: pure intersubjectivity exists only when there 
is complete symmetry in the distribution of assertion and 
disputation, revelation and hiding, prescription and follow‑
ing among the partners of communication.32
As the quotation above teaches us, the realm of communicative 
rationality is devoid of the subject ‑object dialectic that is typical of 
the worlds of economy as well as mechanical labour. In the reality 
constructed and structured by meaningful relations with the Other, 
the subject cannot be regarded as an isolated or detached homo faber 
(the rationalised constructor, appropriator, and creator of the external 
reality) but it resembles the interactive Self, the homo reciprocus who, at 
every moment of their own existence, is reflexively entangled within 
numerous networks of interpersonal communication.
Much ideal or theoretical as it may be, the category of ideal speech 
situation becomes indicative of horizontal social ties that constitute the 
societal tissue of civil societies. This particular realm, consequently, is 
founded upon the existence of iterative dialogical situations, each rest‑
ing possibilities of reaching interpersonal agreements with reference 
to norms and values that regulate social interactions as well as com‑
municative actions implicit in them.33 As opposed to the instrumental 
rationality — whose laws may be subsumed within a schemata of 
objective, empirical knowledge — the realm of interpersonal commu‑
nication is structured by cultural norms and values whose meaning is 
a matter of social consent. As a consequence, communicative rationality 
constitutes the province of hermeneutic rationality; its productivity is 
a matter of social negotiation in which common interpretative frame‑
works are being constructed. Thus, this hermeneutic model assumes 
that communication processes imply the voluntary acceptance of 
symbolic devices, or discourses, used by agents operating in shared 
axiological and normative contexts.34
The idea of communicative rationality clearly refers to the existence 
of interpersonal structures of dialogic communication. In this sense, 
the mechanism of communicative rationality seems to give rise to the 
32 Jürgen Habermas, Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence, in Recent 
Sociology: Patterns of Communicative Behaviour, ed. H.P. Dreitzel (New York: Macmil‑
lan and Co., 1970), p. 143. Emphasis mine.
33 Habermas, Technika i nauka, pp. 354—355.
34 Habermas, Kłopoty z przygodnością, p. 31; Habermas, Teoria działania komu‑
nikacyjnego, p. 637.
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duality of trust culture. The initial act of entrustment is substantial as 
far as the evolution of communication structures is concerned. Yet, at 
the same time, these trans ‑personal phenomena recursively structure 
the very willingness to grant trust.
The Dualities of Culture and Trust
In the context of communicative rationality, the interpersonal dialogue 
resembles an exchange of testimonies held by particular agents enter‑
ing the arena of communication. The realm of civil society is, therefore, 
a sphere where knowledgeable agents (both individual and collective) 
compete in order to gain the upper hand in the process of constructing 
shared narratives about collective identity as well as history.35 From 
this perspective, as Paul Ricoeur remarks, trusting becomes the salient 
societal resource fostering the development of dialogical processes:
In the final analysis, however, we must emphasise the role 
of “trust.” When I testify something I am asking the other 
to trust that what I am saying is true. To share a testimony 
is an exchange of trust. Beyond this we cannot go. Most 
institutions rely fundamentally on the trust they place in 
the word of the other.36
The structured narratives of culture (shared histories, discourses and 
cultural representations, norms as well as values) all constitute ele‑
ments of the public good. In a democratic state, to put it crudely, no 
one owns culture and history, so their emergence (or social becoming 
of axiological, normative and symbolic structures) resembles a series of 
iterative “prisoners’ dilemma games” that call for trust and reciprocity 
in order to be accomplished.
The problem of trust, however, is of far greater importance than its 
role within civil society may suggest. The notion of trust — and let this 
be a place of departure for the next point of this chapter — becomes 
profoundly interwoven into the fabric of societal and cultural reality 
35 See Paul Ricoeur, “Imagination, Testimony and Trust. A Dialogue with Paul 
Ricoeur,” in Questioning Ethics. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, eds. R. Kearney, 
M. Dooley (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 12—17.
36 Ricoeur, “Imagination, Testimony and Trust,” p. 17.
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manifesting itself as an interpersonal realm, functioning in the frame‑
works of signifying practices as well as communicative actions, and 
the sphere saturated with inter ‑subjectively intelligible meanings which 
actualise themselves within consciousnesses of agents who are capable 
of interpretation. In this context, the problem of trust is, as it were, 
entangled within the sphere of culture in a twofold manner. Firstly, as 
the aforementioned relation between testimony and trust teaches us, 
trusting the Other becomes constitutive of creating a common cultural 
habitat consisting of shared discursive devices. Secondly, and perhaps 
more importantly, these cultural phenomena and processes may reflex‑
ively and recursively re ‑shape individuals’ willingness to vest trust in 
the Other. In this sense, we may observe a peculiar duality of trust, 
a term derived from the duality of agency and structure. Hence, trusting 
may actualise itself on the arena of the social as a resource facilitating 
action taking and a kind of structural phenomenon that comprises of 
networks of reciprocity as well as solidarity facilitating vesting trust 
in the Other. This particular phenomenon, to put it otherwise, belongs 
to the world of human agency, but at the same time depends on the 
existence of some kind of structure rendering being trustworthy pos‑
sible. The structural and agential aspects of trust are discussed in the 
following points of this chapter. These paragraphs are also devoted to 
the duality of culture which is the cornerstone of the duality of trust.
Trust is a constitutive correlate with reference to culture conceived 
in terms of the dialectic of the individual and the social. This process 
may be perceived as a sequence of actions comprising cultural produc‑
tion (externalisation), interpersonal symbolic exchange via shared com‑
munication means (social objectivisation) and creative interpretation 
(internalisation).37 The world of culture, hence, is the realm of inter‑
subjectivity as well as communication. It rests upon the agential ability 
to produce meaning, to express it by means of shared, linguistic systems 
of information exchange and to internalise the resultant messages in 
order to assume them as premises of intelligible actions. Consequently, 
individuals become, as it were, detained in a space between the sub‑
jectivity of one’s thoughts and the objectivity of their consequences, or, 
to put it still otherwise, between the intra ‑personality (or psychology) 
of action and motivation, as well as the inter ‑personality (sociology or 
cultural studies) of social and cultural structures.
The significance of the aforementioned triadic sequence, to express 
it in a different nomenclature, oscillates around the constitutive episte‑
37 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. 
A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), p. 79.
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mological premises of social phenomenology whose major tenets refer 
to human reality as an agential construction being (re)produced by 
active agents in the course of intentional acts of their consciousness 
and undertaken actions. As a result, a new humanistic, anti ‑structural 
ontology of social life becomes postulated: patterns of understanding 
society as well as culture and forms of taking part in their manifesta‑
tions are regarded as being inseparable.38 Such a viewpoint is, needless 
to say, founded upon a critical assumption postulating that individuals 
resemble cognitively active subjects who construct their socio ‑cultural 
environment, rather than accept it as something moulded or structured 
by forces independent of human will.
This conceptualisation is indicative of Florian Znaniecki’s methodol‑
ogy of ”the humanistic coefficient” which proclaims that socio ‑cultural 
reality has no other mode of existence than as an array of cognitive 
representations which are filtered through human experience.39 In 
other words, people intend various aspects of participation in society 
and culture. For instance, individuals belong to a particular form of 
social group or community because they experience a particular type 
of emotional and cognitive affiliation. Therefore, the principle excludes 
the possibility of regarding social reality in terms of a pure and struc‑
turally constructed objectivity which exists beyond human cognition 
and functions without the psychological engagement or commitment 
of individuals.
Having an ontological status of a constructed phenomenon, social 
reality cannot be defined as being objective. However, as a result of 
collective actions and acts of interpretation, it cannot be regarded as 
a sheer subjectivity either. Therefore, both society and culture seem to 
transgress the dichotomy and constitute “inter ‑subjective” phenomena. 
Processes of social construction of reality result in the creation of the 
Lebenswelt, that is the universe of human immediate experiences which 
is, on the one hand, an aggregation of individuals subjectivities and, on 
the other, the realm shaped by the influence of socio ‑cultural structures 
as well as acts of symbolic communication. Being expressed by the 
triadic sequence of externalisation, objectivisation and externalisation, 
the duality of culture signals that subjectively constructed meanings 
may produce objectively or inter ‑subjectively experienced consequences 
which, in turn, structure ways of perceiving reality by operating indi‑
viduals. A similar idea, however expressed in a different terminology, 
is indicative of Sztompka’s viewpoint:
38 Zbigniew Krasnodębski, Fenomenologia i socjologia (Warszawa: PWN, 1989), 
pp. 18—19.
39 Florian Znaniecki, Wstęp do socjologii (Warszawa: PWN, 1988), pp. 24—25.
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[I]t may be said that from the vantage point of action there 
exists a parallel “duality of culture.” On the one hand culture 
provides a pool of resources of action that draws form it the 
values to set it goals, the norms to specify the means, the 
symbols to furnish it with meaning, the codes to express 
its cognitive content, the frames to order its components, 
the rituals to provide it with continuity and sequence and 
so forth. In brief culture supplies action with axiological, 
normative and cognitive orientation. In this way it becomes 
a strong determining force, releasing, facilitating, enabling, 
or, as the case might be, arresting, constraining, or prevent‑
ing action. On the other hand, action is at the same time 
creatively shaping and reshaping culture, which is not God‑ 
given, constant, but rather must be seen as an accumulated 
product, or preserved sediment of earlier individual and 
collective action.40
In this sense, individuals are granted subjective agency with reference 
to producing their own testimonies reflecting individualised streams 
of their lived experiences. Yet, the ontological construction of cultural 
reality, so to speak, “arrests” their testimonies in the collective stream 
of human experiences constituting the inter ‑subjectivity of culture. 
As a consequence, a constructor of society and culture may become 
enabled or, contrariwise, disabled by the very nature of socio ‑cultural 
setting in which he or she produces testimonies.
The problem of trust seems to play a pivotal role within the sphere 
of inter ‑subjective reality of cultural origin. Since all individuals live 
in the world which, to a large extent, constitutes an amalgamation 
of socio ‑cultural constructs produced during acts of symbolic commu‑
nication, a successful existence in this peculiar reality depends on the 
feeling of trust that other social actors follow similar interpretative 
strategies as we normally do in the course of our daily routine.41 
In this specific sense, trusting may assume a form of phenomeno‑ 
logical reduction: we are culturally predisposed to “bracket off” 
actions which, to our eyes, transgress the established patterns of 
rituals or routines that are typical of a given interpersonal situa‑
tion. This mechanism rests at heart of our conception of “ontological 
security”:
40 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), pp. 3—4.
41 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self ‑Identity, pp. 36—40.
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The notion of ontological security ties in closely to the tacit 
character of practical consciousness — or, in phenomeno‑
logical terms, to the “bracketings” presumed by the “natural 
attitude” in everyday life. On the other side of what might 
appear to be quite trivial aspects of day ‑to ‑day action and 
discourse, chaos lurks. And this chaos is not just disorienta‑
tion, but the loss of a sense of the very reality of things and 
of other persons. […] To answer even the simplest everyday 
query, or respond to the most cursory remark, demands the 
bracketing of a potentially almost infinite range of possibili‑
ties open to an individual. What makes a given response 
“appropriate” or “acceptable” necessitates a shared — but 
unproven and improvable — framework of reality. A sense 
of the shared reality of people and things is simultaneously 
sturdy and fragile.42
In this peculiar context, the act of entrustment is closely related to 
the aforementioned feeling of ontological security. In order to be, so 
to speak, on the safe side, individuals are forced to believe that the 
Other will not breach culturally legitimised rules. This is, to put it still 
otherwise, the most crucial foundation of social order: existing in the 
reality structured by the formative presence of the Other depends on 
faith that “the underlying framework of reality” will not crumble, that 
human actions will remain predictable.
The foundations of ontological security rest upon the belief that 
members of the shared social context have a stable, repeatable tendency 
to interpret signs in mutually accepted manners. In other words, the 
participation in the constructed reality requires knowledge that other 
individuals use similar signifying practices for comparable objectives as 
we habitually do. Otherwise, if that knowledge fails, we are compelled 
to live in an isolation, in the sphere which is situated beyond society 
and, therefore, outside any regime of signification.
It seems, to conclude this part of argument, that the notion of trust 
transgresses the polysemic reality of language, the situation defined by 
the excess of signs and the multiplicity of discourses. From this per‑
spective, trust could be related to the essential belief that, despite the 
proliferation of signs, people may depend on the common signifying 
practices, on the shared patterns of interpretation. Perhaps, the answer 
to this problem may be found in the notion of “cultural integration” 
which provides agents with a sense of hierarchy, thus, structuring their 
42 Giddens, Modernity and Self ‑Identity, p. 36.
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actions on the basis of commonly shared values, norms and symbols.43 
Therefore, it constitutes a framework granting individuals a feeling of 
relatively stable ontological security which renders our interpretations 
predictable to social actors and, accordingly, worth being trusted.
Uncertainty and Trust:  
Intangibles and Imponderables of Human Existence
The idea of trust stems from the essential feeling of uncertainty attrib‑
uted to the general indeterminacy of encounters between the Self and 
the Other. Vesting trust in others constitutes an attempt at sustaining 
one’s sense of ontological security. It also resembles a remedy enabling 
an individual to bracket off risks caused by unpredictable as well as 
contingent actions. To trust, consequently, means to approach the Other 
who always remains elusive and shrouded in the aura of uncertainty; 
to encounter other individuals without possessing detailed knowledge 
concerning their response beforehand. It is, therefore, a specific act of 
faith which becomes vested in spite of the fundamental indeterminacy 
of interpersonal relationships.
On the most general and abstract level it can be stated that 
the need for stable, and universally recognised structures 
of trust is rooted in the fundamental indeterminacy of so‑
cial interaction. This indeterminacy, between social actors, 
between social actors and their goals, and between social 
actors and resources results in a basic unpredictability 
of social life notwithstanding the universality of human 
interdependence. Consequently, any long ‑range attempt at 
constructing a social order and continuity of social frame‑
works of interaction must be predicted on the development 
of stable relation of mutual trust between social actors.44
What is indicative of the aforementioned conceptualisation is the 
idea that the realm of inter ‑subjectivity always remains veiled in the 
multiplicity of discourses that know no sense of hierarchy or structure 
43 See Wojciech Światkiewicz, Integracja kulturowa i jej społeczne uwarunkowania 
(Katowice: Wydawnictwo UŚ, 1987), pp. 31—51.
44 Seligman, The Problem of Trust, p. 13.
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since from the onset are articulated as equally valid voices of public 
debates. Consequently, interpersonal trust, as we learn from Ricoeur, 
assumes a kind of palliative function with reference to the complexity 
of socio ‑cultural organisation.
The discourse of trusting remains greatly indebted to the language 
of agential autonomy and freedom that is indicative of the cultural 
theory of civil society. Therefore, in this specific context, relations of 
reciprocity and trust presuppose the ontological freedom of an indi‑
vidual. As Seligman puts it:
[T]he obligation to be trustworthy, and so to fulfil promises, 
arises from the moral agency and autonomy, from the free‑
dom and responsibility, of the participants to the interaction. 
Moreover, without the prior existence of these conditions, 
rights really — to freedom, autonomy and responsibility, 
the moral dimension of promise ‑keeping, and hence of 
trustworthiness — cannot be adequately explained.45
Within a system of surveillance and control (and let Jeremy Bentham’s 
idea of Panopticon be a paradigm for such cases) trusting is left behind 
in the social as well as political void as a dispensable cultural resource. 
In such cases, it becomes automatically replaced by the confidence 
vested in the authority of a supervisor who enforces his/her will 
upon subordinated individuals. Consequently, the discourse of trust 
is valid in institutions based upon some sort of voluntary participation 
in which human interactions are not supervised by an agent endowed 
with means of oppression. Hence, the cultural significance of trust is 
discussed with reference to social organisations of modernity where 
the rapid development of the “third sector” (a societal tissue comprising 
local communities and grass ‑roots organisations) is regarded as the 
pivotal factor rendering the progress of politics and economy possible. 
Hence, within structural conditions of modernity, trusting becomes 
institutionalised and, as it were, networked as a long ‑lasting subsystem 
of social and political life. 
From the perspective of aforementioned statements, it can be 
postulated that the cultural reality of a panoptical, totalitarian regime 
is founded, first and foremost, upon the politically and ideologically 
legitimised destruction of trust.46 Its cultural rationale, therefore, pro‑
45 Seligman, The Problem of Trust, p. 6.
46 These mechanisms are explored by George Orwell who elaborated on the 
decomposition of interpersonal relations in terms of an intelligible strategy of 
power reproduction. In this context, the totalitarian regime curbs grassroots rela‑
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claims that trust ‑based interpersonal relationships are automatically 
dismissed as abnormal or threatening to the authority of the supervis‑
ing power. The relationship between the Self and the Other, to put it 
otherwise, ceases to be direct and intimate: it becomes mediated as 
well as authorised by the state. Consequently, horizontal social ties 
are replaced by vertical relationships between the individual and the 
political which, as it were, trespasses the intimacy of relation between 
the Self and the Other. In the realm of civil societies, in turn, trusting 
represents a kind of “generalised expectation that the other will handle 
his freedom, his disturbing potential for diverse action, in keeping with 
personality — or, rather, in keeping with the personality which he has 
presented and made socially visible.”47 In this sense, such relations have 
no other conceivable mode of existence than between two, or more, 
knowledgeable, autonomous agents who participate in symmetrical 
discursive or dialogical situations.
The distinction between trust and confidence seems to constitute 
a pivotal point in the discussion concerning the cultural relevance of 
trust with reference to relations between the Self and the Other. From 
the perspective of Niklas Luhmann’s sociological output, the notions 
are distinguished on a basis of making a formative differentiation 
between individuals (or agents) on the one hand and collective bod‑
ies, such as social institutions and networked systems on the other.48 
In this context, trusting becomes exclusively reserved for personalised 
relations and encounters with Otherness:
Trust remains vital in interpersonal relations, but participa‑
tion in functional systems like the economy or politics is no 
longer a matter of personal relations. It requires confidence, 
but not trust.49
In order to provide a better, more comprehensible classification between 
the two ideas, Luhmann refers to the distinction between danger and 
tions or organisations as being potential germs of anti ‑state activities. Cf. George 
Orwell, Nineteen Eighty ‑Four (London: Penguin Books, 2000).
47 Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, trans. H. Davis, J. Raffan, and K. Rooney 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), p. 39.
48 In the light of a theory that binds agency and structure, such a classifica‑
tion is nevertheless dispensable. As long as systems and institutions are viewed 
as aggregates of actions, we may speak of trust with reference to both kinds of 
phenomena. This is indicative of Giddens’s output. Cf. Anthony Giddens, The 
Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 114.
49 Niklas Luhmann, “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alterna‑
tives,” in Trust. Making and Breaking Corporate Relations, ed. D. Gambetta (New 
York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 102.
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risk. The latter is conceived as the unpredictability of loss which is 
human ‑made. It constitutes a function of actions undertaken by 
individual or collective agents. Danger, contrariwise, is regarded as 
a consequence of a malfunction or a failure which is, as it were, in ‑built 
in a system or an institution.50 From this perspective, the argument 
creates an unavoidable connection between uncertainty, risk as well as 
trust, the connection that seems to legitimise the statement postulating 
that “trust is a solution for specific problems of risk.”51
The notion of trust, hence, is postulated to constitute a remedy for 
a wide array of situations in which an individual faces some degree of 
unpredictability as to the Other’s intentions. In this sense, it constitutes 
a specific kind of a “moral resource,” to use Francis Fukuyama’s telling 
notion,52 facilitating acting on the arena of the social which is fur‑
rowed with the encounters with Otherness. Thus, trusting, to a certain 
extent, resembles gambling: it is an intelligible strategy of coping with 
uncertainty attributed to the realm of interpersonal interaction. Trust‑
ing, as Sztompka observes, may become defined in terms of a “bet 
about the future contingent actions of others.”53 A similar point of 
view is indicative of Diego Gambetta’s conceptualisation: “[T]rust is 
particularly relevant in conditions of ignorance or uncertainty with 
respect to unknown or unknowable actions of others.”54
The relatedness of trusting relations to the feelings of uncertainty 
and risk can be regarded in terms of an “emotional inoculation”55 
against threats of the future life. This type of rationale implies that 
trust is simply indispensable as far as human ontogenetic development 
is concerned. Its significance arises from the very construction of the 
socio ‑cultural reality in which an individual faces the necessity of 
depending upon the Other and his/her actions. This is particularly true 
of complex social systems of modernity: in this specific context, trust‑
ing becomes the pivotal strategy of approaching societal reality whose 
interdependent, network ‑based structure facilitates the escalation of 
self ‑manifestation opportunities for individuals who are granted the 
privilege of always “acting otherwise,” to quote Giddens’s apt phrase. 
50 Luhmann, “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives,” 
pp. 99—101.
51 Luhmann, “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives,” p. 95.
52 See Fukuyama, Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: 
Free Press, 1995).
53 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory, p. 25.
54 Diego Gambetta, “Can We Trust Trust?” in Trust. Making and Breaking Cor‑
porate Relations, ed. D. Gambetta (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 218.
55 Giddens, Modernity and Self ‑Identity, p. 39.
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As opposed to the traditional society, whose structural cohesion is 
achieved due to strict mechanisms of assigning roles to individuals, 
modern society unveils itself as a structure facilitating human agency 
which actualises itself within a variety of interdependent spheres 
including global markets, politics, economy and cultural production. 
The existence of interdependent networks, which are systems of actions 
organized in opaque and abstract ways, increases the demands for 
trusting which becomes the crucial asset (perhaps a cultural compe‑
tence) to be mobilised in the process of acting. Furthermore, trusting 
becomes the salient resource in the reality marked by the impersonality 
of life in great urban districts as well as the increasing presence of 
strangers. From this perspective, such intangibles and imponderables 
as reciprocity, trust, and willingness to fulfil mutual obligations, bridge 
the gap left by the polyphony and ambiguity of the contemporary 
socio ‑cultural reality. In this context, the act of vesting trust is inevi‑
tably related to bracketing off risks, since, as Russell Hardin remarks, 
“[W]ith a complete absence of trust one must be a catatonic, one could 
not even get up in the morning.”56
With the onset of modern times, trusting other individuals seems to 
be faced with a greater proportion of risk than in the pre ‑modern era. 
The advent of mass, atomised society poses a threat to our ontological 
security: people become strangers to one another, isolated particulars 
which are lost in massive social aggregates of modernity. The lack of 
familiarity ties that bind people into coherent, well ‑known, compre‑
hensible groups forces individuals to adopt a strategy of gambler each 
time they enter the stage of sociality.57 In this context, individuals are 
compelled to treat others as potential competitors who hide their true 
identities behind the façade of gestures, appearances of courtesy or 
symbolic embellishments of social status, such as fashion for instance. 
Therefore, modern as well as post ‑modern gamblers need to adopt 
a skill of distinguishing between the essence and mere appearances 
— the ability that is contested by the contextual and pragmatic phi‑
losophies which are indulged in contingencies of the world deprived 
of the unifying purpose or structuring principles.
The cultural perspective on trust — to conclude this chapter — 
remains greatly indebted to the conceptualisation of individuals con‑
ceived as the homo reciprocus, informed agents who encounter multiple 
riddles of collective actions and the concomitant dilemmas of public 
56 Russell Hardin, “The Street ‑Level Epistemology of Trust,” Politics and Society, 
no. 4 (1993), p. 519.
57 Zygmunt Bauman ed., “Ponowoczesne wzory osobowe,” in Dwa szkice 
o moralności ponowoczesnej (Warszawa: Instytut Kultury, 1994), pp. 33—37.
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good accumulation. Trusting relations are vital to a new cultural sce‑
nario for the European modernity in which panoptical structures of 
coercion were replaced by the arena of civil society assuming a form of 
deliberative sphere of interpersonal dialogue. Trust may be conceived 
as a major cultural force taking part in the creation of discursive arenas. 
Sharing discourses, viewpoints (or testimonies in Ricoeur’s nomencla‑
ture) requires norms of reciprocity and responsibility for the Other. At 
the same time, this cultural repertoire functions as a form of the public 
good and may reflexively re ‑organise individual, agential disposition 
to vest trust in other individuals.
This duality of trust opens possibilities for a new line of argu‑
mentation in which trust cultures are defined in terms of theatrical 
performances relating problems of structural determinism to diverse 
forms of agential creativity. The metaphor of dramaturgic event, to put 
it otherwise, enables a more holistic outlook on the idea of trust and 
delineates the social becoming of trust cultures in terms of cultural 
processes taking place in interpersonal spheres comprising actors, 
performed actions (and their interactions with others) as well as the 
pre ‑existent structural resources of commonly shared axiology.
Chapter Four
Between the Stage and the Text
All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players.
They have their exists and their entrances,
And one man in his times plays many parts.1
The discourses of agency and structure constitute two dissimilar 
methodological strategies facilitating the conceptualisation of society 
and culture in the theoretical frameworks of sociology and cultural 
studies. Their synthesis has given a new impetus to variegated insights 
into the ontology of socio ‑cultural reality. New theoretical projects 
have fructified with innovative conceptualisations of actors who re‑
main shrouded in duality, rather than dualism. Knowledgeable agents 
are neither reified particulars driven by the superintended forces of 
social as well as cultural structures, nor do they resemble the abstract 
figure of the Cartesian subject. Therefore, the legacy of the synthetic 
methodologies — such as the theory of structuration — renders a novel 
strategy of research. Effective scholars must devote as much attention to 
structural determinants of human actions as to agential conditions of 
structural elaboration. The statement, to put it otherwise, postulates that 
discourses should follow synthetic, rather than analytic procedures in 
order to provide a more generalised perspective on society and culture.
The following chapter wishes to delineate a distinct methodological 
conceptualisation postulating that the synthesis of the agential and the 
structural may assume a form of “theatrical performances” combining 
agents (actors) and socio ‑cultural underpinnings of their actions (the 
text). This metaphor, furthermore, is indicative of a new interpretative 
formula seeking to unveil cultural mechanisms of trust cultures that 
1 William Shakespeare, As You Like It. Act 2, Scene 7, in History of English 
Literature. An Anthology for Students, ed. K. Fordoński (Poznań: Rebis, 2005), p. 310.
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are typical of pre ‑modern and modern forms of social organisation. The 
general outline of the proposed paradigm pays its theoretical debts to 
three distinct discourses within the realm of theoretical humanities: 
(1) Erving Goffman’s dramaturgic perspective, (2) the concept of arena 
policies and, last but not least, (3) the theory of structuration.
The legacy of Goffman’s dramaturgic perspective paves the way for 
a conceptualisation of human reality in terms of iterated dramaturgic 
events in which individuals are actively engaged in the construction 
of their social personalities. Consequently, the dramaturgic perspective 
puts special emphasis on the role of the Other (or the audience) who 
assumes an attitude of vigilant observation towards actions undertaken 
by principal actors on a stage.2
The Self […] is not an organic thing that has a specific loca‑
tion, whose fundamental fate is to be born, to mature, and 
to die: it is a dramaturgic effect arising diffusely from a scene 
that is presented.3
From this perspective, an actor’s self is not a static entity, but rather 
a product of one’s agential drive towards self ‑presentation performed 
under the sceptical gaze of the Other. By the same token, the scrutiny 
of the Other becomes, as it were, reciprocated or incorporated within 
the rationale of an actor’s performance. The approach, furthermore, is 
based upon the firm conviction that interpersonal encounters do not 
occur in spatial and temporal void. On the contrary, dramaturgic events 
are placed within a specific locale (the stage) which bridges the gap 
between the communicative universe of interpersonal dialogue and its 
spatial as well as temporal milieu.
The concept of arena policies delineates the totality of mecha‑
nisms that participate in the creation of policies by means of societal 
mobilisation and conflict resolution.4 The notion can be regarded 
as a conceptual tool facilitating our understanding of the nature of 
cultural reproduction which is conceived as a series of collective ac‑
tions directed at the reinforcement or, contrariwise, the transformation 
of pre ‑existing structures of cultural hegemony. Hence, arenas seem 
to illuminate the rationale as well as mechanisms of cultural policy 
2 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1959).
3 Goffman, The Presentation of Self, pp. 252—253. Emphasis mine.
4 Stephen Hilgartner and Charles L. Bosk, “The Rise and Fall of Social Prob‑
lems: A Public Arenas Model,” in American Journal of Sociology, no. 94 (1988), 
pp. 53—75.
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implementation.5 In this particular respect, cultural stages purport 
to constitute arenas on which social groups (individual and collec‑
tive actors representing different class, gender and race affiliations) 
compete in order to gain cultural hegemony conceived as an authority 
to legitimise existing elements of symbolic culture, such as representa‑
tions, norms and, above all, values. In this specific context, arenas re‑
semble institutionalised domains of societal construction of knowledge 
comprising actors actively engaged in organised cultural practices.6 
Consequently, knowledge remains neither subjective nor objective: it is 
a sphere of social constructs deeply rooted in the inter‑subjectivity of 
everyday praxis — the dialectic of subjective intensions and objective 
consequences of action.7
The theory of structuration8 provides an underlying ontological 
framework for the theatrical metaphor of cultural production. The 
major premise here is a notion that social and cultural structures do 
not possess a hard or organic objectivity sui generis, but, contrariwise, 
are regarded as inter ‑subjective consequences of human actions: they 
resemble entities that are being reproduced in the course of social 
practices undertaken by knowledgeable agents.9 The emphasis put on 
the synthetic properties of “duality of structure,” rather than structural 
dualism, paves the way for an ontology of the socio ‑cultural world 
that refers to dramaturgic events, or performances, as the constitutive 
elements of socio ‑cultural realities.
The Text
An individual’s agency is deeply anchored in the pre ‑given, structural 
reality of the text. From the perspective of structural determination of 
human activity, actors are conditioned (both constrained and enabled) 
by the existing panorama of textual references comprising of values, 
norms, signs and discourses of culture. The egocentric freedom of the 
5 See Glen Jordon and Chris Weedon, Cultural Politics: Class, Gender, Race and 
the Postmodern World (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
6 Jordon and Weedon, Cultural Politics, p. 13.
7 See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of 
Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), 
pp. 59—61.
8 Giddens, The Constitution of Society.
9 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, pp. 25—26.
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Cartesian model of human subjectivity constitutes an illusion — actors 
are compelled to articulate the pre ‑given lines, to perform conventional 
gestures. This imperative of repetition becomes a crucial element of 
the theatrical role. It is the repetitive character of roles that implies 
the compulsion of remembering, recollecting past memory traces and 
inscribing one’s self in the matrix of the cultural. The role, to put it 
otherwise, provides an actor with a secure harbour, a haven of ontologi‑
cal security. Repeated textual references constitute, to use Bourdieu’s 
concept, the “cultural capital,” a totality of cultural resources acquired 
by means of socialization and education from which individuals draw 
throughout their life.10 In this sense, human activities remain rooted 
in the legacy of the past: steps taken forward require attention to the 
totality of bygone, yet still pervasive and formative phenomena.
However, the legacy of the past cannot establish the complete 
hegemony over the actuality of the present day and the potentiality 
of the future. An actor does not resemble a passive entity which is 
totally moulded by the semio ‑spaces of culture. Consequently, human 
existence does not resemble a mirror image of texts that have paved the 
way for it: actors are not compelled to repeat the lines unreflectively, 
without an element of creative interpretation. In this sense, the nature 
of memory cannot be conceived as a mode of pure representation, 
but rather a means of alternation of the past. This agential aspect of 
remembering, as Robert Lowell teaches us, situates an actor within 
a nebular field of fluidity in which “the past changes more than the 
present.”11 As a consequence, the faculty of remembering implies the 
dialectic of reconstructive and constructive imagination; the fusion of 
mere repetition and alternative interpretation constituting the construc‑
tion of human identity.
In spite of their reliance on the legacy of the past, individuals retain 
their possibility of self ‑interpretation: their agency is rooted in the 
hermeneutic potential of homo textualis, an agent who remains active 
and constituted by the textual exterior.
By interpreting both the exterior and itself — and as a sign 
it cannot escape self ‑interpretation — the subject as much 
10 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1990), pp. 124—125.
11 See Allan Johnston, “Modes of Return: Memory and Remembering in the 
Poetry of Robert Lowell,” Twentieth Century Literature 36, no. 1 (1990), p. 73. Quoted 
after Borkowska, “Memory as a Mode of Return,” in Memory and Forgetfulness. 
Essays in Cultural Practice, eds. W. Kalaga, T. Rachwał (Katowice: Wydawnic‑
two UŚ, 1999), p. 34.
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constitutes (or constructs) itself as it is constituted (or 
constructed) by discourses; it is as much offered subject 
positions as it co ‑creates those positions via appropriation 
and interpretation.12
In the postulated framework, texts refer to the totality of structural 
devices (e.g. ideologies, discourses, symbols) that are used by knowl‑
edgeable actors in the process of interacting on stages of the cultural. 
In this context, texts are deprived of their objective and autopoietic 
character and can be seen as rules and resources rendering acting on 
a particular stage possible. The agential, action ‑based aspect of cultural 
structures is rooted in the faculty of memory conceived as an interpreta‑
tive mode of return. In this context, an actor’s performance is perceived 
as taking place within a particular time ‑space dimension. It concerns 
a moment in time which is located between the past that cannot be 
undone and the future that always remains open for possible action 
and re ‑interpretations. As a consequence, actions (and agents) are both 
conditioned by pre ‑existing imperatives of culture and simultaneously 
participate in their reproduction, change or elaboration. Textual devices, 
therefore, are not equipped with an objective significance but exist 
only virtually as streams of lived experiences within an individual’s 
memory. To listen to Giddens:
To say that structure is a “virtual order” of transformative 
relations means that social systems, as reproduced social 
practices, do not have “structures” but rather exhibit “struc‑
tural properties” and that structure exists, as time ‑space 
presence, only in its instantiations in such practices and 
as memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable 
human agents.13
Giddens seems to be postulating, as it were, a peculiar “phenomenol‑
ogy of socio ‑cultural structures,” an alternative solution of the problem 
of structural determinants of human action. Textual circumstances of 
human action are in ‑built in the hermeneutic processes in the course of 
which the recollected past (structural properties) becomes, so to speak, 
invented or reproduced in order to provide novel conditionings of ac‑
tion. Needless to say, the postulated interpretation of socio ‑cultural 
12 Kalaga, Nebulae of Discourse. Interpretation, Textuality, and the Subject (Frank‑
furt am Main, Berlin, Bern, New York, Paris, Wien: Peter Lang, 1997), p. 179.
13 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 17. Emphasis mine.
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structures renders the conceptualisation of an actor as the homo textualis: 
texts exist as interpretative events collected in an individual’s memory.
An actor’s role is conceived as the flow of interpretative events 
assuming the dialectic of repetition and interpretation and may be 
seen as being tantamount to an individual’s self ‑identity. In this spe‑
cific context, the issue of human identity becomes conceptualised, in 
a textual (or cultural) manner, in terms of a relatively continuous flow 
of biographical self ‑narration.14 Yet, the textual character of identity 
involves also its “emplotment,” the introduction to a chain of events 
narrated by the Other.
The category of character is therefore a narrative category as 
well, and its role in the narrative involves the same narrative 
understanding as the plot itself.15
From this perspective, the spatio ‑temporal character of an actor’s iden‑
tity is subjected to the process of discursive categorisation undertaken 
in terms of the dialectic of difference and sameness. An individual 
constructs coherent self ‑narrations on the basis of difference from 
other actors whose performance entails taking part on distinct (isolated 
geographically, temporarily or symbolically) stages.16 Less evident is 
the other side of the coin: an actor’s identity is also anchored in the 
continuity of the sameness: our biographical narrations are subjected 
to the never ‑ending process of axiological verification with regard to 
different individuals who, in our eyes, belong to the same, trustworthy 
perimeter of values, norms and texts of culture.17 Cultural identity, to 
put it otherwise, implies the existence of a particular radius of trust18 
stressing that we tend to trust those who are anchored in similar 
textual heritage, those who act within the shared perimeter of norms 
and values.
Trustworthy actors — to conclude this part of argument — tend 
to read cultural texts in a comparable fashion. They are embedded 
14 See Giddens, Modernity and Self ‑Identity, p. 76.
15 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. K. Blamey (Chicago and London: The Uni‑
versity of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 143.
16 Wojciech Kalaga, “Culture and Signification,” in Britishness and Cultural 
Studies. Continuity and Change in Narrating the Nation, eds. K. Knauer, S. Murray 
(Katowice: Wydawnictwo Śląsk, 2000), p. 65.
17 Zbigniew Bokszański, Tożsamości zbiorowe (Warszawa: PWN, 2005), pp. 36—
37.
18 See Fukuyama, The Great Disruption. Human Nature and the Reconstruction of 
Social Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), p. 52.
101The Stage
in, to use Stanley Fish’s terminology, an “interpretative community” 
representing a societal network whose existence depends on the virtue 
of shared sensitivity to symbolic culture.19 Interpretative communities, 
as the literary critic teaches us, do not purport to constitute fixed geo‑
graphical or organizational entities. The term represents a special kind 
of symbolic locale, a container of social relations whose constitution is 
a result of long ‑lasting socio ‑historical processes of axiological as well as 
normative consolidation, rather than purposeful social engineering. In 
this particular context, the notion of interpretative community is related 
to the second element of the postulated framework, namely, the stage.
The Stage
An actor’s performance does not resemble a solitary monologue. On the 
contrary, it can be perceived as a voice participating in the heteroglossia 
of theatrical stages. The notion suggests that dramaturgic events may be 
spatially and temporarily located within a distinct time ‑space continu‑
ity. As a consequence, the concept of the stage indicates a site of cultural 
convergence or debate in which knowledgeable and “emplotted” actors 
enter dialogic relations. Hence, it seems that cultural processes are not 
a matter pure, agent ‑less inter ‑textuality in which elements of symbolic 
culture belong to “the general field of anonymous formulae whose 
origin can scarcely be located; of unconscious or automatic quotations, 
given without question marks.”20 The stage, as a result, is a locale in 
which actors compete in the process of legitimising knowledge: it is 
an arena where dissimilar viewpoints, economic and political interests 
are intertwined with the pre ‑existing elements of culture.
The stage is not an objective geographical entity or a fixed organiza‑
tional system. It rather represents a symbolic location represented as the 
arena of interpersonal relations and political actions.21 Politically speak‑
ing, its major function is to represent diverse mechanisms of individual, 
local and regional policymaking in a form of a coherent conceptual 
19 Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretative Com‑
munities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).
20 Roland Barthes, Theory of the Text, trans. I. McLeod, in Untying the Text: 
a Post ‑Structuralist Reader, ed. R. Young (London: Routledge, 1981), p. 39. Quoted 
after W. Kalaga, Culture, p. 62.
21 Cf. Edmund Wnuk ‑Lipiński, Socjologia życia publicznego (Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Scholar, 2005), pp. 121—214.
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framework comprising all political actions involved in a specific issue. 
In this sense, arenas are constitutive elements of contemporary demo‑
cratic societies in which policies are products of social participation 
and grass ‑roots mobilisation, rather than centralised implementation 
as well as regulation.
Although the stage is conceptually based upon the aforementioned 
notion of arena, its significance goes beyond the issues of policymak‑
ing. From the perspective of contemporary theory, the stage resembles 
public sphere conceived, as we learn from Habermas, in terms of an 
arena of public opinion which constitutes itself in a certain distance 
from structures of institutionalised authority and control.22 The idea 
of the stage is represented as a symbolic location of dialogic and com‑
municative actions undertaken in order to attain the societal consensus 
with reference to symbolic and textual resources constituting the cul‑
tural identity of a given community. Consequently, the stage cannot 
be seen as an axiological and normative monolith, but rather it reveals 
its mercurial or discordant nature as a network ‑based site of cultural 
conflict in which a number of divergent discourses are confronted in 
the never ‑ending quest for cultural domination and textual hegemony.
The interpersonal character of the stage involves its conceptualisa‑
tion, to use Ricoeur’s terminology, as a kind of “discordant concord‑
ance,” a nebular field of diverse, often contradictory voices.23 In this 
context, stages seem to head towards the state of “positive cultural inte‑
gration,” which does not imply cultural homogeneity (over ‑integration), 
but refers to mechanisms and instruments of public debate, conflict 
resolution and interpersonal mediation. Ricoeur makes the point most 
firmly when he advocates the necessity of grounding common history 
in the concept of public deliberation by means of juxtaposing a number 
of discourses:
We make the difference between reasonable agreement and 
intractable disagreement. A common or identical history can‑
not be reached — and should not be attempted — because 
it is a part of life that there are conflicts. The challenge is 
to bring conflicts to the level of discourse and not let them 
degenerate into violence.24
22  Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, trans. T. Burger 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p. 27.
23 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 142.
24 Ricoeur, “Imagination, Testimony and Trust. A Dialogue with Paul Ricoeur,” 
in Questioning Ethics. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, eds. R. Kearney, M. Dooley 
(London, New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 12.
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Hence, the stage, as the aforementioned quotation teaches us, is first and 
foremost an ethical concept: its functioning reflects norms and ideals of 
a good discourse which are at heart of the ethics of discussion. Since 
the discursive ethics entails the possibility to argue without the need 
to suppress the Other’s voice, the stage is founded upon symmetrical 
relations typical of civil society. However, at this point a methodologi‑
cal digression should be made. The postulated conceptualisation retains 
its validity only as the Weberian “ideal type,” a hermeneutic device 
representing “subjective meaning attributed to the hypothetical actor 
or actors in a given type of action.”25 Thus, the actual construction of 
the stage becomes a mere approximation of the delineated model.
Conceived as a symbolic field of dialogic relations, the stage 
comprises interpersonal networks facilitating the exchange of cultural 
resources or, to use Ricoeur’s nomenclature, testimonies due to the 
presence of trust. Dramaturgic events entail placing bet as to the 
Other’s contingent actions. The function of trust is, thus, to sustain an 
individual’s ontological security by means of bracketing risks as well 
as uncertainties involved in everyday life. In this context, the repeti‑
tive character of an actor’s role as a secure haven may be evoked one 
more time. In the world of triumphant uncertainty running rampant 
throughout stages of cultural reproduction, actors are characterised by 
the need of a text, a reliable role, whose lines would fulfil its pallia‑
tive function with respect to faced risks. The nature of these textual 
devices changes respectively with the transformation of cultural stages 
and could be represented in a form of models comprising societies of 
pre ‑modern and late modern characters.
Furthermore, acting on a stage involves the ability to co ‑operate and 
communicate in order to create common symbolic representations and 
discursive devices enabling the perception of socio ‑cultural reality. The 
cultural aspect of this process is tantamount to the rise of so ‑called 
“discursive coalitions” which unite — permanently or temporarily — 
actors who are seeking to achieve similar objectives.26 The formation 
of discursive coalitions, in turn, depends on the ability to accumulate 
stocks of social capital which becomes related to the existence of robust 
horizontal and dialogical relations of trust. As Robert D. Putnam puts it:
Social capital here refers to features of social organisation, 
such as trust norms and networks, that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.27
25 Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, p. 89.
26 See Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 29—30.
27 Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, p. 167.
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In this sense, trust unveils its constructive nature as a resource facilitat‑
ing attaining objectives in the quest for influencing cultural policies. 
Yet, the same applies mutatis mutandis to the pre ‑given textual circum‑
stances of theatrical performances.
Perceived as a spatial and temporal entity, the stage retains its sig‑
nificance not as a geographical sphere, but as a cultural space assuming 
both the dialectic of presence and absence, as well as the continuous 
flow of time linking the present with the past and the potentiality of 
the future. In this sense, the concept outlines the totality of agential 
actions as being, first of all, localised on the cultural territory existing 
between the locality of place and the global character of space.28 As 
a consequence, individuals performing on stages are not only embed‑
ded in local circumstances of action, but are also influenced by the 
phantasmagorical presence of myriads of distant Others. The idea of 
the stage, second of all, subsumes a process of purely temporal origin 
conceptualised as a dynamic relation of the present day to both the Past 
and the Future. Hence, the stage can be delineated as the dialectic of 
modernisation and tradition. Theatrical performances, in turn, become 
localised between the ideological, progressive orientation towards the 
possibilities of distant future and the traditionalistic awe towards the 
past that cannot be undone.
Throughout their lives actors become embedded in a number of 
interrelated stages. Since the construction of human subjectivity pre‑
supposes the existence of significant relations with a multiplicity of 
others, agents reflectively refer to themselves as being entangled within 
a great number of stages. In a way, human life is an art of acting on 
many stages (educational system, the sphere of work, family life) which 
utilise dissimilar textual devices and are “inhabited” by many differ‑
ent actors.29 From this perspective, the Self entering the multiplicity 
of cultural stages constitutes itself as homo multiplex, a divergent and 
multi ‑layered personality. As George Herbert Mead postulates:
We carry on a whole series of different relationships to dif‑
ferent people. We are one thing to one man and another 
thing to another. There are parts of the self which exist only 
for the self in relation to itself. We divide ourselves up in all 
28 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, pp. 18—19.
29 Tomasz Burzyński, “The Self in the Looking ‑Glass of the Other. Inter‑
subjectivity, Friendship and Trust in the Discourse of Modernity,” in Zobaczyć 
świat w ziarenku piasku. O przyjaźni, pamięci i wyobraźni. Tom jubileuszowy dla Pro‑
fesora Tadeusza Sławka, eds. E. Borkowska, M. Nitka (Katowice: Wydawnictwo UŚ, 
2006), pp. 122—123.
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sorts of different selves with reference to our acquaintances. 
[…] There are all sorts of different selves answering to all 
sorts of different social reactions. […] A multiple personality 
is in a certain sense normal, as I have just pointed out.30
Mead seems to suggest that the complexity of interpersonal relations 
paves the way for the self ‑constitution of “multiple personalities” and 
provokes situations in which an agent deals with the Other not as 
a wholly structured and complete personality but, contrariwise, a con‑
stellation of diverse potentialities of personal development. As a conse‑
quence, an individual may be regarded in terms of a “wanderer” whose 
fate entails the necessity to roam from one cultural stage to another 
on the risky and uncertain paths of his or her life. This fate, to put it 
still otherwise, rests upon the ability to use one’s agency to adopt to 
new textual conditions embedded on a novel stage.
The overall significance of the metaphor of the stage for the theoreti‑
cal apparatus of cultural studies may be attributed to the assumption 
that the concept purports to constitute the spatial and temporal frame‑
work of cultural morphogenesis. The term represents the potentiality 
of self ‑change or self ‑elaboration by means of actions undertaken by 
knowledgeable agents, which is in ‑built in social and cultural systems. 
As Margaret Archer, the leading theoretician of socio ‑cultural morpho‑
genesis, observes:
Hence the use of the term “morphogenesis” to describe the 
process of social structuring; “morpho” indicating shape, 
and “genesis” signalling that the shaping is the product of 
social relations. Thus “Morphogenesis” refers to those proc‑
esses which tend to elaborate or change a system’s given 
form, state or structure.31
The constructive nature of dialogical relations with the Other gives rise 
to the process of elaboration of textual forms and structures that are 
reproduced on a given cultural stage. From the morphogenetic perspec‑
tive, stages are regarded as changeable entities whose dynamism is 
rooted in the agential potential of actors, the typically human élan vital 
that reconstructs social and cultural environments. Much embedded 
30 Mead, “The Self, the I and the Me,” in Social Theory. The Multicultural and 
Classic Readings, p. 223.
31 Archer, Realist Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach, p. 166. Emphasis 
mine.
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in the theory of action as the concept of morphogenesis may be, its 
interpretation is not deprived of the problem of external, structural 
conditions of human agency. As a result, an actor’s performance on the 
stage is both conditioned by their own self ‑interpretative and agential 
actions, as well as by the forces of structural determination constitut‑
ing, as it were, the alter ego of morphogenesis.
The notion of the stage would be a mere hypostasis, if it was not 
for the agential capabilities of individuals. Hence, the term refers to the 
existence of actors and the audience whose observant gaze seems to be 
tantamount to, to use Adam Smith’s terminology discussed in the previ‑
ous chapter, the idea of “impartial spectator” who provides the moral 
equilibrium to the otherwise mercurial universe of dialogic relations.
Actors and the Audience
The legacy of Goffman’s dramaturgic approach may be attributed to 
the great emphasis put on human agency which is perceived from the 
perspective of performances undertaken by knowledgeable individuals 
in front of the audience whose gaze constitutes axiological and norma‑
tive conditionings of performed actions. As a result, individuals are 
recognised as actors whose existence is conceptualised as a series of 
formative dramaturgic events involving the presentation of their selves 
to the audience. Hence, the major premises of the approach are related, 
first and foremost, to the directly experienced reality of everyday en‑
counters with the Other (the Lebenswelt), rather than to the abstract and 
trans ‑personal potentiality of social and cultural structures. Needless 
to say, the dramaturgic perspective is generally considered to constitute 
a theoretical antithesis with reference to functionalism and structural‑
ism whose theoretical heritage is often subsumed within the pessimist 
idea suggesting that the autonomous, creative subject is a mere illusion. 
The dramaturgic perspective is, thus, constituted on the basis of George 
Homans’s bold imperative: “[L]et us get some men back in, and let us 
put some blood in them.”32
Cultural stages should be seen as arenas on which individuals act 
reflexively which means that they possess a certain amount of opera‑
tional knowledge concerning their own actions and circumstances to 
32 George Homans, “Bringing Men Back In,” in Institutions and Social Exchange, 
eds. H. Turk, R.L. Simpson (Indianapolis: Bobbs ‑Merril, 1971), p. 113.
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be faced. In this sense, reflexivity should be seen as a cornerstone of 
human agency:
“Reflexivity” hence should be understood not merely as 
“self ‑consciousness” but as the monitored character of the 
ongoing flow of social life. To be a human being is to be 
a purposive agent who both has reasons for his or her ac‑
tivities and is able, if asked, to elaborate discursively about 
those reasons (including lying about them).33
The idea of reflexive actors is, nonetheless, strikingly dissimilar with 
reference to the structuralist perspective on human subjectivity depict‑
ing it as being generally false or uninformed. It is the ideology heralding 
the demise of the subject — no matter how provocative it may be — that 
situates individuals’ motivations and actions as irrelevant to the general 
construction of society and culture: “intentions or actions of human 
subjects, whether individual or collective, can easily be disposed of 
as irrelevant to the structural properties of the system.”34 The main 
shortcoming of functionalism and structuralism, in this context, may 
be related to its static conceptualisation of socio ‑cultural structures 
conceived as purely autopoietic matrixes representing a more profound 
dimension of reality. As a consequence — and in relation to the positiv‑
ist ideology embedded in structural thought — structures are seen as 
“blueprints” for social relations.
The “structure” of an organism exists “independently” of its 
functioning in a certain specific sense: the parts of the body 
can be studied when the organism dies, that is, when it has 
stopped “functioning.” But such is not the case with social 
systems, which cease to be when they cease to function: 
“patterns” of social relationships only exist in so far as the 
latter are organised as systems, reproduced over the course 
of time.35
Hence, the concept of the death of the subject logically presupposes 
attempts at conducting its “post ‑mortem,” that is actions aiming at dis‑
33 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 3.
34 Milner and Browitt, Contemporary Cultural Theory (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 98.
35 Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory. Action, Structure and Contradiction 
in Social Analysis (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), 
pp. 61—62.
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secting socio ‑cultural reality as if it was a corpse subjected to anatomi‑
cal investigation. The stage would become an empty construction if it 
was not seen from the perspective of actors and their agency embedded 
in actions as well as interpersonal relations.
From this perspective, the concept of the stage draws from an idea 
that actors may be conceived in terms of the homo creator: reflexive 
agents who are placed in ‑between of the textual legacy of their role and 
their creative impulses to act. By the same token, the stage constitutes 
an arena of textual constraints as well as facilitations, the sphere of 
cultural resources which may be used by agents in informed ways. The 
central, spot ‑lighted place on the stage is occupied by principal actors 
who seek to influence cultural production as well as cultural policy. 
These actors may be individualised personae (great thinkers, scholars 
and intellectual provocateurs or gurus) whose work provides us with 
new insights into the nature of cultural reproduction. Yet the cultural 
agency may also be embodied in a form of collective actors which are 
institutionalised (political parties, grass ‑roots organisations) as well as 
informal and non ‑institutionalised (subcultures and social movements).
Actors, who compete on the stage of culture, cannot be seen as 
being endowed with equal possibilities or capabilities to influence poli‑
cies; their agency remains differentiated. The situation in which every 
conceivable agent is able to exert the same proportion of influence on 
culture — as both commonsensical observation and scholarly theories 
teach us — is as untenable as squaring of the circle. Let us, without 
analysing the long debate in the sociology of social inequality, quote 
the following remark:
Power, in this relational sense, concerns the capability of 
actors to secure outcomes where the realisation of theses 
outcomes depends upon the agency of others. The use of 
power in interaction thus can be understood in terms of 
facilities that participants bring to and mobilise as elements 
of the production of that interaction, thereby influencing its 
course. Social systems are constituted as regularised prac‑
tices: power within social systems can thus be treated as 
involving reproduced relations of autonomy and dependence 
in social interaction.36
The abovementioned conceptualisation of power is, nevertheless, 
greatly indebted to the Weberian idea suggesting that this particular 
36 Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 93. Emphasis mine.
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term indicates a special kind of interpersonal relation with the Other 
in which the empowered actor can exercise his/her will upon another 
participants even in spite of their resistance.37 However, disabled ac‑
tors are not doomed to face the position of passive reification and 
— in spite of their unprivileged position within the totality of power 
relations on the stage — may possess some resources facilitating 
their performance with regard to the empowered principal actors. 
This is the so ‑called “dialectic of control” which, as Giddens teaches 
us, shows “how the less powerful manage resources in such a way 
as to exert control over the more powerful in established power 
relationships.”38 The concept, to put it otherwise, indicates the role 
of the audience on the stage. In this theoretical framework, the audi‑
ence represents the totality of agents who at a given time remain 
silent (or silenced) during the cultural debate. Yet, as the rationality 
of democracy teaches us, their role becomes constitutive as far as 
principal actors’ actions are concerned: the audience is endowed with 
a special form of collective agency best characterised by the Latin 
proverb: vox populi vox dei.
The Performance 
Towards the Culture of Trust
The three components of the proposed methodology cannot exist inde‑
pendently and are joined together as the dramaturgic event. Texts are 
performed by knowledgeable actors who retain the ability to interpret 
both the textual resources as well as their identities from the perspec‑
tive of the performed roles. Actors reflexively refer to themselves as 
being placed within the multiplicity of other agents embodied within 
distinct spatial and temporal relations constituting stages. Therefore, 
dramaturgic events seem to constitute the only empirical entities as 
far as culture is concerned. A similar ontological postulate has been 
envisaged by Sztompka who coins the category of socio ‑individual field 
in order to show the mutual dependence of the structural and the 
individual.
37 See Weber, The Theory of Social, p. 152.
38 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 374.
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In their own constitution social events fuse individualities 
and totalities, persistence and change, potentiality and 
actuality.39
During the performance on the stage, an actor is not only rooted in the 
potentiality of textual references, but also in the actuality of the gaze 
of the Other. Agents are naturally driven towards the Other whose 
presence confirms the validity of performed roles. The Other’s actuality 
as well as integrity is mutatis mutandis the provenance of trust in one’s 
own identity.
The general idea that stands behind the outlined conception of the 
theatrical performance suggests that this particular framework may 
be adopted in order to analyse morphogenetic processes participating 
in the construction of stable trust cultures. The term indicates that 
interpersonal reciprocity, solidarity as well as trustworthiness are 
not only individualised phenomena, but also may be seen in terms 
of attributes inscribed in any given socio ‑cultural environment.40 The 
culture of trust — conceived as a collective, emergent institution — 
remains a function of personalised trust. It is constructed on basis of 
human agency that actualises itself in a form of actions oriented at plac‑
ing trust, entrusting something and evoking trust. In this sense, trust 
culture is an objective of cultural actions, a goal, to use the employed 
terminology, of dramaturgic performances.
Applying these conceptions to the building of trust culture, 
we must first emphasise the continuity of the process, which 
unfolds incessantly from the past through the present to‑
ward the future. Taking the perspective of the present, we 
shall notice that the relevant praxis consists of actions — 
individual and collective — in which people deploy trust, 
and make the bets of trust in three forms: placing trust, 
entrusting something and evoking trust. Looking backward, 
toward the past, we shall see that people act within some 
received tradition concerning trust, that is, the prevailing 
cultural climate of trust, or the reverse, the culture of dis‑
trust. […] Looking forward, toward the future, we shall see 
that these bets of trust bring some results: predictive trust 
is confirmed, entrusted values are returned, evocative trust 
is reciprocated.41
39 Sztompka, Society in Action, p. 96.
40 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory, pp. 119—121.
41 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory, p. 120.
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The aforementioned quotation asserts most firmly that the emergence 
of trust cultures resembles an active process of cultural morphogenesis 
taking into account both individual or collective actions undertaken 
by actors as well as structural, or textual, conditionings of their acts.
The following chapters are devoted to the analysis of trust cultures 
of traditional and modern societies from the perspective of the outlined 
framework of theoretical performances. In this sense, the problem is 
conceived in the context of an interplay between agential and structural 
factors whose generalised impact produces dissimilar cultures of trust. 
The main thesis illustrating patterns of changeability is the assumption 
that trust cultures undergo the process of modernisation in which the 
onus is shifted from the structural (textual) conditionings of the role 
to the spatio ‑temporal environment of stages and the agency of actors 
manifested by their ability to win trust. In other words, pre ‑modern 
cultures are seen as trust cultures that generate trust on the basis of 
legacy of textualised roles. In turn, trust in modernity is related to the 
agential activity of actors who perform in an uncertain environment 
defined by the proliferation of theatrical roles and ubiquity of global, 
networked stages.

Chapter Five
Trust as a Structural Expectation 
Tradition, it might be said, is an orientation to the 
past, such that the past has a heavy influence or, 
more accurately put, is made to have a heavy influ‑
ence over the present. Yet, clearly, in a certain sense 
at any rate, tradition is also about the future, since 
established practices are used as a way of organising 
future time. The future is shaped without the need 
to carve it out as a separate territory. Repetition […] 
reaches out to return to the future to the past, while 
drawing on the past also to reconstruct the future.1
Trust cultures are endowed with a purely temporal dimension sig‑
nalling that processes of social change give rise to distinct cultural 
environments providing individuals with wide ranges of incentives 
as well as disincentives facilitating or, contrariwise, hindering repos‑
ing trust in the Other.2 It postulates that forces of historical change 
give rise to distinct patterns of cultural reproduction responsible for 
the construction of trust cultures. As far as the theatrical framework 
is concerned, these patterns entail specific combinations of agential 
(actors), textual and spatio ‑temporal (the stage) factors subsumed in 
them. When translated into the problematic of interpersonal relations 
of trust, this hypothesis postulates that trust cultures may be perceived 
as systems in the process of change from the structurally rendered 
expectation towards the dimension of agential necessity.
The following chapter wishes to unveil the structural (or textual) 
determinants of the process of reproduction of trust cultures in the 
1 Giddens, “Living in a Post ‑Traditional Society,” in Reflexive Modernisation. 
Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, eds. U. Beck, A. Giddens, 
and S. Lash (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 62.
2 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, p. 100.
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realm of pre ‑modern or, to put it otherwise, traditional societies. In this 
context, the major cultural phenomenon fostering durable structural 
foundations of trusting relations is the reign of traditionalism, a specific 
organisation of time which establishes the hegemony of institutional 
time over the temporal order of day ‑to ‑day existence by means of the 
all ‑pervading compulsion of repetition.
The Kula Ring
An investigation into pre ‑modern trust cultures pays its theoretical 
debts to social anthropology which renders a more informed and, so to 
speak, de ‑romanticised outlook on the reality of pre ‑modern societies. 
The realm of traditional folk cultures becomes deprived of its con‑
ventional interpretation defining it as a sphere of heavenly order and 
tranquillity. In the context of anthropological discourse, pre ‑modernity 
cannot be seen as a historical era whose cultural ethos contained more 
friendship and benevolence, than it is experienced nowadays.3 Here, 
the stress is laid not on attempts to prise the ethos of pre ‑modernity, 
but to observe it in a more critical manner. This is also indicative 
of this very argument which traces the pre ‑modern patterns of trust 
culture reproduction as being anchored in collective and traditionalistic 
mechanisms enforcing reciprocity and multilateral solidarity, such as 
the institution of the “Kula Ring.”
In the context of social anthropology, the Kula Ring may serve 
as a prototypical trust culture whose functioning depends upon pre‑ 
modern, structural (textual) mechanisms of accumulating stocks of gen‑
eralised trust. The distinctiveness of the Kula Ring is related, first and 
foremost, to specific patterns through which the pre ‑modern cultural 
order is being reproduced. Sociologically speaking, pre ‑modernity con‑
notes the Gemeinschaft, a community based upon strong and emotional 
social ties whose durability is reinforced by the sacred authority of 
tradition as well as the familiarity of local cultural environments.4 In 
the reality of pre ‑modern community, interpersonal bonds and bridges 
can be constructed only when the Other is perceived as being predict‑
3 Bauman, “Modernity and Ambivalence,” in Global Culture, Nationalism and 
Modernity, ed. M. Featherstone (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Pub‑
lications, 1997), p. 151.
4 Tönnies, Community and Association (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1955).
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able and the conditions of his or her benevolence are presented in 
a convincing and plausible manner.5 Trusting, consequently, becomes 
inscribed into a totality of cultural mechanisms — such as the Kula 
Ring — facilitating the reduction of complexity inscribed in interper‑
sonal relations.
The Kula Ring has won almost universal acclaim as a paradigmatic 
instance of cultural institution whose main function is attributed to pre‑
serving individuals’ ontological security by means of providing moral 
foundations for relations of trust and reciprocity.6 Bronisław Malinowski 
took greatest intellectual courage and stamina to delineate a vivid and 
cognitively inspiring representation of native cultures inhabiting the 
coral archipelago of the Triobriand Islands. Although his study unveils 
itself as a formative and seminal text as far as the development of social 
anthropology is concerned, it also enables drawing more informed 
parallels between the cultures of pre ‑modernity and advanced socie‑
ties of the contemporary era. Malinowski’s study contains empirical 
evidence belatedly sustaining John Locke’s argument suggesting that 
social bonds and mutual responsibilities (appetitus societatis) predate 
fully ‑fledged political organisation. The case of Triobriand islanders, 
to translate it into the discourse of political philosophies, illustrates 
the thesis suggesting that the elaboration of interpersonal structures 
of trust logically antedates the rise of institutionalised mechanisms of 
coercion typical of advanced political bodies, such as national states, 
for instance.
The cultural logic of the Kula Ring, to put it briefly, aims at “the 
creation of networks of alliances among stateless societies so as to fa‑
cilitate commercial exchange.”7 The term denotes an elaborate system of 
ritual exchange in which eighteen tribal communities of the Triobriand 
archipelago take part each year. The islanders participate en masse in 
the cyclical, ritual exchanges of ceremonial artefacts (red shell ‑disc 
necklaces and white shell bracelets) which are performed with regard 
to complex norms of reciprocity. The reciprocity logic of the Kula Ring 
prescribes complex exchange rules stating that the necklaces are traded 
to the north (the artefacts circle the whole archipelago in a clockwise 
direction) and the bracelets are traded to the south (the items circle 
the archipelago in a counter ‑clockwise direction). Consequently, the 
5 Cf. Luhmann, Trust and Power, trans. H. Davis, J. Raffan, and K. Rooney 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), p. 4.
6 Bronisław Malinowski, Argonauci Zachodniego Pacyfiku. Relacje o poczynaniach 
i przygodach krajowców z Nowej Gwinei (Warszawa: PWN, 1981).
7 Janet Landa, Trust, Ethnicity and Identity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994), p. 142.
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archipelago’s naval and territorial geography becomes re ‑defined by 
the ring ‑shaped trading network.
Despite its elaborate cultural regulations, the trade itself is seen 
as a mere façade with reference to the main function of the ceremo‑
nies, namely, the construction of stable interpersonal bonds between 
members of the geographically isolated communities. Consequently, 
the ritual exchange gives rise to network of moral obligations that 
serve as a form of social capital which could be depended upon at 
various times in the communities’ existence. The ritual of interchange 
is firmly anchored in the common cultural tradition of the Triobriand 
Islands whose constitutive elements provide mythical and magical 
rules governing not only the trade itself, but also auxiliary activities 
surrounding the ceremony.8
The ritual exchanges are associated with a high proportion of 
uncertainty and risk. The islands are separated by rough seas which 
pose a serious threat for the communities deprived of modern naval 
technologies. Hence, despite its supposedly commercial character, the 
ritual cannot be regarded as an economic institution par excellance. The 
objective value of the artefacts cannot compensate both dangers as 
well as labour necessary for the accomplishment of the ceremony. As 
opposed to the majority of modern economic institutions, the Kula 
Ring ritual seems to aim at the reproduction of cultural imperatives, 
rather than the sheer accumulation of economic capital. In this respect, 
Malinowski’s functional methodology — to use the contemporary 
discourse of functionalism — is constructed on the basis of a di‑
chotomy between manifest and latent functions.9 This distinction, to 
put it succinctly, lays stress on the idea that socio ‑cultural realities are 
endowed with hidden patterns or regularities whose existence renders 
order to seemingly irrational actions or phenomena. Consequently, 
methodological insights, so some would claim, should be placed first 
and foremost upon the whole array of unintended consequences (latent 
functions) which make actions intelligible from the perspective of 
a cultural system conceived as a functional totality. A modern observer 
may therefore find no practical or utilitarian value in the institution of 
the Kula Ring. Yet the unintended consequences associated with the 
institution unveil its latent teleology as a powerful and active means 
of attaining cultural integrity.
Behind this functionalistic brand of thought, there lurks an idea 
suggesting that the methodology based upon the predilection for 
8 Malinowski, Argonauci, pp. 149—155.
9 See Robert King Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1968).
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unveiling the hidden cultural meaningfulness is, nevertheless, indica‑
tive of Malinowski’s perspective on the mythical aspects of traditional 
cultures.
Myth fulfils in primitive culture an indispensable function: 
it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it safeguards and 
enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and 
contains practical rules for the guidance of man. Myth is 
thus a vital ingredient of human civilisation; it is not an idle 
tale but a hard ‑working, active force; it is not an intellectual 
explanation or an artistic imagery, but a pragmatic charter 
of primitive faith and moral wisdom.10
Despite the apparently Western penchant for applying evaluative 
terminology, the postulated viewpoint on pre ‑modern cultures — as 
the citation teaches us — seems to convey a very post ‑modern or post‑ 
colonial idea proclaiming that indigenous communities are endowed 
with their own specific cultural rationale and, therefore, cannot be 
assessed as being primitive from the viewpoint of modernised ration‑
ality. The rationality in question refers to the necessity of possessing 
accumulated stocks of moral resources (trust, solidarity, empathy) for 
the development of modern social organisations. In fact, theories, which 
tend to occupy a sizeable part of contemporary debates in contempo‑
rary social philosophy and sociology, seem to give great prominence 
to the re ‑invention of close emotional ties as a remedy for the societal 
disintegration which runs rampant in our times.11
In the context of modern problems with societal fragmentation 
and deregulation, the paradigmatic significance of the Kula Ring may 
become attributed to the assumption that, historically speaking, it 
constitutes the first model conceptualising the accumulation of social 
capital by means of constructing, to use Mark Granovetter’s nomencla‑
ture, an all ‑encompassing network of “weak social ties.”12 The notion 
has been originally coined in order to conceptualise the importance of 
10 Bronisław Malinowski, “The Role of Myth in Life,” in Sacred Narrative. Read‑
ings in the Theory of Myth, ed. A. Dundes (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1984), p. 199.
11 See especially Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of 
American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Putnam, Making Democ‑
racy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1993).
12 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revis‑
ited,” Sociological Theory 1 (1983), pp. 201—233.
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interpersonal relations of acquaintanceship for specific mechanisms of 
cultural production (creation of new ideas or ideologies, dissemination 
of beliefs) in highly differentiated urban settings. In this sense, “the 
strength of weak ties” is not an oxymoronic phrase, but a statement 
expressing a firm belief in societal networks conceived as determinants 
of the macroscopic integration of communities. As Granovetter aptly 
observes:
The macroscopic side of this communication argument is 
that social systems lacking in weak ties will be fragmented 
and incoherent. New ideas will spread slowly, scientific 
endeavours will be handicapped, and subgroups separated 
by race, ethnicity, geography, or other characteristics will 
have difficulty reaching a modus vivendi.13
Although the notion remains firmly embedded within the urban 
panorama of modern societies, its theoretical implications seem to 
convey wider connotations and may also become indicative of the 
pre ‑modern type of social organisation. From this specific perspective, 
the cultural productivity of weak societal ties is especially evident in 
the case of the Argonauts of the Triobriand archipelago. Despite the 
objective, geographical distances between particular islands, the native 
communities succeeded in the construction of an all ‑encompassing 
network of interpersonal interaction, a peculiar cultural stage whose 
axiological and normative organisation seems to defy the pre ‑existing 
spatial intervals.
The cultural significance of trusting relations based on the weak 
social ties — to translate it into the general terminology of the theatrical 
performance framework — can be attributed to their role in accumu‑
lating stocks of social capital which may potentially enhance actors’ 
performances undertaken in the uncertain and fluid world inhabited 
by myriads of Others. This enabling (or facilitating) character of trust 
becomes indicative, to put it otherwise, of the general construction of 
socio ‑cultural reality in which individual actions are, to use Ricoeur’s 
nomenclature, “emplotted” within the trans ‑personal as well as the 
inter ‑subjective. From a more utilitarian perspective, vesting trust 
becomes constructive as far as an actor’s activity is concerned: both 
mutual obligations and solidarity seem to amplify individual agency. 
This practical aspect of trust sheds further light on the inter ‑subjective 
13 Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited,” 
p. 202.
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nature of culture in which objectives are attained collectively by means 
of cooperation and negotiation.
From the perspective of weak social ties, the institution of the 
Kula Ring constitutes an intelligible mechanism aiming at the societal 
construction of a particular type of the public good: a stable and well 
integrated culture of trust. In this context, the routine of ritual voyages 
as well as axiologically reinforced confidence that the ceremonial gifts 
must be reciprocated constitute the all ‑pervading aura certitude which 
interpolates the native cultures of the Triobriand archipelago. Myths 
and rituals participating in the societal actualisation of normative 
imperatives implicit in the institution may be regarded in terms of 
factors enabling coping with risk and complicity inscribed in the realm 
of everyday experiences.
Therefore, the Kula Ring — to put it in a discourse of contemporary 
cultural studies — constitutes a distinct signification system in which 
the tribesmen cease to function as anonymous individuals and become 
participants taking part in the same performance. They are all united 
by the perception of common imperatives and undertake actions which 
become intelligible from the perspective of the whole cultural system. 
This institution, as far as its general cultural significance is concerned, 
is indicative of the functional status of myths and rituals within the 
panorama of pre ‑modern cultural systems. Symbolic devices, as Clyde 
Kluckhohn asserts, may function as elements aiming at the preserva‑
tion of ontological security in a world of uncertainty and risk in which 
everyday experience seems to sink in the turmoil of contingency as 
well as unpredictability.
Existence in an organised society would be unthinkable 
unless most people, most of the time, behaved in an expect‑
able manner. Rituals constitute “tender spots” for all human 
beings, people can count upon the repetitive nature of the 
phenomena. […] Rituals and myths supply, then, fixed points 
in a world of bewildering change and disappointment.14
From this perspective, the cultural productivity of myths and rituals 
fulfils a palliative function with regard to the totality of human actions. 
Actors tend to perceive each other as trustworthy persons due to the 
fact of being united by the shared principles of the Ring. Risk associ‑
ated with unfulfilled obligations becomes, consequently, diminished.
14 Clyde Kluckhohn, “Myths and Rituals: A General Theory,” in Reader in Com‑
parative Religion. An Anthropological Approach, eds. W.A. Lessa, E.Z. Vogt (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1979), p. 74.
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The significance of the Kula Ring for the cultural analysis of 
pre ‑modernity enables postulating a thesis suggesting that in this 
particular context trust functions as a form of generalised normative 
expectation. In this particular context, trusting is not a result of profit/
loss calculations which presupposes a conscious decision of vesting 
confidence in the Other. The agency of trust, consequently, presup‑
poses an act of rational choice — an individual is obliged to make an 
informed decision on the basis of knowledge concerning the Other and 
his/her motivations to undertake particular actions. The same applies 
mutatis mutandis to the figure of a trustee who becomes obliged to 
present oneself as a reliable partner of interaction.
The problem of trust — as it is presented in the case of the Kula 
Ring — does not seem to be subsumed within the category of the 
agency of trust. In this case, trusting relations are placed externally 
upon individuals. In other words, to use terminology of the theatrical 
framework, trust seems to be safeguarded by the legacy of roles which 
actors fulfil during cultural performances (such as the Kula Ring). As 
Sztompka observes:
Looking at trust as a cultural phenomenon is the domain 
of the cultural approach, unravelling the third dimension 
of trust. From this perspective, trust appears as neither 
a calculated orientation, nor a psychological propensity, but 
a cultural rule. […] It is the property of social wholes, rather 
than relationships or individuals. If the rules demanding 
trust are shared by a community, and perceived as given 
and external by each member, then they exert a strong con‑
straining pressure on actual acts of giving or withdrawing 
trust.15
In the context of pre ‑modern culture, actors are normatively expected 
to vest trust in the Other, and as a result, to believe that their positive 
attitudes will be reciprocated. The statement, to put it in a more general 
or synthetic terminology, indicates that pre ‑modern cultures may be 
perceived in terms of realms of structural expectations and obliga‑
tions. Actors who remain anchored in the textual aspects of sacred 
tradition — as opposed to modern individuals who enjoy the plurality 
of choices — live under the spell of compulsion and repetition. They 
are expected to emulate and internalise sacred imperatives as well as 
prerogatives. The postulated understanding of pre ‑modern cultures, to 
15 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory, p. 66.
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put it still otherwise, may be conceptualised from the perspective of 
an actor’s biography. Human biographies cannot be solely perceived 
through the prism of agential drives of self ‑actualisation implicit in 
a personality typical of a cultural actor. Important as they may be, 
such innate drives are always related to culturally established patterns 
of behaviour providing individuals with ready ‑made, “off ‑the ‑shelf” 
personality models suggesting legitimised trajectories of “normal” 
biographies.
The overtly compulsive character of pre ‑modern culture becomes 
also reinforced by the roles played by actors performing on stages 
of culture. As opposed to social roles of modernity, whose normative 
contents may by subjected to processes of negotiation, moral obliga‑
tions typical of pre ‑modern cultural actors are expressed in a form of 
imperatives that cannot be transformed. This is emphasised by the term 
“status relations” which, as Francis Fukuyama observes, indicates the 
sphere of life ‑long compulsion, rather than the agential predilection for 
making biographical choices:
A father was bound to his family or a lord to his slaves and 
servants in a lifetime personal relationship that consisted 
of a host of informal, unarticulated and often ambiguous 
mutual obligations. No one could simply walk away from 
the relationship if he or she did not like it.16
The problem of axiological as well as normative obligations corresponds 
to the construction of the Kula Ring which assumes that the participants 
are bound by the authority of tradition and, therefore, one cannot with‑
draw their access to the institution or change its rules.17 The concept of 
the status relationship — if it is perceived from a more psychological 
perspective — is endowed with a serious implication concerning the 
psychology of its participants: partaking in such a relation is a matter of 
habitual and often unthinkable repetition. As a consequence, actors are 
not perceived in a reflexive manner — their performances rely upon the 
ability to follow the lines of texts in the most literal sense of the word.
The idea of non ‑reflexive cognition clearly summarises Malinowski’s 
observations concerning the islanders who are perceived in terms of 
passive participants. The possessed knowledge becomes limited to an 
individual’s subjective motives and aspirations: consequently, one is 
deprived of a more generalised perspective on the phenomenon he 
16 Fukuyama, The Great Disruption. Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social 
Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), p. 9.
17 Malinowski, Argonauci, p. 132.
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or she partakes in.18 This mechanism is, nevertheless, indicative of 
processes of participation in the totality pre ‑modern cultures and their 
institutions, such as mythologies for instance.
Myth […] is not an intellectual reaction upon a puzzle, but 
an explicit act of faith born from the innermost instinctive 
and emotional reaction to the most formidable and haunt‑
ing idea. […] They never explain in any sense of the world; 
they always state the precedent which constitutes an ideal 
and a warrant for its continuance, and sometimes practical 
directions for the procedure.19
The quotation may be interpreted in an evaluative manner as an 
attempt at inscribing native tribesmen into the realm of the natural 
which manifests itself by their reliance upon the reign of biologically 
intelligible instincts and primordial — psychoanalysts would say 
unconscious — drives lurking at the hinterlands of human personality 
and being expressed by myths. Yet when we approach this statement 
with more contemporary explanatory devices, it becomes apparent that 
the dependence upon ritual and myth is not a sign of developmental 
backwardness, but rather an indicator of reliance upon the impact 
of “practical consciousness” which takes hold of human behaviour 
both in modernity and in bygone historical eras. This notion suggests 
that all purposeful actions involve the use of tacit knowledge which 
cannot be entirely expressed in a discursive way.20 Although practical 
consciousness tends to be underestimated as a means of controlling 
an individual’s flow of acts, this kind of knowledge is indispensable 
for the continuity of social and cultural systems. The overwhelm‑
ing majority of Englishmen, for instance, consist of competent users 
of their native language. They, however, can speak the language 
without having a detailed and discursively expressed knowledge of 
linguistic theories or generally accepted rules of prescriptive gram‑
mar. Moreover, the continuous and reflective use of this knowledge 
would backfire the most crucial function of language, namely, the 
societal communication.
In the context of the Kula Ring, cultural reproduction can be seen 
as a matter of habitual, quasi ‑instinctive ability to recall and repeat. 
Hence, it depends on the element of human experience that is deeply 
18 Malinowski, Argonauci, pp. 128—129.
19 Malinowski, The Role of Myth, p. 206. Emphasis added.
20 See Giddens, The Constitution of Society, pp. 6—7.
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interwoven, as Chris Jenks postulates, into the very sense of continuity 
and change conceived in terms of foundations of cultural reproduction 
processes.21 The ability to provide discursive explanations for individual 
or collective actions is, in the context delineated above, a very modern 
phenomenon which may be related to the growing expansion of profes‑
sional expertise in the age of modernity. In the context of practical 
consciousness, actors rely upon textual devices which are embedded in 
their roles and the whole cultural performance seems to head towards 
the stability of structures, rather than the mercurial activity of human 
agency.
The next sub ‑chapters wish to seek for underpinnings of pre ‑modern 
trust cultures in three interrelated conditions of cultural reproduction. 
First of all, this is the all ‑pervading impact of tradition which organ‑
ises cultural stages. Secondly, this is the agential conceptualisation of 
natural environment which assumes the role of the guardian of the 
textual. Thirdly, it is the spatial organisation of communities invoking 
associations with the Gemeinschaft ‑like type of societal organisation.
Memorization as a Form of Compulsion
The stage is a concept related to the issue of spatial and temporal loca‑
tion of actions aiming at the reproduction of culture. From a perspective 
of an individual actor, the temporal aspect of the stage is represented 
by the degree to which it provides acting agents with reliable means 
of coping with the passage of time, the unnerving fact of temporality 
inscribed in the world of human affairs. Hence, the cultural significance 
of the stage arises from the fact that every attempt at providing culture 
with continuity in time and space occurs within a distinct set of pre‑ 
existent spatial and temporal relations. Cultural conceptions of time, 
to put it otherwise, may facilitate or, contrariwise, constrain modes of 
cultural reproduction.
When translated into the conceptual reality of the postulated theat‑
rical framework, dramaturgic events involve three intertwined orders 
of temporality.22 The first aspect of temporality is the reversible durée of 
daily routines. This is the temporal order which is constituted by the 
21 Chris Jenks, “The Analytic Bases of Cultural Reproduction Theory,” in Cul‑
tural Reproduction, ed. Ch. Jenks (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 5.
22 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, pp. 34—36.
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necessity of constant repetition. Not only do actors follow the lines of 
the same script each day, but they also expect to take part in repeatable 
and reliable institutions, rituals or other recurrent cultural phenomena. 
In other words, actors — when facing similar social situations everyday 
— are compelled to draw from comparable discursive options (texts) in 
the process of coping with problems of daily existence.
A strikingly dissimilar order of temporality is discussed when the 
problem of human ontogenesis becomes evoked. The overall course of 
human life, then, constitutes, the irreversible time of human ontoge‑
netic existence. Nevertheless, when we assume a different viewpoint, 
the problem may be conceptualised as constituting the second axis of 
ontological security stating that actors are obliged to vest trust in the 
life ‑long continuity of social and cultural institutions. This particular 
aspect of ontological security is related to a belief that one’s existence 
is dependable upon the logic of social evolution. It stresses that stability 
of social order is not only temporary, but it is a permanent, life ‑long 
feature of social systems.
This expectation that social systems reach beyond the individual’s 
life alludes to the third order of temporality. In this context, one can 
observe the dimension of temporality conceived as an essential element 
of trans ‑personal institutions of society and culture. This constitutes 
the reversible time of institutions which indicates that patterns of social 
evolution are a mixture of continuity and change so that each succes‑
sive generation follows the same ontogenetic steps and expects that 
after their death culture will continue to exist.
The concept of trust cultures perceived through the prism of theatri‑
cal performances is based upon the premise that the process assumes 
the unity of actors, stages and texts. Yet a similar assumption can be 
postulated with reference to the aforementioned orders of temporality:
The reversible time of institutions is both the condition and 
the outcome of the practices organised in the continuity of 
daily life, the main substantive form of the duality of struc‑
ture. It would not be true, however, as I have already men‑
tioned, to say that the routines of daily life are ‘foundation’ 
upon which the institutional forms of societal organisation 
are built in time ‑space. Rather, each enters into the constitu‑
tion of the other, as they both do into the constitution of 
the acting self.23
23 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 36.
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Actors, to put it otherwise, orientate themselves towards the repeatable 
actions constituting the day ‑to ‑day practice as well as their “grand 
performance” representing the irreversible flow of activities heading 
towards the end of earthly matters. This temporal reality of daily 
routine as well as the irreversible time of being ‑towards ‑death trans‑
form themselves and, consequently, create — to use Fernand Braudel’s 
terminology24 — the historically defined longue durée of social and 
cultural institutions. This reversible institutional time mutatis mutandis 
constitutes the sphere of constraints as well as facilitations enabling 
the course of daily routines. By the same token, the institutional time 
renders ontological security of the irreversible time of being ‑towards‑ 
death.
The cultural significance of tradition — to put it in the most 
general context — alludes towards a distinct cultural strategy of 
organising and controlling of time.25 This concept ought to be un‑
derstood in terms of a peculiar trans ‑individual phenomenon and, 
since individual traditions are not conceivable, it is tantamount to the 
aforementioned longue durée of social and cultural institutions. Hence, 
traditions may be subsumed within the idea of collective memory or 
consciousness. The social aspect of the phenomenon is expressed by 
an idea that all traditions involve an organisation of interpersonal 
relations as well as reciprocity: the term reflects the existence of social 
consent with reference to accepted hierarchies of inherited norms 
and values.
In the context of the aforementioned triadic order of temporality, the 
reign of tradition becomes a collective medium of memory rendering 
the organisation of reversible time associated with day ‑to ‑day activates 
possible. As far as pre ‑modern cultures are concerned, the authority 
of the past goes hand in hand with the organisation of activities con‑
cerning the totality of day ‑to ‑day pursuits, especially when those tend 
to involve uncertainty and risk.26 In this context, media of collective 
memory supply actors with solutions to problems of eschatology: they 
help to re ‑organise human life so that it contains more sense and order 
in its process of oscillating for eternity. Running parallel to these state‑
ments is the appreciation of tradition as being a living phenomenon, 
24 Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
25 Anthony Giddens, “Living in a Post ‑Traditional Society,” p. 62.
26 Magic and myths seem to constitute the pre ‑modern response to problems, 
to use contemporary discourses, of occupational safety and risk management. 
See Bronisław Malinowski, “Myth in Primitive Psychology,” in The Myth and 
Ritual Theory. An Anthology, ed. R.A. Segal (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 
pp. 173—179.
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that is, a cultural institution that has no other conceivable mode of 
existence, than through actions undertaken both in the scope of daily 
routines and human life in its totality.
Less evident, however, is the agential side of tradition. This strategy 
of temporal organisation is not a given, stable monolith, but it consists 
of processes of interpretation aiming to defy the devastating impact of 
time. Hence, tradition — conceived here as a mechanism of cultural 
reproduction — renders a specific configuration of pre ‑modern drama‑
turgic performances in which the principal cultural actors separate 
themselves from social masses (the audience) by means of boundaries 
that cannot be crossed.27 This mechanism results in the hierarchical, 
rather than individualistic or egalitarian, construction of pre ‑modern 
societies. The logic of cultural hierarchy, to put it succinctly, indicates 
that a candidate aspiring to a privileged status in a community has to 
fulfil a parade of normative imperatives, including those of age, gender, 
or family connections. Therefore, the temporal dimension of tradition 
becomes reinforced by its agential or social aspect. Traditional cultures 
are based upon a distinct type of social structure whose organisation 
situate the older on the top of societal hierarchy. This mode of, to 
use Margaret Mead’s terminology, “post ‑figurative cultures” renders 
the guardians of the textual a role of principal cultural actors within 
societies of pre ‑modernity.28
If in oral cultures older people are the repository (and also 
often the guardians) of traditions, it is not only because they 
absorbed them at an earlier point than others, but because 
they have the leisure to identify the details of these traditions 
in interaction with others of their age and teach them to the 
young. Tradition, therefore, we may say, is an organising 
medium of collective memory.29
In the context of the quotation, tradition becomes both a medium of 
collective recollection and an institution indicating the position of 
principal actors in the process of cultural becoming. This element of 
agential interpretation implies that traditions cannot be conceived in 
terms of the institutions sui generis. The contemporary understand‑
ing of traditionalism and its role in the pre ‑modern morality is best 
27 The next sub ‑chapter provides a further insight into leadership patterns 
implicit in pre ‑modern processes of cultural reproduction.
28 Margaret Mead, Culture and Commitment. A Study of the Generation Gap (New 
York: Doubleday, 1970).
29 Giddens, “Living in a Post ‑Traditional Society,” pp. 63—64.
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characterised by the expression “living tradition.”30 This idea suggests 
that traditions must be reproduced, so that they may acquire a relative 
continuity in time and space.
Living tradition — conceived here as morality in the process of 
ongoing social becoming — is a chief temporal mechanism fostering 
the development of pre ‑modern trust cultures. It “provides an anchor‑
age for that ‘basic trust’ so central to continuity of identity; and it is also 
the guiding mechanism for other trust relations.”31 The most essential 
means, to put it more analytically, through which living traditions 
acquire the persistency in spite of the passage of time are rituals:
Both myth and ritual are symbolic procedures and are most 
closely tied together by this as well as by other facts. The 
myth is a system of word symbols, whereas ritual is a system 
of object and act symbols. Both are symbolic processes for 
dealing with the same type of situation in the same affective 
mode.32
Rituals come to serve as specific dramaturgic events — the perfect uni‑
ties of the textual, the agential and the interpretative — whose cultural 
function aims at the reproduction of axiology and morality by means 
of compulsive repetition. In the case of the aforementioned Kula Ring 
institution, the ritual of undertaking sea voyages aims at the reproduc‑
tion of trust culture typical of the Triobriand islanders. Yet the general 
function of tradition in the creation of generalised trust expectations 
seems to transgress this isolated example. A more holistic aspect of 
the process becomes unveiled when the general construction of the 
pre ‑modern socio ‑cultural reality is taken into account. Bauman tries 
to ground pre ‑modern cultural phenomena in the idea of homogeneity 
suggesting a kind of systemic integration which becomes defined the 
“dense sociability.” Let us adduce the following definition in extenso: 
The “dense sociability” of the past strikes us, in retrospect, 
as distinct from our own condition not because it contained 
more friendship than we tend to experience in our own 
world, but because its world was tightly and almost com‑
pletely filled with friends and enemies — and friends and 
30 Cf. Mircea Eliade, “Cosmogonic Myth and the ‘Sacred History,’” in Sacred 
Narrative. Readings in the Theory of Myth, ed. A. Dundes (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1984), pp. 127—151.
31 Giddens, “Living in a Post ‑Traditional Society,” p. 81.
32 Kluckhohn, Myths and Rituals, p. 71.
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enemies only. Little room, if any marginal room only, was 
left in the lifeworld for poorly defined strangers.33
The dislocation of strangeness from the scope of pre ‑modern social 
organisation becomes indicative of situations in which actors are 
all engaged in the same, community ‑based theatrical performances. 
Consequently, actors wear basically the same cultural mask which is 
a product of shared conditions of existence. At the same time, they 
act according to pre ‑existent lines of sacred texts and are not granted 
(except for the principal cultural actors) the privilege of creative 
improvisation or interpretation. In other words, the societal organi‑
sation of pre ‑modern theatrical performances provides the majority 
of cultural actors with clear ‑cut, predictable conditions of existence: 
trajectories of their identities are firmly rooted in the sphere of shared 
discourses, fixed interpretative communities, and well ‑organised paths 
of sociality.
Life which follows the lines of the text, to use the theatrical meta‑
phor one more time, is inevitably anchored in the sacred legacy of 
the past which is conveyed by the totality of mythology and becomes 
socially expressed in a form of rituals. From this perspective, the 
virtue of integral and homogeneous culture — as it is expressed by 
the unwavering continuity of axiological and normative hierarchies 
— may transform itself into the stable integrity of human subjectiv‑
ity. Mechanisms of cultural integrity may be represented as models 
of personal development indicating legitimate trajectories of human 
existence. Hence, under the circumstances of stable, community‑ 
based trust cultures, actors’ biographies are “normal” in a way that 
they reflect the pre ‑existent stability of culture. In other words, 
trust vested in the integrity of culture gives rise to unwavering self‑ 
narrations which, in turn, constitute the cornerstone of coherent 
identities. From this perspective (and as it is stated earlier in the 
text) actors’ identities remain non ‑reflexive or, to put it still otherwise, 
textually granted.
The aforementioned relatedness of human identity to cultural 
imperatives of personal development is indicative of collectivism. 
Thus, it is the reign of collectivism that separates human agency from 
human development. In this way, individualism is indeed a typically 
modern invention which cannot be adjusted to the cultural reality of 
pre ‑modern communities. As Giddens observes:
33 Bauman, Modernity, p. 151.
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[T]he individual, in a certain sense, did not exist in tradi‑
tional cultures, and individuality was not prized. Only with 
the emergence of modern societies and, more particularly, 
with the differentiation of the division of labour, did the 
separate individual become a focus of attention.34
In the context of pre ‑modern society, identity cannot be conceived in 
terms of a project which needs to be attained or worked out. Quite 
to the contrary, it is a permanent feature granted to individuals by 
their societal and cultural organisations. In a way, individual identities 
are all rooted in collective ones, so that a person, most of the time, 
ceases to be an agent and remains a particle driven by superintended 
forces of social integration, such as mythology, religion, habits and 
folkways. Tradition one more time unveils its epistemological hold 
over the present day and the future time: myths and rituals indicate 
the sphere of socially legitimised knowledge with reference to human 
identity.
This is, nevertheless, indicative of Ernst Cassirer’s perspective on the 
pre ‑modern epistemology which states that “[N]ot nature, but society is 
the true model of myth.”35 Cassirer gives great prominence to textual 
elements of traditions which in his anthropology become representa‑
tions of the pre ‑existent social and cultural orders made, as it were, 
ex post. Myths are vehicles of social integration: they fulfil functions 
which are productive as far as the integrity and durability of social 
institutions (such as marriage or rites of passage) are concerned. This 
particular way of conceptualising tradition is, nevertheless, indicative 
of the perspective on cultural models as it is delineated by Clifford 
Geertz. This standpoint is an attempt to problematize the concept of 
model by means of providing a dichotomous classification between, 
so to speak, prescriptive and descriptive understanding of the term 
in question.36 In this context, textual resources of tradition seem to 
fulfil the prescriptive function as elements of social knowledge created 
in order to reinforce a community’s norms and values by supplying 
evidence sustaining their functionality. This methodological strategy 
seems to reverberate in Mircea Eliade’s conception of mythology as the 
sacred history of pre ‑modern communities.
34 Giddens, Modernity and Self ‑Identity, p. 75.
35 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man. An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human 
Culture (New York: Anchor Books, 1956), p. 106.
36 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 
p. 93.
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Now in every case where we have access to a still living 
tradition, and not to a acculturated one, one thing strikes 
us from the very beginning: the mythology not only con‑
stitutes, as it were, the “sacred history” of the tribe, but it 
equally reveals a hierarchy in series of fabulous events that 
it reports.37
The internal organisation of an actor’s identity is deeply rooted in the 
temporal character of culture: it is a way of dealing with the pas‑
sage of time which, consequently, allows for coping with cultural 
changeability.38 In the context of pre ‑modern cultural environments, 
we may speak of the positive dialogue with time: traditions, in turn, 
obtain their precedence over the present day as the sources of cultural 
classifications that are used in order to make sense out of the external 
reality. Such a constructive conversation, needless to say, makes it pos‑
sible for actors to tolerate the all ‑pervading impact of the past upon 
their present biographical narrations.
Nature as a Guardian of the Textual
The sacredness of common history remains, one may propose, at heart 
of traditionalism conceived in terms of a specific orientation towards 
time which is typical of pre ‑modern cultural settings. As opposed 
to civilisations of (post)industrial modernity, which in the main are 
founded upon the free circulation of knowledge, all traditional cultures 
rely upon the existence of severe structural constraints restraining 
the flow of information. The realm of pre ‑modern epistemology, to 
put it otherwise, is founded upon arenas of arcane knowledge which 
is deposited in the hands of the few who constitute the social elite. 
Therefore, the status of knowledge in traditional cultures cannot be 
conceived in terms of an expertise which, it is argued, is a typically 
modern phenomenon.39 The traditional organisation of beliefs concern‑
ing the past distinguishes itself from the contemporary perception of 
history. The latter, as a distinct branch of modern academic expertise, 
remains open to dialogue and re ‑interpretation. It is a particular type 
37 Eliade, Cosmogonic Myth, p. 140.
38 Eliade, p. 72.
39 Giddens, “Living in a Post ‑Traditional Society,” p. 84.
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of public good subjected to the process of political or scholarly discus‑
sion uniting all interested parties under the common denominator of 
all ‑inclusive debate.40
The cryptic knowledge implicit in traditional cultures coincides 
with a specific model of social structure in which guardians of the 
sacred beliefs — namely, prophets, priests or shamans — become the 
principal actors engaged in the process of cultural morphogenesis. 
The privileged status of their cultural roles is related to the unique 
abilities of interpretation of the sacred history. From this perspective, 
the traditional model of cultural morphogenesis is defined as being 
dependant on a particular type of principal actors whose authority 
is derived from a combination of innate psychological traits and the 
charismatic abilities to partake in the order of the supernatural. Max 
Weber makes the point most firmly when he outlines the most classical 
definition of charismatic leadership:
The term “charisma” will be applied to a certain quality of 
an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart 
from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatu‑
ral, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers 
or qualities.41
Charismatic leadership, as opposed to the modern pattern of author‑
ity (the legal ‑rational leadership), is founded upon the specific type 
of innate predilection for communicating with the divine, rather than 
upon the institutional properties of political systems. Therefore, to put 
it in a critical manner, the substantial shortcoming of the charismatic 
authority is the constant crisis of legitimisation which may be resolved 
only by means of providing evidence of one’s supernatural powers. 
This is, however, not the case with the pattern of legal ‑rational authority 
which is based upon institutional mechanisms (the rule of law embod‑
ied by the constitution) that aim at providing modern leadership with 
a stable framework of social and cultural legitimisation. The constant 
crisis of legitimisation, as it is discussed later in the text, is the first 
premise upon which natural environment becomes used in a political 
way in order to provide the long ‑lasting foundation of the charismatic 
leadership and the durable basis for traditional orders in the long run.
40 Cf. Ricoeur, Imagination, Testimony and Trust. A Dialogue with Paul Ricoeur, in 
Questioning Ethics. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, eds. R. Kearney, M. Dooley 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 12.
41 Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, trans. T. Parsons (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), pp. 358—359.
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Charismatic leaders, as the theatrical perspective teaches us, assume 
social roles of principal cultural actors: their duty is to control processes 
through which culture is reproduced. Needless to say, ordinary tribes‑
men assume the role of the audience who are compelled to vest trust 
in the spiritual capabilities embodied by their leaders. The principal 
cultural actors’ powers of interpretation rely on epiphany in which 
the hidden essence conveyed by the authority of sacred texts becomes 
unveiled and translated into the everyday discourse. Their work im‑
plies a belief in a kind of hidden teleology, a peculiar “formulaic truth” 
whose existence legitimises social status of charismatic leadership.
Like all other aspects of tradition, ritual has to be interpreted; 
but such an interpretation is not normally in the hands of 
the lay individual. Here we have to establish a connection 
between tradition’s guardians and the truths such traditions 
contain or disclose. Tradition involves “formulaic truth,” to 
which only certain persons have full access. Formulaic truth 
depends not upon referential properties of language but 
rather upon their opposite; ritual language is performative, 
and may sometimes contain words and practices that the 
speakers or listeners can barely understand.42
Consequently, the idea of formulaic truth seems to uphold the initial 
conceptualisation of cultural reproduction as a series of dramaturgic 
events. It depends upon the dichotomous classification between the 
main stage (the articulated part of cultural reproduction which is 
performed and disguised as a ritual) as well as the backstage constitut‑
ing the repository of the cryptic knowledge used in order to provide 
a legitimisation framework for the performed actions. In this sense, 
pre ‑modern charismatic leaders seem to be forerunners of modern leg‑
islators whose task — as Bauman’s perspective on cultural modernity 
teaches us — is to delineate as well as implement plans and projects 
aiming at the superimposition of social order.43
The aforementioned classification between the cultural stage and the 
arcane backstage is indicative of the societal significance of the taboo 
mechanism. The essential characteristic of morality based upon the 
invention of taboo “is that without consulting experience it pronounces 
a priori certain things to be dangerous.”44 The exclusion of public 
42 Giddens, “Living in a Post ‑Traditional Society,” p. 64.
43 See Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post‑Moder‑
nity and Intellectuals (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).
44 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, pp. 136—137.
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wisdom as well as experience from the social institution of taboo, as 
a consequence, reinforces the monopoly of pre ‑modern legislators to 
formulate moral judgements that purport to attain the status of divine 
truth. Hence, the pre ‑modern system of morality is based upon an 
ability to conceptualise formulaic truths whose social function is to 
uphold moral coherence of a community. It is the cultural integrity 
which is conveyed by the sacredness of mythology and laboured in 
a long process of interpretative reproduction undertaken by the elite 
perceiving themselves as the guardians of traditional thinking.
As opposed to modern systems of political legitimisation, tradi‑
tional mechanisms of morality (such as systems of taboo ethics) and 
the concomitant position of charismatic leaders all seem to fall victim 
to the perpetual crisis of legitimisation. As a consequence, the stability 
of their authority rests upon the readiness to provide a strong coercive 
instance which would act as a factor legitimising moral knowledge that 
cannot be consulted by experience or practical wisdom. An attempt at 
legitimising taboo morality is typical of, as Mary Douglas and Aaron 
Wildavsky assert, the cultural mechanisms of politicising natural 
environment.45 In this particular case, charismatic leaders represent 
themselves as moral authorities whose power is derived from their spe‑
cial communion with the threatening and destructive forces of nature. 
Their cultural role is, therefore, related to the act of conceptualising 
nature in an essentially agential manner as a guardian of morality 
which secures the axiological consensus by means of relating natural 
dangers to moral defects perpetrated by individual or collective actors.
Such a standpoint is, nevertheless, indicative of the cultural perspec‑
tive of risk which outlines social strategies of amplification or attenua‑
tion of dangers from the perspective of moral norms and values implicit 
in a given community or social organisation.46 In this context, Douglas 
outlines a moral aspect of natural hazards perception within the scope 
of pre ‑modern morality:
In short, the stronger the solidarity of a community, the 
more readily will natural disasters be coded as signs of 
reprehensible behaviour. Every death and most illnesses will 
give scope for defining blameworthiness. Danger is defined 
to protect the public good and the incidence of blame is a by‑ 
product of arrangements for persuading fellow members to 
45 Douglas and Wildavsky, Risk and Culture. An Essay on the Selection of Envi‑
ronmental and Technological Dangers (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1983).
46 Douglas and Wildavsky, p. 6.
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contribute to it. […] A common danger gives them a handle 
to manipulate, the threat of community ‑wide pollution is 
a weapon for mutual coercion.47
The quotation, thus, refers to the existence of an intrinsic connection 
between trust and the public understanding of uncertainties. The 
development of positive and coherent trust cultures is seen as depend‑
ing on the ability to deploy common fears as a means of upholding 
common moral values.
The moral dialogue on how to organise moral communities seems 
to postulate that natural environment is not perceived in terms of an 
object, but an agent. As opposed to the axiology of industrial modernity, 
traditional cultures see nature as a powerful benefactor of their cultural 
leadership. In this sort of discourse, nature is perceived through es‑
sentially ethical lenses as the perfect template of order.
If nature contains a divine element it appears not in the 
abundance of its life but in the simplicity of its order. Na‑
ture is not, as in polytheistic religion, the great and benign 
mother, the divine lap from which all life originates. It is 
conceived as the sphere of law and lawfulness. And by this 
feature alone it proves its divine origin.48
Nature is believed to be seen as a particular type of a cultural actor, 
a player on arenas of pre ‑modern communities, which uses its external 
position to enforce moral order upon the tribesmen. The political or 
moral functions of natural environment clearly indicate that nature is 
not an objective notion, but rather a societal construction. It is often 
argued — for instance in the post ‑industrial discourse in general and 
in the cyberpunk genre in particular — that nature ceases to constitute 
an independent sphere and resembles a cultural construct made, as it 
were, ex post in order to justify the supremacy of societal or technologi‑
cal environment. This is, for instance, indicative of the Heideggerian 
concept of enframing which postulates that modern rationalisation rep‑
resents nature from the perspective of its own interests so that a river 
ceases to constitute a complicated biological habitat and is perceived 
through technologically reductive lenses in terms of a resource supply 
for industry.49
47 Douglas, Risk and Blame. Essays in Cultural Theory, p. 6.
48 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 131.
49 See Keith Tester, The Life and Times of Post ‑Modernity (London: Routledge, 
1993), p. 95.
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It also seems implausible to see nature as the guardian of morality, 
since from the very onset the construction of nature defies morality: 
it is the realm of biologically intelligible egoism where competition 
among species knows no sense of ethical commandments. From the 
perspective of the political use of nature, we may say that coding natu‑
ral environment as an ally in the fight with human wickedness can be 
regarded as an ideological subterfuge indicating the parallel between 
pre ‑modern and modern (perhaps even post ‑modern) conceptualisa‑
tions of nature. As Ulrich Beck, the leading scholar on the arena of 
sociology of risk, postulates:
If someone uses the word “nature,” the question immediately 
arises: What cultural model of “nature” is being taken for 
granted? […] So, nature in itself is not nature: it is a concept, 
a norm, a recollection, an alternative plan. Today more than 
ever. Nature is being rediscovered, pampered, at a time 
when it is no longer there.50
Within the discourse of traditionalism, nature is “no longer there”: it 
is dislodged from its genuine meaning and becomes transformed in 
order to be functional as far as community integration is concerned.
In the age of traditional culture, the moral conceptualisation of 
nature goes hand in hand with two antithetical attitudes towards 
it: the fear of the natural as the realm of incomprehensible risk and 
the veneration of its deity ‑driven order. The awe articulated towards 
natural environment becomes self ‑evident when one assumes that to 
the pre ‑modern worldview man becomes subordinated to the pow‑
ers of nature which is seen as the all ‑encompassing chain uniting all 
the conceivable beings. The doctrine of all ‑pervading forces of nature 
(the divine pneuma) establishes natural and unbreakable connections 
between society, culture and the natural habitat, so that people can 
no longer perceive themselves in terms of detached observers or ma‑
nipulators of the natural.51 As opposed to the modern man of science, 
who experiences the rational supremacy over the irrational nature, 
members of traditional communities may perceive nature in a semanti‑
cally reduced way as a guarantee of order, but at the same time they 
bow before the magnitude of its creation. If, to put it otherwise, the 
modern man of science allows to intervene into the order of nature, 
the actor of pre ‑modernity believes in the reverse logic of the process: 
50 Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p. 21.
51 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 109.
136 Trust as a Structural Expectation
it is nature that intervenes into social affairs. As Douglas comments 
on Levy ‑Bruhl’s cultural anthropology:
He taught that after millennia of our human past in which 
dangers were said to be caused by witchcraft or taboo‑ 
breaking, our distinctive achievement was to invent the idea 
of natural death and accurately believe in it. The concept of 
accident rate and of normal changes of incurring disease 
belongs to the modern, scientific way of thinking. Faced 
by statistical averages, there is no point in my asking why 
a particular illness should have struck me. If there are no 
deeper explanations available, the question about my own 
case appears pointless. Our curiosity is stopped by the doc‑
tor’s certificate of death from natural causes.52
From this specific perspective, the core element of pre ‑modern morality 
is attributed to the aforementioned feature of hidden teleology: the reign 
of charismatic leaders becomes sustained and reinforced by the alleged 
powers of observing cryptic connections between people’s misfortune 
and their behaviour assessed from the viewpoint of taboo ethics.
When Culture Precedes Territory: The Place as a Locale
The cultural significance of spatial relationships subsumed under the 
notion of theatrical stage cannot be reduced to the objective dimension 
of geographical distances, but it rather concerns the notion of interplay 
between presence and absence. Consequently, the cultural organisation 
of spatial relations comes to serve as a crucial factor pre ‑determining 
the emergence of stable trust cultures. The reality constructed upon 
well ‑defined conditions of co ‑presence (which are at core of the cultural 
conceptualisation of “place”) is conducive to the development of trust 
and personal security. The relations of co ‑presence constitute the axis 
mundus of world conceived as a sphere of familiarity and transpar‑
ency.53 The loss of familiarity, when the surrounding reality is not 
domesticated, becomes a keynote to the rise of interpersonal distrust, 
52 Douglas, Wildavsky, Risk and Culture, p. 31.
53 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory, pp. 123—124.
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suspicion and cynicism. Moreover, the dissolution of well ‑entrenched 
rural communities may also lead to personal or collective pathologies, 
such as the disruption of personal identities, delinquency or the erosion 
of kinship relationships.54
From the perspective of the theatrical framework, actions may be 
expressed in terms of their dual relationship with the cultural dimen‑
sion of space. Firstly, human actions tend to bind space, that is, produce 
meaningful cultural localisations. Rituals or religious ceremonies, for 
instance, establish a perimeter of the sacred space which is automati‑
cally differentiated from the spatial and cultural circumstances typical 
of day ‑to ‑day activities. This form of cultural morphogenesis is typical 
of pre ‑modern communities in which traditions tend to control space 
through their capability of organising time.55 Yet, an opposite relation‑
ship is also plausible. When established by means of action, cultural 
spaces retain the potentiality to shape organised human practices. In 
this context, sacred spaces, to return to the aforementioned example, 
may determine certain classes of actions. They may refrain individuals 
from undertaking a great majority of practices associated with day ‑to‑ 
day life and provide a place for behaviour which would be coded as 
abnormal or even bizarre in a different interpretative context.56
The cultural significance of relations between traditionalism and 
space seems to pre ‑date the modern cartographic discourse in a way 
that it makes spaces domesticated by means of subsuming them under 
the label of shared symbolic devices. In this context, a modern map 
renders a certain domestication of geographical spaces possible in order 
to represent them as realms of familiarity, stable environments for the 
emergence of trust cultures.57 This task, as far as modern cartography 
is concerned, is possible only when a map is perceived in terms of 
a “representation conceived as imitation.”58 Yet, a similar mechanism 
54 A classical instance of the loss of domestication was observed in the case 
of Polish emigrants in Chicago. Cf. W.I. Thomas, F. Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant 
in Europe and America (Boston: Badger, 1918—1920).
55 Giddens, “Living in a Post ‑Traditional Society,” p. 96.
56 Geertz speaks of religion systems as a means of actualisation of specific 
psychological moods and motivations that would otherwise be left in a void. See 
Geertz, The Interpretation, pp. 94—98.
57 See Zbigniew Białas, “Mnemotechnics, ‘Projection’ and Colonial Cartogra‑
phy: Enforcing a Comprehensibility of Strangeness,” in Memory and Forgetfulness. 
Essays in Cultural Practice, eds. W. Kalaga, T. Rachwał (Katowice: Wydawnictwo 
UŚ, 1999), pp. 9—11.
58 Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary 
Criticism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 123. Quoted after 
Białas, “Mnemotechnics, ‘Projection’ and Colonial Cartography,” p. 9.
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of signification seems to be at the heart of tradition and its power 
exerted over topographical spaces. From the perspective of traditional‑
ism, the organisation of the Kula Ring could be perceived in terms 
of a cultural institution that produces distinctive symbolic locations 
of actions oriented at the emergence of the native trust culture. As 
a result, the Ring itself should be conceived as a form of pre ‑modern 
simulation, a representation which seems to follow Jean Baudrillard’s 
homology of simulacrum to a cartographic entity which precedes al‑
legedly pre ‑existent territorial organisations. By way of exemplification, 
let us quote the relevant passage:
The simulation is no longer that of territory, a referential 
being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real 
without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer 
precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the 
map that precedes the territory — procession of simulacra 
— that engenders the territory […].59
Hence, in raising the question concerning the theoretical use ‑value of 
the Kula Ring conception, one may recognize that the institution does 
not purport to constitute an objective geographic entity. It is, rather, 
a symbolic representation of the Triobriand archipelago conceived 
from a cultural perspective of ritual exchanges which bind the isolated 
islands into a relatively coherent spatial totality. In this sense, cultural 
imperatives — stating that necklaces and bracelets must be inter‑
changed in two opposite directions — bind the spatial organisation of 
the Triobriand archipelago. The rules of exchange provides the islands 
with a new sense of territorial organisation (hence the term “Ring”) 
that restores order to otherwise chaotic geography of the archipelago.60 
The islanders’ tradition, to put it otherwise, establishes hegemony over 
the spatial organisation of the archipelago, thus rendering its conver‑
sion from the realm of risk (uncertainty associated with dangerous sea 
voyages) into the emergent trust culture.
Challenging as it is, the significance of spatial relation to the devel‑
opment of pre ‑modern trust cultures cannot be solely reduced to the 
issue of traditionalism as a medium enabling the control of space. As 
far as pre ‑modern cultural systems are concerned, the cultural institu‑
tion of the Kula Ring provides us with a paradigmatic organisation of 
space. Despite the existence of geographical distances, the Triobrianders 
59 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. S.F. Glaser (The University 
of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 1.
60 Malinowski, Argonauci, p. 128.
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are motivated to undertake long and risky journeys in order to visit 
their partners inhabiting the neighbouring islands.61 As a consequence, 
the act of ritual exchange involves the establishment of cultural rela‑
tions of co ‑presence. This cultural imperative of participating in the 
exchange — to perceive it from a different angle — defines the cultural 
signification of the pre ‑modern stage: the islanders’ system of ritual 
exchange is based upon moral imperatives that get the upper hand over 
the constraint of geographical distances. As a result, the Triobrianders 
participate in the same spatial arena of cultural morphogenesis.
The system of the Kula Ring provides a pattern of cultural institu‑
tion that establishes its hegemony over objective territory. This sort of 
spatial relations is best conveyed by the term “place” which should be 
understood in opposition to the concept of “space.”
“Place” is best conceptualised by means of the idea of 
locale, which refers to physical settings of social activity as 
situated geographically. In pre ‑modern societies, space and 
place largely coincide, since the spatial dimensions of social 
life are, for most of the population, and in most respects, 
dominated by “presence” — by localised activities.62
The focus on co ‑presence gives rise to the notion that social cognition is 
anchored in the same mechanism. This type of perception is indicative 
of the so ‑called “facework commitment” which, as Goffman observes, 
is based upon the ability to maintain one’s face, that is, to present 
one’s self as being benevolent or trustworthy by means of verbal and 
non ‑verbal acts directly perceived by the Other.63
The social becoming of pre ‑modern trust cultures, to conclude 
this chapter, seems to be firmly rooted in the structural, or textual, 
conditionings of actor’s agency subsumed under the cultural signifi‑
cance of traditionalism. Hence, trusting relations constitute a kind of 
structurally rendered axiological expectation, rather than an agential 
necessity or obligation awaiting to be fulfilled, or “worked out.” In this 
context, reciprocity seems to be more psychologically rewarding than 
bonds of trustworthiness inscribed within the contemporary, “faceless” 
networks of indirect and mediated communication.64 In the realm of 
pre ‑modern cultures the gift of trust becomes almost instantaneously 
reciprocated by a trustee. Actors of cultural exchange, to follow the 
61 Malinowski, Argonauci, pp. 126—132.
62 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, p. 18.
63 See Goffman, Interaction Ritual (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 5—9.
64 Cf. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, p. 113.
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model of the theatrical performance, are united by the shared textual 
references rendering structurally reinforced trust cultures. The sacred 
legacy of texts, in turn, is founded upon the charismatic nature of 
pre ‑modern leadership whose authority is derived from their relation to 
natural environment conceived as a guardian of traditionalism. Hence, 
it is the structurally granted reliability of exchange which constitutes 
the aura of psychological credibility and predictability.
Chapter Six
The Agency of Trust in the Framework  
of Reflexive Modernization
Moralists, reactionaries, and people with strict 
feelings for style are perfectly correct when they 
complain about the increasing “lack of form” in 
modern life. They fail to understand however, that 
what is happening is not only a negative, passive 
dying out of traditional forms, but simultaneously 
a fully positive drive towards life which is actively 
repressing these forms.1
Social changes affecting modern socio ‑cultural orders have paved the 
way for a new form of trust culture. As opposed to the pre ‑modern 
cultures, in which interpersonal trusting is inscribed within axiological 
and normative systems as a kind of structural expectation, the advent 
of modernity gives rise to the agential conceptualisation of trust as 
a cultural resource inscribed in the personal reflexivity of a cultural 
actor facing the systemic nature of modernization. This idea also 
suggests that in the era of late modernity structural constraints are 
entities in the terminal phase of development, which enables actors 
to re ‑organise their identities, social roles as well as their individual 
propensities for trusting.
This progressive drift towards the culture of agency becomes facili‑
tated by the dissolution of spatial and temporal constraints of the stage, 
which is related to the proliferation of texts and the multiplication 
of cultural actors equipped with distinct political, social or cultural 
agendas. As a consequence, trusting resembles an endeavour of coping 
with risks as well as uncertainties inscribed in the world of rampag‑
1 Georg Simmel, The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays, trans. K.P. 
Etzkorn (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968), p. 12.
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ing contingency in which myriads of actors participate en masse in the 
heteroglossia of the global network.
Modernity and the Idea of Historical Discontinuity
What seems to rest at the heart of the contemporary theoretical vantage 
point in the humanities is a feeling of fundamental uncertainty which 
is best characterised by Thomas Kuhn’s methodology relating risk 
inherent in theory ‑making to the process of the paradigm shift. Not 
only do definitions or conceptualisations drift in the realm of uncer‑
tainty, where their practical usefulness becomes assessed, to evoke 
Karl Raimund Popper’s claim, by the criterion of falsification, but also 
entire systems of theoretical explanation (or paradigms) are regarded 
as being transient, fluid and potentially non ‑effective.2 Consequently, 
what becomes postulated as the ultimate fate of methodologies is 
a certain degree of uneasiness related to the grim aura of foreboding 
concerning the arrival of a theory’s Other, a competing paradigm. The 
process of cognition, to put it otherwise, becomes perceived through 
the lenses of fluidity. Epistemologies unveil their changeable char‑
acter assuming a form of the incessant parade of crises putting the 
enlightened premise of the linear and cumulative cognitive progress 
into oblivion. In this context, the solidity of so ‑called “normal sci‑
ence” becomes dissolved into a dialectical process of verification and 
falsification, a cognitive struggle in which the ability to forget is often 
more seductive and functional than the knowledge how to memorise. 
As Kuhn aptly observes:
The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from 
which a new tradition of normal science emerge is far from 
a cumulative process, one achieved by an articulation or 
extension of the old paradigm. Rather it is a reconstruction 
of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that 
changes some of the field’s most elementary theoretical 
generalisations as well as many of its paradigm methods 
and applications.3
2 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution (Chicago: Chicago Uni‑
versity Press, 1962), p. 85.
3 Kuhn, The Structure, pp. 84—85.
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The ideas of fluid uncertainty and conflict signalled by the carnival of 
competing paradigms seem especially illustrative of the contemporary 
debate concerning a legitimate methodology that would provide a bet‑
ter insight into the contemporary socio ‑cultural reality. This theoretical 
dialogue seems to constitute a testimony to the unprecedented distrust 
towards categories of contemporary social and cultural theories and 
assumes a form of an academic wrangle over the idea of historical 
discontinuity which has been triggered by the term “post ‑modernity.”
The mainstream of contemporary debate is, consequently, focused 
upon the struggle for a basic theoretical framework enabling more 
informed conceptualisations of socio ‑cultural realities of advanced 
societies of the northern hemisphere.4 In this sense, the discussion 
unveils itself as the lack of one dominating meta ‑narrative, a unified 
biography of the present times. This absorption, to use Jean ‑Francois 
Lyotard’s terminology,5 in the multiplicity of linguistic games provokes 
the return to basic, philosophical problems. It also suggests the prolif‑
eration of existential and ontological questions which can no longer be 
bracketed off by the feeling of certitude associated with the supremacy 
of a coherent, theoretically outstretched meta ‑narrative. This “recourse 
to philosophy and to debate over fundamentals”6 is, needless to say, 
a coefficient to the cognitive turmoil caused by the parade of paradigms.
Such conceptual dilemmas assume a shape of theoretical projects 
purporting to capture the problem of historical discontinuity and 
represent it as the unnerving presence of modernity lurking at the hin‑
terlands of supposedly post ‑modern discourses. In this interpretative 
context, modernity manifests itself as both an opportunity and problem 
imposed on us by the malicious forces of societal change. On the one 
hand, one may be fully aware of its historical inevitability which is 
inscribed in the objective logic of technological development resulting 
in the advent of industrial systems of mass production and the rise 
of extensive urban spaces. Modernity, therefore, constitutes a single 
step, an element in the complicated matrix of economic, technological 
and social changes which are all subsumed within the paradigms of 
progress and modernization.
On the other hand, however, the framework of modern society may 
be perceived through the prism of its negative consequences, the rami‑
fications which cannot be accepted as morally neutral coefficients to 
4 Zygmunt Bauman, Spór o ponowoczesność, in Ciało i przemoc w obliczu 
ponowoczesności, ed. Z. Bauman (Toruń: Wydawnictwo UMK, 1995), p. 23.
5 Jean ‑Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge 
(Manchester University Press, 1979), p. 66.
6 Kuhn, The Structure, p. 91.
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progress.7 It is precisely the burden of those abominable consequences 
— such as the reification of agents in overstretched bureaucratic en‑
vironments or the rise of totalitarian regimes — that facilitates the 
withdrawal from discourses of modernity. From the latter perspective, 
a logical solution to the cultural legacy of modern society is, then, 
putting the very philosophical idea of modernity into the sphere of 
remorse and seeking redress in a different philosophical discourse that 
will hopefully leave the old troubles aside.
The opportunity side of modern society is emphasised by those 
intellectuals whose certitude of judgement could be compared, as 
Bauman puts it, to legislators’ unwavering trust in their ability to 
delineate axiological formulas by means of “the provision of authorita‑
tive solutions to the questions of cognitive truth, moral judgement and 
aesthetic taste.”8 Nevertheless, legislators’ task is very often debunked, 
which goes hand in hand with the contemporary incredulity towards 
the idea of objective truth, the totalising concept that has been dis‑
carded in the post ‑modern rush of axiological holophobia. To listen 
to Habermas:
[T]he usefulness of the concept of legitimation, which 
permits a demarcation of types of legitimate authority (in 
Weber’s sense) according to the forms and contents of legiti‑
mation, is undisputed. What is controversial is the relation 
of legitimation to truth.9
Legislators’ theoretical — and perhaps transcendental — vantage point 
is deeply rooted in the legacy of positivistic optimism concerning a pos‑
sibility of implementing cognitive apparatuses of the exact sciences 
onto the field of the humanities. This cognitive strategy was especially 
evident in the case of Charles Darwin’s evolutionism, which paved the 
way for socio ‑philosophical conceptualisations of history in terms of 
a series of continuous, cumulative processes of structural elaboration 
and systemic perfection.10 The most evident case of such a strategy is 
the modern understanding of modernisation processes which explores 
 7 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, p. 3.
 8 Bauman, “Is There a Postmodern Sociology?” in Theory Culture and Society 5 
(1988), p. 219.
 9 Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (London: Heinemann, 1976), p. 97.
10 The most widespread example of such a conceptualisation is the linear 
process of socio ‑economic development in which particular stages form a cause‑ 
and ‑effect chain of logical relationships. See W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic 
Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 4—16.
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social and cultural changes in terms of a “gradual process of social 
and cultural change considered as differentiation.”11
The paradigm of modernization gives rise to the reinforcement of 
the synchronic ‑diachronic antinomy. The legacy of evolutionist method‑
ology teaches us that social and cultural reality could be conceptualised 
in terms of a series of timeless snapshots which constitute the sequence 
of social development.12 As a consequence, the changeable nature of 
society and culture becomes lost. One, consequently, tends to forget 
that “ontologically, society is nothing else but change, movement and 
transformation, action and interaction, construction and reconstruction, 
constant becoming rather than stable being.”13
The concept of post ‑modernity seems to be greatly indebted to the 
aforementioned model of social change conceived as modernisation. 
In this sense, the advent of post ‑modernity is logically inscribed in 
the framework of evolutionary social change: it denotes a crisis of 
industrial modernity and an assumption that modern civilisation is 
no longer functional. Hence, the idea of post ‑modernity stands at the 
fountainhead of the contemporary disillusionment with modern soci‑
ety and signals the arrival of a supposedly new model of socio ‑cultural 
development stressing “the pluralism of authority and the centrality 
of choice.”14 This concept has been coined in order to disseminate an 
ideology suggesting that modernity itself faces a terminal stage of self‑ 
development; it resembles a phenomenon which has utilized all 
the conceivable possibilities of further development. In this specific 
sense, as Mike Featherstone observes, “to speak of postmodernity is 
to suggest an epochal shift or break from modernity involving the 
emergence of a new social totality with its own distinct organising 
features.”15
Post ‑modern culture is often defined in terms of its penchant for 
the unreal and non ‑existent. As opposed to modern ideas of truth and 
scientific objectivity, the new culture of simulation succumbs to the 
realm of imagery representations “to the point of collapsing every last 
11 Kenneth Bock, “Theories of Progress, Development, Evolution,” in A His‑
tory of Social Analysis, eds. T.R. Bottomore, R. Niesbet (London: Heinemann, 1979), 
p. 70.
12 Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 198.
13 Sztompka, “The Trauma of Social Change. A Case of Postcommunist Socie‑
ties,” in Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, eds. J.C. Alexander et al. (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004), p. 155.
14 See Peter Beilharz, The Bauman Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 
pp. 173—188.
15 Mike Featherstone, “In Pursuit of the Postmodern: An Introduction,” in 
Theory Culture and Society 5 (1988), p. 198.
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form of ontological distinction or critical truth ‑claim.”16 Hence, this 
new societal totality unveils itself, to put it otherwise, as a cultural 
coefficient to new forms of socio ‑technological organisation, subsumed 
within the model of the post ‑industrial or information society. This 
type of relationship is especially evident in the case of Lyotard’s and 
Baudrillard’s methodologies which both link post ‑modernity to the pro‑
liferation of communication technologies and mediascapes, the rise of 
data simulation as well as modelling in the age of information exchange 
and the widespread use of abstract scientific expertise.17 In the life 
world structured by the reign of most advanced technologies, society 
and culture become transformed to such an extent that human existence 
cannot be organised around sets of ontological positions typical of the 
reality of industrial modernity — i.e. consolidated workplaces, national 
states, families with a single breadwinner. Consequently, human life 
is far less organised or structured by the spatial and temporal dimen‑
sions of the production processes and becomes concerned, first and 
foremost, with consumption as well as the processing of information 
and abstract knowledge.18 As far as social structure is concerned, this 
transformation becomes indicative of the rise of a new middle class, 
the technostructure (also known as the knowledge class) embodying 
highly qualified, mobile young urban professionals. Consequently, the 
hard, mechanical character of industrial civilisation becomes, as it were, 
dispersed and transformed into the organic and networked character 
of post ‑modernity.19
Despite the proliferation of post ‑modern discourses, a sizeable part 
of the contemporary debate in the humanities is devoted to the pursuit 
of a golden means that could facilitate keeping balance between the 
hopes for modernization and the grim awareness of their consequences 
stressed by the adherents of post ‑modern theories. The methodology 
behind such a conciliatory conceptualisation seems to be embedded 
within a fairly realist conception referring to the sequential logic inher‑
ent in historical processes.
[H]istory does not possess any metaphysical, substantive 
reality. Thus, in this image, the pattern of history is not 
16 Christopher Norris, What’s Wrong with Postmodernism. Critical Theory and the 
Ends of Philosophy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 23.
17 Douglas Kellner, “Postmodernism as Social Theory. Some Challenges and 
Problems,” in Theory Culture and Society 5 (1988), p. 249.
18 Cf. Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 76.
19 Bauman, Liquid Times. Living in an Age of Uncertainty (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2007), p. 3.
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superimposed or pre ‑established, but rather emerges out 
of intermeshed plurality of events. Such a pattern is not 
treated as unique or singular, but rather emerges as the 
combined product of multiple sequences, overlapping 
and parallel, convergent and divergent, contradicting and 
complementing each other. It is not seen as a uniform and 
unidirectional process, but may change direction, course 
and speed. It is not viewed as approaching any fixed, final 
goal, but is open ‑ended and contingent, allowing of alterna‑
tive scenarios.20
In the context of sequential understanding of history, the rise of indus‑
trial modernity is viewed as a process which was logically heralded or 
prefigured by structural changes within traditional socio ‑cultural orders. 
The direction of those changes is not self ‑evident or pre ‑established: 
the contemporary global world consists of societies exhibiting diverse 
paths towards modernity. By the same token, modernity unveils itself 
as a sequential process intertwining the possibilities for modernization 
with consequences of progress; intermeshing socio ‑cultural features 
that contradict and complement each other.
In the context of the sequential logic, theories of the post ‑modern 
seem untenable since the constitutive pillars of modern society and 
culture (such as national states organised by means of bureaucratic 
administration, free capitalist markets, the rule of legal ‑rational author‑
ity as well as processes of institutionalised surveillance and control) 
are still valid as the foundations of social organisation. Moreover, their 
transformation is more quantitative than qualitative.21 For instance, the 
rise of post ‑industrial information technologies is not tantamount to the 
demise of industrialism as a branch of national economies. It, rather, 
denotes the quantitative economic change affecting labour markets 
and manifesting itself as the stable tendency towards the economic su‑
premacy of services as potential sources of work opportunities and the 
gross domestic product.22 In this context, the dominant features of the 
emergent post ‑industrial order — namely the centrality of knowledge, 
new intellectual technologies, the spread of knowledge class, and the 
transition from goods to services — are seen as futures deeply rooted 
into the modern potentiality for innovation as well as modernisation, 
20 Sztompka, Society in Action. The Theory of Social Becoming, p. 71.
21 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, pp. 58—59.
22 Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post ‑Industrial Society. A Venture into Social Forecast‑
ing (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. IX—XXII.
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rather than a distinct set of post ‑modern socio ‑economic coefficients. 
As Giddens declares:
Rather than these developments taking us “beyond moder‑
nity,” they provide fuller understanding of the reflexivity 
inherent in the modernity itself. […] We are left with ques‑
tions where once there appeared to be answers, and I shall 
argue subsequently this is not only philosophers who realise 
this. A general awareness of the phenomenon filters into 
anxieties which press in on everyone.23
Hence, the changes occurring within contemporary society and culture 
should not be seen as sign of the radical departure from the order of 
modernity, but, contrariwise, as phenomena implicit within the very 
system of modern civilisation. This viewpoint, to put it more meth‑
odologically, is tantamount to the analysis of changes occurring in the 
system itself, not transformations of the system. Therefore, this perspec‑
tive is concerned, first and foremost, with the inherent dynamism of 
modern institutions, its implicit, innate potential for self ‑transformation. 
Consequently, modernity is seen as being in the state of fluidity24 which 
allows for a gradual demystification of the hidden developmental 
possibilities implicit in it. In this context, the socio ‑cultural order of 
modernity may be perceived as a self ‑transforming entity equipped 
with its distinct, sequential logic of change implying the existence of 
the early (industrial) modernity and late (post ‑industrial) modernity.
Reflexive Modernization: Towards a Phenomenology  
of Late Modernity
The methodology of late modernity as well as its existential or episte‑
mological contours seem to problematize traditional conceptualisations 
of socio ‑cultural change which are rooted in the positivistic ideology 
of progress and modernization. The late modern understanding of 
modernization processes stands under the sign of investigating into the 
negative consequences of change so as to construct a new methodol‑
23 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, p. 49.
24 The self ‑transformation of Bauman’s attitude towards methodology is in‑
dicative of this perspective. See Bauman, Liquid Modernity.
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ogy subsumed under the notion of “reflexive modernization.” As Beck 
sees it:
This type of confrontation of the bases of modernization with 
the consequences of modernization should be clearly distin‑
guished from the increase of knowledge and scientization 
in the sense of self ‑reflection and modernization. […] Then 
“reflexive modernization” means the self ‑confrontation with 
the effects of risk society that cannot be dealt with and as‑
similated in the system of industrial society — as measured 
by the latter’s institutionalised standards.25
Consequently, the emergent paradigm delineates internal changes 
within the nature of modern cultural institutions in terms of the nega‑
tive tendencies that have been caused by the very success of modern 
ideology and practice. Modern standards of rationalisation have pre‑
pared the foreground for abstract knowledge which is no longer viewed 
as emancipatory or ameliorative but, contrariwise, unpredictable and 
uncertain by its very nature. In this context, the contours of late mo‑
dernity tend to subsume the discourse of “risk society” stressing the 
dark side of modern civilisation in which the distribution of undesired 
outcomes of modernization overshadows the classical debate over the 
societal distribution of accumulated economic surplus.26 From this 
perspective, the awareness of risk has become the cultural dominant 
of late modern social life: modernity itself is perceived as a riddle to 
itself where “uncertainty retains and proliferates everywhere.”27
The era of reflexive modernisation paves the way for a new 
“phenomenology of modernity” which stands for distinctive forms of 
individual and collective consciousness by means of which modern 
institutions are represented in forms of cultural reproduction. In this 
specific context, the cultural reality of late modernity can be seen 
through the prism of trust and uncertainty conceived as phenomeno‑
logical correlates to the interpersonal organisation of social life. The 
idea of risk as a coefficient to reflexive modernity goes hand in hand 
with the importance of trusting relations. Here, late modernity is seen 
25 Beck, “The Reinvention of Politics: Toward a Theory of Reflexive Moderniza‑
tion,” in Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social 
Order. Eds. U. Beck, A. Giddens, S. Lash (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 
p. 6. Emphasis added.
26 See Beck, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity? (London, Thousand Oaks, 
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992).
27 Beck, “The Reinvention of Politics,” p. 12.
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as the age of cryptic relationships inscribed in the networked as well as 
globalising world in which trust can no longer be mediated by means of 
face ‑to ‑face interpersonal interaction and cultural institutions inscribed 
in familiar social organisations. The general logic of those transforma‑
tions suggests that modern trusting relations are marked by the risky 
dialectic of presence and absence involving the intensification of the 
Self ‑Other relations. The emergent global order of late modernity seems 
to be creating both novel demands for trust as well as innovative forms 
of insecurity and risk.
In other words, the times of reflexive modernity constitute, as it 
were, the realm of cryptic agency. It is a new form of social organi‑
sation in which actions performed by topographically distant others 
seem to reside “on the other side of the fence.” This annihilation of 
spatial and temporal dimensions of social life is also reflected by the 
demise of privacy and intimate self ‑control or self ‑monitoring. As Beck 
argues, “[T]he most intimate — say, nursing a child — and the most 
distant, most general — say, a reactor accident in the Ukraine, energy 
politics — are now suddenly directly connected.”28 The quotation sug‑
gests that the array of contemporary life options is not conditioned 
by events and processes taking place in local settings. By the same 
token, human cognition cannot be reduced to interpretation processes 
occurring within the framework of “hermeneutics of nearness” typical 
of the traditional, pre ‑modern order. Being modern is to be entangled 
in the global network in which uncertainty becomes an existential 
coefficient to the presence ‑absence dialectic. In this latter context, 
cognition becomes much more hypothetical and dependable upon the 
“hermeneutics of remoteness.”
The idea of remoteness inscribed in the global, networked culture 
is especially conducive to the development of the agency of trust. 
With the proliferation of unknown strangers, trusting resembles an 
individual enterprise, a project to be planned and executed, as it were, 
single ‑handedly. In this sense, remoteness translates itself into the 
inability to exercise effective control over social practice. This agential 
conceptualisation of trust is, needless to say, an outcome of freedom 
granted to individuals in the age of modernity. In this sense, “an 
actor’s trust in others presupposes the freedom of action of others.”29
28 Beck, “The Anthropological Shock: Chernobyl and the Contours of the Risk 
Society,” Berkeley Journal of Sociology 32 (1987). Quoted after Giddens, The Conse‑
quences of Modernity, p. 121.
29 Jack M. Barbalet, “Social Emotions: Confidence, Trust and Loyalty,” Interna‑
tional Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 16, no. 9/10 (1996), p. 79.
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This developmental change in the ontology of trusting relations 
stems from the increasing ubiquity modern abstract systems and net‑
works (mass media, mass communications, global financial markets) 
that act as intermediaries of trust. Such abstract trust networks are 
embedded within contemporary communications systems and post‑ 
industrial technologies which, as will be argued later in the text, 
establish a new interactive paradigm of presence/absence dialectics re‑
inforced by the separation of time and space in the cultural experience 
of contemporary societies. This paradigm, as Giddens observes, may 
be subsumed within the general idea of globalisation which “concerns 
the intersection of presence and absence, the interlacing of social 
events and social relations ‘at distance’ with local contextualities.”30 
The concept of globalisation is not only a strictly social phenomenon. 
Its personal aspect is inevitably related to the rise of a new kind 
of selfhood, a novel strategy of auto ‑biographical narration which, 
after Scott Bukatman, may be defined in terms of the “terminal 
identity.” The terminal identity of late modern era succumbs itself 
to the episodic and transitory character of human existence dictated 
by the fluidity of commerce and the ubiquity of signs constituting 
astral empires.
The transformation of trust relations in the late modern cultural set‑
ting, as the formerly outlined theatrical framework suggests, is related 
to three major socio ‑cultural processes. First of all, this is the implo‑
sion of spatial and temporal distances constituting theatrical stages of 
cultural reproduction of trust cultures. The annihilation of time and 
space occurs within abstract terminal spaces linking the existing to 
the non ‑existent, the present to the absent, the Self with the potential, 
cryptic and elusive Other. Secondly, the transformation of trust cultures 
is related to the increasing number of partners taking part in electroni‑
cally mediated interpersonal interactions. As a consequence, the era of 
late modernity witnesses, last but not least, the increasing proliferation 
of cultural actors (individual and collective) with distinct political and 
cultural agendas (the lack of universal texts), whose voices in the public 
debate constitute a new type of agency subsumed under the notion of 
“multiculturalism.”
30 Giddens, Modernity and Self ‑Identity, p. 21.
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Modernity as a Challenge to Trust Cultures
The self ‑transformation of modern trust cultures can be represented as 
the struggle between two modes of cultural morphogenesis: the real, 
denoting patterns of “off ‑line” interpersonal interaction, and the hyper‑ 
real stressing the impossibility to “maintain the old economy of truth 
and representation in a world where ‘reality’ is entirely constructed 
through forms of mass media feedback, where values are determined 
by consumer demand […], and where nothing serves as a means of 
distinguishing truth from merely truth ‑seeming.”31 This dichotomy 
may, in turn, serve as a starting point for a discussion concerning the 
process of erosion affecting traditional regimes of trust which — as 
the aforementioned citation suggests — are founded upon maintaining 
strict distinctions between reality and representation. Furthermore, the 
late modern paradigm of media saturation brings to one’s mind the 
problem of the implosion of sociality into social masses (the idea of so‑
cietas abscondita) and, consequently, postulates the demise of grassroots 
political activities that are not propelled by the compulsive demand 
for media feedback.
While addressing the problem of trust in late modern societies, 
Francis Fukuyama identifies a syndrome of consequences implicit in 
late modern culture which he aptly names as the “great disruption” 
affecting the well ‑established systems of values and norms typical of 
traditional and early modern social and cultural settings:
Anyone who has lived through the decades between the 
1950s and the 1990s in the United States or other Western 
countries can scarcely fail to recognize the massive value 
changes that have taken place over this period. These 
changes in norms and values are complex, but can be put 
under the general heading of increasing individualism. […] In‑
stead, involuntary ties and obligations based on inherited 
social class, religion, gender, race, ethnicity, and the like are 
replaced by ties undertaken voluntarily.32
Future scenarios for the European and American modernities are 
associated with new forms of individualism (also conceptualised as 
31 Norris, What’s Wrong, p. 166.
32 Fukuyama, The Great Disruption. Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social 
Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), p. 47. Emphasis added.
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individualization by Beck and Giddens) reinforced by the proliferation 
of media networks (the Internet). This form of individualism is fostered 
by information bombardment which dissolves traditional constraints 
set upon an individual person and his/her lifestyle opportunities. 
The ubiquity of information facilitates human agency by providing 
opportunities showing that the currently practised lifestyle is just 
a single option taken out of the possibly unlimited array of existential 
choices. This triumph of agency over the restraining impact of social 
and cultural structures (habit, religion, tradition) indicates that late 
modernity unveils its “liquid” character as the era in which traditional 
cultural constraints of identity and personality formation cease to exist. 
As Bauman teaches us:
First of all, the passage from the “solid” to a “liquid” phase 
of modernity: that is, into a condition in which social 
forms (structures that limit individual choices, institutions 
that guard repetitions of routines, patterns of acceptable 
behaviour) can no longer (and are not expected) to keep 
their shape for long, because they decompose and melt faster 
than the time it takes to cast them.33
Psychologically speaking, the concept of “individualization” stands 
for the demise of the traditional trajectories of human biographies. 
As far as the theatrical perspective is concerned, the late modern 
information bombardment destabilises and deregulates actors’ roles 
by undermining the durability of their textual underpinnings.34 This, 
to put it otherwise, is rooted in the deregulation affecting axiological 
frameworks embedded in late capitalistic society. It is “the unqualified 
priority awarded to the irrationality and moral blindness of market 
competition, the unbound freedom granted to capital and finance at 
the expense of all other freedoms, the tearing up of socially maintained 
safety nets and the neglect of all but economic considerations […].”35
The process of individualization may be, therefore, presented in 
terms of the progressive liberation of human agency from the con‑
straining impact of social and cultural structures. The structural and 
textual frameworks of the early industrial phase modernity — namely, 
fixed ideologies, family structure, nation state, class or gender — are 
dissolved and replaced by social forms promoting new possibilities 
33 Bauman, Liquid Times, p. 1.
34 Cf. Beck, The Reinvention, p. 13. See also Beck and Beck ‑Gernsheim, The 
Normal Chaos of Love (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 7.
35 Bauman, The Individualised Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p. 84.
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of exercising the freedom of individual choice.36 Consequently, the 
structurally understood society becomes increasingly remote from 
human everyday experiences which forces individuals to take full 
responsibility for decisions made under the circumstances of risk. One, 
therefore, cannot see society through the prism of structural or textual 
constraints but, contrariwise, from the perspective of self ‑development 
and self ‑actualisation. The late modern pattern of cultural reproduction, 
to refer to the delineated dramaturgic metaphor, is anchored in the 
agential process of textual improvisation denoting the autonomy to 
browse through a potentially unlimited number of values, norms and 
signs offered by the contemporary mass media.
The breakdown of structural and textual constraints in the age of 
individualistic consumer societies of late modernity is powered by 
the rise of simulated representations of sociality offered by the con‑
temporary mass media. The participation in new forms of digitalised 
symbolic culture may be compared to an experience of a city dweller 
who becomes lost in the world of fluid and changeable appearances. 
Individuals assume, as Bauman puts it, a cultural mask of strollers 
who observe the external reality as being deprived of depth, history, 
hierarchy and significance.37 Needless to say, actors on the stage of 
late modern society are forced to assume an attitude of a person who 
lives in the world of changing appearances, where the essence remains 
elusive since cognition is inevitably reduced to a series of camera ‑like 
glances. As Ewa Borkowska observes:
In an increasingly computerised life, the change of symbols 
is simply too fast for reflexive cognition and since a visual 
paradigm establishes hegemony over culture, thought be‑
comes perceptual and “the glance” replaces “the gaze” in 
the scopic regime of signification.38
Traditional trust relations as well as traditionally established “facework 
commitments” are becoming dysfunctional in this novel, media ‑satu‑ 
rated setting. What becomes postulated in their place is the quality
36 See Scott Lash and J. Urry, Economies of Sign and Space (London: Sage Pub‑
lications, 1994).
37 Zygmunt Bauman, “Ponowoczesne wzory osobowe,” in Bauman, Dwa szkice 
o moralności ponowoczesnej (Warszawa: Instytut Kultury, 1994), pp. 22—25.
38 Ewa Borkowska, “The ‘Culture’ of Simulation,” in Signs of Culture: Simulacra 
and the Real, eds. W. Kalaga, T. Rachwał (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, New 
York, Paris, Wien: Peter Lang, 2000), p. 89.
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of “civil inattention,” the very opposite of the interpersonal cognition 
postulating an act of mutual non ‑cognition in which a single and 
momentary glance should suffice. This form of inattention, as Gid‑
dens observes, constitutes “a very general presupposition of the trust 
presumed in regular encounters with strangers in public places.”39 As 
a consequence, this late modern strategy of sustaining trust cultures 
seems to be playing a crucial role within virtual realties in which all 
individuals are mere complexes of signifiers, avatars participating in 
the “consensual hallucination”40 of media spaces.
This seductive character of contemporary madiascapes induces 
the withdrawal of trust from the traditional regimes of reality and 
gestures towards Baudrillard’s dystopian scenario of media representa‑
tions conceived as something more real than the reality itself.41 As 
a consequence, the contemporary discourse of media distrust seems to 
follow the Gibsonian concept of the “consensual hallucination” which 
— in this context — postulates that the mass media “are nothing else 
than a marvellous instrument for destabilizing the real and all true, 
all historical or political truth.”42 Baudrillard’s theoretical output, to put 
it otherwise, seems to constitute a dark scenario for the prospects of 
Western democracies. The discourse of all ‑pervading media simulation 
seems, as Christopher Norris observes, to arrive at the point where 
human agential subjectivity becomes left behind since “’the real’ is 
the construct of intra ‑linguistic processes and structures that allow 
no access to a world outside the prison ‑house of discourse.”43 Since 
political debates are conceptually framed by the mass media feedback, 
political actions are staged by means of mass media and the very proc‑
ess of governance becomes caught in the treadmill of public relations 
management in which each decision is dependent upon the prediction 
of the potential impact of government decisions on public opinion. As 
Norris observes:
One line of argument much canvassed in the run ‑up was 
that opinion polls were perhaps having a harmful influence 
on the democratic process since voters were unduly swayed 
by the wording of questions, the “hidden agenda,” or the 
39 Giddens, The Consequences, p. 81.
40 William Gibson, Neuromancer (New York: Ace Books, 1984), p. 67.
41 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, trans. S.F. Glaser (Minneapolis: Uni‑
versity of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 2.
42 Jean Baudrillard, The Masses: The Implosion of the Social in the Media (Cam‑
bridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 217.
43 Norris, What’s Wrong, p. 185.
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feedback ‑effect which told them what to think before they 
had even started to make their minds up.44
The erosion of traditional trust cultures is also evident in the empiri‑
cal studies conducted by Robert D. Putnam, who concludes that the 
recent developments in media technologies may be “driving a wedge 
between our individual interests and our collective interest.”45 The 
rise in the new forms of trust operating within the abstract systems 
of post ‑industrial technologies manifests itself as the decline in civic 
cooperativeness (the dissolution of civil society) as well as the eroding 
willingness to participate in the democratic institutions (such as popu‑
lar elections), which is tantamount to the fall of civic culture. In this 
sense, the destructive impact of media hyperreality on contemporary 
trust cultures is represented as the erosion of civil society with the 
concomitant decline in the productivity of grassroots organisations and 
other institutions functioning as arenas of public debate. Putnam’s argu‑
ment, to put it in a nutshell, points to the destabilization of democratic 
regimes that come in the wake of the dissolution of public interest in 
forms of civic life. In this sort of political discourse, civic grassroots 
organisations are indispensable for having a fully fledged democratic 
order because they are instrumental in fostering the general norm 
of reciprocity, a feeling of reliability and confidence associated with 
encounters with Otherness.
The consequences related to the transformation of trust cultures in 
the age of late modernity do not affect only socio ‑political systems, but 
also actors performing their roles on those stages. Mediated trust is, on 
the one hand, indispensable with reference to the process of sustain‑
ing routines integrated within abstract systems. This constitutes a new 
pillar of ontological security: human existence is founded upon trust 
vested not in particular individuals, but rather impersonal principles 
and regulations whose role becomes instrumental in stabilizing social 
relations across indefinite spans of temporal and spatial dimensions 
implicit in the global society. Yet this situation, as we learn from Gid‑
dens, “creates novel forms of psychological vulnerability, and trust 
in abstract systems is not psychologically rewarding in the way in 
which trust in persons is.”46 This process is inevitably related to the 
self ‑transformation of interpersonal relations which, as it were, are 
rendered more public and technological character. The multiplicity of 
44 Norris, What’s Wrong , p. 176.
45 Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of 
Democracy 6, no. 1 (1995), p. 75.
46 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, p. 113.
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actors and the rise of novel circumstances of interaction are related, 
furthermore, to a notion postulating that in the age of late modernity 
trust resembles a process, a project or an enterprise, rather than a state 
granted and taken at face ‑value.
The transformation of trust unveils the true nature of the in‑
dividualization processes implicit in late modern culture. In this 
specific context, individualization does not necessarily mean the self‑ 
constitution of individuals conceived autonomous, self ‑dependent and 
active personalities. In this sense, the modern culture of individualism 
unveils its more sombre face related to the rise of inert mass societies. 
As Rollo May observes: 
What is occurring as an inescapable phenomenon of our 
times, the inevitable result of the collectivism, mass edu‑
cation, mass communication, mass technology, and other 
“mass” processes which form modern people’s minds and 
emotions.47
The panorama of late modern social world implies the radical implo‑
sion of the social into the mass, the coming of the age which could 
be characterised by the term societas abscondita delineating the world 
of human relations that hides itself behind the façades of anonymity, 
media hallucination and conformity to the demands of consumption 
markets. The modern model of individual designates a fragile personal‑
ity succumbed to the incessant propaganda of consumer society and 
endowed with an internalised penchant for emulating the external 
reality.
Moreover, new forms of psychological vulnerability attributed to 
the development of post ‑industrial abstract systems seem to deepen 
the quality of loneliness which David Riesman deploys in order to 
delineate the reality of contemporary mass societies.48 This decline of 
interpersonal bonds or the erosion of social capitals, as Putnam would 
diagnose it, coincides with the rise of “other ‑directed personalities” 
— individuals who remain succumbed to their inner indecisiveness 
because of their essential inability to face risks associated with taking 
decisions. Consequently, the feature of other ‑directness does not mean 
the readiness to engage in a risky cooperation with the Other, but 
rather to treat him/her in terms of a template which is going to be 
47 Rollo May, Psychology and the Human Dilemma (New York and London: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1980), p. 28.
48 Riesman, The Lonely Crowd.
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unreflectively emulated in the conformist pursuit of social approval. 
Needless to say, this type of other ‑directed personality becomes here 
a cultural coefficient to the late modern “cyberblitz,” the increasing 
assault of media advertising technologies on the real world.49
Time, Space and the Ontology of the Terminal Identity
The erosion of traditional trust cultures is a consequence of changes 
affecting spatial and temporal distances (subsumed here under the 
notion of theatrical stages) that characterise late modern socio ‑cultural 
systems. Interpersonal relations which previously took place in the local 
settings are nowadays dissolved and re ‑organised across the dimen‑
sions of global, networked society. This process, however, seems to be 
endowed with far ‑reaching cultural consequences which overshadow 
its purely spatial and temporal understanding. The cultural panorama 
of late modernity — as the theatrical framework sees it — enables 
the increasing estrangement of both cultural actors to the point in 
which the cultural reproduction of trust cultures resembles a process 
of interacting among distant and absent strangers.
The ontological conditions of existence in the world of modernity 
are usually inscribed within the discourse delineating the process of 
globalisation whose technological, economic, social and political coef‑
ficients render the emergence of the networked social and political 
reality possible. As Douglas Kellner puts it:
For critical social theory, globalisation involves both capital‑
ist markets and sets of social relations and flows of com‑
modities, capital, technology, ideas, forms of culture, and 
people across national boundaries via global networked society. 
The transmutations of technology and capital work together 
to create a new globalised and interconnected world. A tech‑
nological revolution involving the creation of a computerised 
network of communication, transportation and exchange is the 
presupposition of a globalised economy, along with the ex‑
tension of a world capitalist market system that is absorbing 
49 Cf. J. Baudrillard, “Design and Environment, or How Political Economy 
Escalates into Cyberblitz,” in For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, ed., 
trans. Ch. Levin (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1981).
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ever more areas of the world and spheres of production, 
exchange, and consumption into its orbit.50
What becomes immediately associated with the advancement of 
globalizing tendencies is the establishment of a new form of social 
structure conceptualised, as Manuel Castells suggests, in terms of the 
“network society.”51 The networked organisation of social structure 
may be perceived as a practical illustration of the rhizome, a type 
of structure which remains persistently contradictory with reference 
to thinking in terms of hierarchies, orders or fixed categorisations.52 
The concept of the network society is, then, delineated in terms of 
a global, fluid organisation of flows of information, political power, 
cultural authorities and, last but not least, capital which seems to defy 
national and territorial boundaries as well as any established patterns 
of fixed social structures or hierarchies.53
The flexible structure of the network society paves the way for the 
cultural re ‑conceptualisation of both spatial and temporal dimensions 
of human agency which in the late modern order assume the forms 
of “timeless time” and “space of flows.”54 The idea of the space of 
flows pays its theoretical debts to the Yi ‑Fu Tuan’s phenomenological 
conceptualisation which defines cultural spaces as being deprived of 
well ‑defined interpretative connotations embodying human histories 
associated with a given locality.55 The spatial organisation of the 
network society reflects the idea of global heterogeneity taking place 
as the free fluctuation of cultural meanings. The latter term, in turn, 
delineates the radical compression, and the subsequent annihilation, 
of temporal dimension of human practice. This process is especially 
indicative of computerised environments in which performed actions 
bring their consequences instantaneously so that there is virtually no 
possibility of withdrawing from them in the meantime.
This type of flexible, fluid disorganisation and the apparent chaos 
that comes in its wake is made possible by the introduction of digital 
50 Douglas Kellner, “Theorizing Globalisation,” Sociological Theory 20, no. 3 
(2002), p. 287. Emphasis mine.
51 Manuel Castells, The Rise of Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
2004).
52 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizo‑
phrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 7—14.
53 Castells, “Materials for an Explanatory Theory of the Network Society,” 
British Journal of Sociology 51, no. 1 (2000), p. 15.
54 Castells, “Materials for an Explanatory Theory,” pp. 13—14.
55 Yi ‑Fu Tuan, “Space and Place: A Humanistic Perspective” Progress in Geo‑
graphy 6 (1974), p. 213.
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technologies of the information processing. As a consequence, the 
annihilation of temporal and spatial dimensions of social life leads 
towards the self ‑transformation of theatrical stages of trust culture re‑
production. As Castells comments on the spatio ‑temporal mechanisms 
of network society:
Culture was historically produced by symbolic interaction 
in a given space/time. With time being annihilated and 
space becoming a space of flows, where all symbols coexist 
without reference to experience, culture becomes the culture 
of real virtuality. It takes the form of an interactive network 
in the electronic hypertext, mixing everything, and voiding 
the meaning of any specific message out of this context.56
The overall characteristic of late modernity is related to the separation 
of time and space which denotes the existential coefficient of techno‑
logical processes that cannot be conceived within the boundaries of 
traditional, pre ‑modern cultures.57 This process is, nevertheless, firmly 
grounded within the phenomenon of modernization. It implies the 
colonization, standardisation and technological appropriation of time 
and place. As far as the problem of trust is concerned, this process 
is endowed with a serious ramification: partners to interaction may 
interact in the same time, but not the same space or, conversely, may 
occupy the same space but at different time intervals.
The advent of modernity increasingly tears space away 
from place by fostering relations between absent “others,” 
locationally distant from any given situation of face ‑to ‑face 
interaction. In conditions of modernity, place becomes 
increasingly phantasmagoric: this is to say, locales are 
thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social 
influences quite distant from them.58
The stage, on which the reproduction of trust cultures is undertaken, 
becomes transformed: trust is no longer sustained within regimes 
covering the relations of co ‑presence, but rather by the unique combina‑
tion of presence and absence implicit in abstract systems of modernity. 
These processes, in turn, give rise to the disembedding of social and 
56 Castells, “Materials for on Explanatary Theory,” p. 21.
57 See especially Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, pp. 17—19; Giddens, 
Modernity and Self ‑Identity, pp. 16—19.
58 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, pp. 18—19.
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cultural systems of trust, which in the age of late modernity, become 
“lifted out” from the traditional context of locality and reproduced 
around vast tracts of space implicit in the global organisation of the 
network society. In this sense, we cannot really speak of the “global 
village” after the fashion of Marshall McLuhan’s thought: the village 
conceived as a pre ‑modern social setting implies the relations of co‑ 
presence taking place in local circumstances of action which activate 
traditional forms of trust cultures. Global society, in turn, is founded 
upon the existence of abstract systems of trust.
Contemporary forms of trust involve “faceless commitments” ac‑
tualised in frameworks of economic, technological or political systems 
of modernity.59 This sort of commitment is based upon interactions 
which are conceived not as the cooperation complete persons but, 
contrariwise, as a relationship taking place between fragmented per‑
sonalities defined by the roles fulfilled temporarily for the sake of the 
interaction in question. This process was first pointed out by Durkheim 
whose insight into the nature of modernity rests upon the concept 
of division of labour. In modern economy, individuals do not act as 
compete personalities, but as fragmented ones which are constituted 
by a role chosen to be economically productive at a given moment in 
time (relationships taking place between managers and floor workers 
is a good example here).60
This process, nevertheless, reaches its extreme character in the 
late modern abstract systems (such as contemporary mediascapes and 
virtual realties) through which human subjectivity and agency becomes 
mediated. The reality of information technology, then, promotes a new 
form of human subjectivity: individuals are not interacting as frag‑
mented personalites, but rather as mediated or dissimulated avatars.61 
The ontological challenges posed by the dialectic of presence and 
absence within cyberspaces of information industry give rise to a new 
conceptualisation of actors (agents) defined as “terminal subjects” by 
Bukatman. The term denotes a distinct form of subjectivity as well as 
agency which evolves at the intersection of the human mind (percep‑
tive skills) and the computerised (silicon) machinery.62 This interactive, 
perhaps even dialogic, construction of the terminal subjectivity seems 
59 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, p. 80.
60 Cf. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (New York: Free Press, 1964).
61 The name is taken from Neil Stephenson’s novel Snow Crash in which liv‑
ing characters act within cyberspaces as avatars — digitalised representations of 
personality. See N. Stephenson, Snow Crash (London: Roc., 1993).
62 Bukatman, Terminal Identity. The Virtual Subject in Postmodern Science Fiction 
(Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 22.
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to elude the traditional dichotomy of the techno ‑phobic and the techno‑ 
philiac. In this particular case the subject is empowered and enabled 
by its extension into the cyberspace and, at the same time, constrained 
or entombed in the digital cage of fake, digitalised representations. Let 
us consider, for instance, the dissimulated reality of an internet chat 
room: each actor is granted the ability to bracket off space and to chat 
with spatially distant Others (timeless time and space of flows are at 
work here) but, at the same time, one is restrained by uncertainty as 
to other participants identities.
The ontology of terminal subjectivity is closely related to the nature 
of network society. This new type of social actor enjoys the privilege 
of autonomy that is granted by the very nature of social structures of 
information society. As Marcin Mazurek puts it:
As there is no privileged source of the space origin, be it the 
ultimate computer or a universal mind responsible for the 
system’s internal regulation, terminal space appears to be 
a perfectly de ‑centred structure. Its net ‑like nature negates 
the very possibility of a privileged and dominant discourse 
which could possibly operate within terminal territory. The 
most essential consequence of this lack of source is the 
absence of the periphery, hence the opposition between the 
centre and the margin becomes irrelevant and as such is 
treated with remote indifference.63
The heterogeneous network of late modern abstract systems increases 
demands for the construction of stable trust cultures. In this context, 
trusting seems to remain the only remedy for situations of uncertainty 
and risk inscribed in modern societies. Vesting trust is equivalent to the 
act of bracketing off the encountered spatial and temporal distances. 
Trusting, thus, provides individuals with an emotional inoculation 
against the feeling of anxiety associated with other people’s absence. 
In this sense, trusting may be represented by the notion of continu‑
ity of individuals and things, the coherence of socio ‑cultural world 
which has been lost with the advent of abstract systems. Entrustment, 
to put it still otherwise, enables binding up of the temporal and spatial 
dimensions of human existence in a way that is similar to the role of 
the “place” within the culture of pre ‑modernity. Trust communities in 
this sense resemble patterns of emotional sociability which are formed 
63 Marcin Mazurek, “Thirdness of Terminal Space. Implosion. Indifference. 
Infinity,” in The Same, the Other, the Third, ed. W. Kalaga (Katowice: Wydawnictwo 
UŚ, 2004), p. 87.
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by actors engaged in the reproduction of norms and values of trust in 
the condition of co ‑presence.
The rise of institutionalised networks of multilateral trust may be 
seen in terms of a remedy for the increasing individualism inscribed 
within social systems of modernity. The unceasing, all ‑pervading 
media bombardment, or the cyberblitz, become an essential element 
of life within abstract systems of late modernity. Yet, the remedy for it 
can be found in the act of symbolic return to the realm of traditional 
community, the pre ‑modern continuity of time and space. This is, nev‑
ertheless, possible only when the tissue of organisations constituting 
civil societies is flourishing.
The Reflexivity of Trust in the World of Counterfactuals
The era of traditional pre ‑modernity unveils itself as a realm of sys‑
temic — both social and cultural — constraints set upon an operating 
actor. The very idea of tradition conceived in terms of repetition paves 
the way for the conceptualisation of a social actor as being deprived 
of agency since from the onset individuals are dispossessed of rational 
calculation conceived here as a means of informed planning as well 
as acting. Actions remain legitimised in the cognitive framework of 
the past and their reference leads towards the sacred tradition, rather 
than the future, conceived as the realm of possible opportunities as 
well as risks.
It is the orientation towards the future, a feature firmly rooted in 
the temporal organisation of the modern cultural stage, that undoes 
constraints set upon actors and opens fields of possibilities before their 
eyes. Future events are, then, perceived as a venture into institutional‑
ised plurality, rather than homogeneity enclosed in the strict forms of 
formulaic truths provided by traditional thinking. As Terry Eagleton 
comments on modernity seen from the perspective of its penchant for 
modernization and colonisation of the future:
All historical epochs are modern to themselves, but not all 
live their experience in this ideological mode. If modernism 
lives its history as peculiarity, insistently “present,” it also 
experiences a sense that this present moment is somehow 
of the “future,” to which the present is nothing more than 
an orientation, so that the idea of the Now, of the present 
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as full presence eclipsing the past, is itself intermittently 
eclipsed by an awareness of the present as deferment, as an 
empty excited openness to the future which is in one sense 
already here, in another sense yet to come.64
The ideology implicit in the drive towards the colonisation of the future 
endows modern culture with its inherent dynamism, an orientation 
towards the process of perpetual modernization and development. In 
this sense, modernity resembles a project in the agential process of 
becoming.
The logic of reflexive modernisation, however, transforms this 
typically modern orientation towards the future. This transmutation 
of modernisation becomes inherent in the constitution of late modern 
culture and is regarded as a logical consequence of the very nature 
of the future conceived as a field of conflicting, counterfactual pos‑
sibilities and, therefore, of uncertainty. As a result, as Giddens claims, 
“[T]he more we try to colonise the future, the more it is likely to 
spring surprises upon us.”65 In this sense, late modernity resembles 
a grand experiment founded upon the basis of the radical methodologi‑
cal doubt, the cognitive strategy that has always been present in the 
panorama of modern thought. Modernity is indebted to the less known 
part of the famous Cartesian dictum in which, paradoxically enough, 
the enterprise of attaining the ultimate truth is always preceded by the 
initial act of distrust towards the status of knowledge.
As nature becomes invaded, and even “ended,” by human 
socialization, and tradition is dissolved, new types of 
incalculability emerge. […] On the global level, therefore, 
modernity has become experimental. We are all willy ‑nilly, 
caught up in a grand experiment, which is at the one time 
our doing — as human agents — yet to an imponderable 
degree outside of our control.66
The point is that the tendency implicit in modern culture is to operate 
within the wide range of possible scenarios (cultural texts or discourses) 
which do not unveil themselves as objective truths but, contrariwise, 
64 Terry Eagleton, “Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism,” in Modern 
Criticism and Theory, ed. D. Lodge (London: Longman, 2000), p. 367.
65 Giddens, “Living in a Post ‑Traditional Society,” in Reflexive Modernization. 
Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, eds. A. Giddens, U. Beck, 
and S. Lash (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 58.
66 Giddens, “Living in a Post ‑Traditional Society,” pp. 58—59.
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are closely depended upon human knowledge and willingness to act. 
In this sense, modernity is seen as the triumph of human agency over 
the constraining capabilities of structures. The future is seen as being 
“worked out” right now by actors engaged in their performances tak‑
ing place on the theatrical stages consisting of possibilities as well as 
limitations. This paves the way for a new conceptualisation of cultural 
(re)production: cultural resources are not granted but, on the contrary, 
are being created on theatrical stages by actions undertaken by actors 
(individual as well as collective) equipped with their own discourses, 
values and political agendas. As a consequence, the popular idea of 
“multiculturalism” gestures towards the essentially late modern idea of 
agential reflexivity conceived as an ability and willingness to construct 
one’s own personal biographies without the suppressing of the Other’s 
perspective.67
The ideas of human agency as well as knowledgeability constitute 
the core element of the modern culture of human reflexivity. The term 
delineates an array of epistemological processes through which modern 
culture reproduces itself by means of the constant use of knowledge 
which — along with the calculus of chance versus risk — come to 
constitute a basis for social organisation.
With the advent of modernity, reflexivity takes on a differ‑
ent character. It is introduced into the very basis of system 
reproduction, such that thought and action are constantly 
refracted back upon one another. […] The reflexivity of 
modern social life consists in the fact that social practices are 
constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming 
information about those very practices, thus constitutively 
altering their character.68
The very idea of reflexivity is, thus, encoded within the modernist 
promise of social practice which uses history in order to construct 
history. However, this process — as the very idea of the paradigm 
shift suggests — is far from being cumulative and linear: future is 
always associated with the grim awareness of risk, the developmental 
by ‑product of the modern will to change.
The modern principle of reflexivity affects the societal basis of trust 
cultures. It is related, as the delineated theatrical framework postulates, 
to the overall change of actor’s performance: our roles are more de‑
67 On the idea of multiculturalism, see W. Kalaga, ed., Dylematy Wielokulturowości, 
(Kraków: Wydawnictwo Universitas, 2007).
68 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity,  p. 38.
166 The Agency of Trust
pendable upon the agency of relatively free interpretation, rather than 
their emplotment within shared textual references. This triumph of 
agency over structural constraints is a result of the spatial and temporal 
transformation of stages on which trust cultures take place. In the age 
of late modernity, one experiences processes of globalisation which “lift 
up” localised trusting relations and reproduce them on the networked 
stage of global society. Moreover, in the era of overt individualisation 
and the radical implosion of structural (textual) constraints, trust‑
ing becomes individualized as well as introduced as the very basic 
principle of system reproduction. Since the social becoming of late 
modern trust cultures involves the cooperation and cohabitation of 
diverse actors operating within open ‑ended networks of multicultural 
societies, the willingness to enter dialogical relations of reciprocity 
and trust becomes the crucial cultural competence. Trust cultures are 
not, moreover, granted or stabilised by the constraining forces of the 
past: vesting trust resembles an enterprise of browsing through great 
numbers of competing or counterfactual discourses. Hence, in the late 
modern context, we may elaborate on the reflexivity of trust.
Conclusions
Ours is an individualized, privatised version of 
modernity, with the burden of pattern ‑weaving 
and the responsibility for failure falling primarily 
on the individual’s shoulders. It is the patterns of 
dependency and interaction whose turn to be lique‑
fied has come […] Solids are cast once and for all. 
Keeping fluids in shape requires a lot of attention, 
constant vigilance and perpetual effort — an even 
the success of the effort is anything but a foregone 
conclusion.1
Behind the conceptualisations delineated in this dissertation would 
lurk an assumption that cultural phenomena are socially productive, 
especially in the spheres of norms and values. In this specific sense, 
diverse axiological and normative elements of culture are constructive 
forces producing normatively integrated moral communities based 
upon standards of generalised reciprocity as well as interpersonal 
trust. The moral discourse of trust, consequently, seems to pull carpet 
from under the feet of those who might be still inclined to the early 
modern — deeply rooted in the legacy of Marxist thinking — concep‑
tion suggesting that culture is a matter of false consciousness. The 
social becoming of trust cultures does not constitute a mere reflection 
of pre ‑existent social structures and concomitant mechanisms aiming 
at the inter ‑generational reproduction of economic inequalities. Quite 
to the contrary, accumulated reservoirs of societal trust unveil their 
economic as well as political productivity as stocks of social capital 
facilitating the undertaking of collective actions in the trans ‑personal 
reality. From this perspective, trust culture may assume a form of an 
autotelic value in a sense that the generalised reciprocity may serve 
1 Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), pp. 7—8.
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as a public good whose accumulation is beneficial for the community 
considered as a whole. Needless to say, trusting mechanisms imply 
a transition from discourses conceptualising an individual in the 
utilitarian terms of homo oeconomicus to a more communicative notion 
of homo reciprocus. Consequently, norms of reciprocity are inscribed 
in symmetrical interpersonal relations and founded upon dialogical 
norms of, as it were, cultural rationality which seems to take the upper 
hand over the purely economic calculus.
The process of social becoming of trust cultures can be discussed in 
the context of the general changeability of socio ‑cultural orders which 
emanates from the dynamic and historical character of societal reality 
rendering the transformation of traditional, pre ‑modern communities 
into rationalised orders of advanced modernity possible. The institu‑
tionalisation of modernity is tantamount to the general reconstruction 
within intrinsic mechanisms structuring the morphogenesis of trust 
cultures. The process denotes the rise of a new environment of trust 
in which reciprocity and trusting relations become projects which 
remain, so to speak, in statu nascendi. Methodologically speaking, the 
work purports to delineate the aforementioned transformation of trust 
cultures from the perspective of the theatrical framework conceiving 
processes of cultural morphogenesis in terms of a combined outcome 
of structural (textual) conditionings of human agency, spatial, temporal 
and interpersonal frames of symbolic interactions, and actors’ creative 
impulses to take action. By way of illustration, a brief summary of 
argumentation is given in table 1.
The theatrical framework predicts that the transformation of trust 
cultures may be represented as a process of change in which trusting 
relations are assuming a form of compulsive necessity rendering an 
actor’s agency possible. In other words, in the realm of pre ‑modernity 
trust is not a problem. Individuals — as being united within the same 
interpretative horizon of shared norms and values — are routinely 
expected to vest trust in other actors. The advent of modernity, on 
the other hand, problematizes interpersonal trusting relations. In the 
contemporary context, trust becomes a function of individual choices; 
it resembles a project to be “worked out” from a potentially infinite 
range of life scenarios. Moreover, the ubiquity of risks and uncertain‑
ties inscribed in abstract systems of modernity manifests itself as the 
necessity of vesting trust: actors are simply compelled to trust in order 
to participate in social life.
The theatrical framework perceives the aforementioned transforma‑
tion of trust cultures in terms of a joint result of changes affecting 
stages of social interaction, discursive (textual) options possessed by 
169Conclusions
Table 1
A Comparison of traditional and modern trust cultures
Elements of  
Theatrical  
Framework
Traditional Society Late Modernity
Stage the place conceived as a realm of 
familiarity implying relations 
between present actors;
focus on the sacred past reinfor‑
ced by the political use of dan‑
gers
global and networked spaces 
implying the dialectic of 
presence/absence;
colonisation of the future via 
risk calculation
Texts traditions conceived as sources of 
relatively unified reference points
multiple textual references;
structures as fatal forms
Actors charismatic leadership;
identities are fixed: individuals 
interact as coherent and com‑
plete personalities
plurality of individual as well 
as collective actors with dis‑ 
tinct political agendas;
actors interact as fragmented 
and dissimulated “terminal 
identities”
Performance domination of inherited roles, the 
compulsion to repeat
centrality of individual cho‑
ice, the agential interpreta‑
tion of roles
Trust culture trust as a structurally rendered 
expectation;
fixed, non ‑negotiable character
trust as a necessity;
agential character in statu nas‑
cendi
individuals as well as actors’ identities. In this context, the theatri‑
cal stage undergoes a radical change from the realm of predictable 
familiarity — the Gemeinschaft in Ferdinand Tönnies’s nomenclature 
— where actors relate to one another as participants in shared elements 
of symbolic culture towards the global space where interaction implies 
uncertainty calculation inscribed in the dialectic of presence and ab‑
sence. The totality of textual resources oscillates from the pre ‑modern 
unity of traditionalism to the rhizomatic plurality of discursive options, 
the multiplicity of divergent voices constituting the post ‑traditional 
symbolic culture. An actor’s identity, consequently, changes its fixed 
nature reinforced by direct encounters with other individuals (who 
are conceived as coherent, complete personalities) into a fragmented 
and dissimulated character which is typical of participants in indirect 
relationships inscribed in the disembedded character of modern social 
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institutions. From this perspective, social becoming of trust cultures 
— conceived as a theatrical performance — undergoes transformation 
from the reliance on fixed discourses of tradition and compulsion to 
repeat roles towards the agential interpretation and negotiation of 
social roles, the improvisation performed as an interplay of multiple 
textual references.
Hence, the dynamic character of trust and reciprocity in the age 
of reflexive modernity is related, first and foremost, to the incredible 
advancement of human agency. In this essentially individualistic era, 
actors are often liberated from the formative, structuring impact of 
social and cultural structures. As a consequence, trajectories of their 
personal identities become truly “individual” in a way that they are 
no longer anchored in a secure, repeatable authority of cultural texts 
rendering human behaviour more predictable. Hence, it is the culture 
of human agency, the era in which cultural structures become “fatal,”2 
which poses new challenges as far as the morphogenesis of trust cul‑
tures is concerned. The very act of trusting becomes individualised 
and privatised; it depends more on the capability of human agency 
(actualising itself within a distinct time ‑space continuity) than upon 
the traditionalised legacy of cultural structures.
The overall transformation of trust cultures gestures towards the 
emergence of a new cultural discourse of modernity which is defined 
by the notion of “cultural trauma.” In this sense, modernity becomes 
coded as a cultural phenomenon which seems to jeopardize the very 
foundations of moral communities. The idea that advanced culture of 
modernity constitutes a deeply traumatic phenomenon is firmly rooted 
in an extensive criticism of modernity, in which it becomes understood 
as an intrinsically oppressive socio ‑cultural formation conveying the 
previously hidden potential of social reification and standardisation. 
As Sztompka observes:
The career of the concept of trauma as applied to society 
begins with the realization that change itself, irrespective 
of the domain it touches, the group it affects, and even 
irrespective of its content, may have adverse effects, bring 
shocks and wounds to the social and cultural tissue. The 
focus shifts from the critique of particular types of change 
to the disturbing, destructive, shocking effects of the change 
2 See J.S. Epstein, M.J. Epstein, Fatal Forms: Toward a (Neo)Formal Sociological 
Theory of Media Culture, in Baudrillard. A Critical Reader, ed. D. Kellner (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1994).
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per se. The classical assumption that change is autotelic value 
is finally lifted; the fetish of change is undermined. It is 
countered with the hypothesis that people put value on 
security, predictability, continuity, routines, and rituals of 
their lifeworld.3
The discourse of cultural trauma, as the aforementioned passage 
puts it, lays great stress on the idea of predictability and certitude 
constituting, to use Giddens’s nomenclature, the cornerstone of human 
ontological security.4 In this context, the notion may be defined in terms 
of a sense of spatial as well as temporal continuity of perceived things 
and encountered individuals, which an agent experiences in his/her 
everyday life. Hence, in order to exist in the Lebenswelt of everyday life, 
an actor must develop a sense of universal reliability, the generalised 
expectation that risks and contingencies of the outside environment 
may be — to use phenomenological nomenclature — bracketed off.
The feeling of ontological security is anchored in the interpersonal 
universe of early childhood, in the psychological need for continuity 
which becomes personified, first and foremost, by the figure of a mother 
who constitutes the axis mundus of a child’s life. In this context, the 
notion of individual security becomes, as it were, exercised in a daily 
process of upbringing in which a child has to cope with the absence of 
his/her caretaker. Ontological security, consequently, emerges as a form 
of faith vested in a caretaker’s integrity representing a firm belief that 
periods of absence are only temporary aberrations from the standard 
pattern of everyday life.
The theory of cultural trauma suggests, however, that it is pre‑
cisely this general awareness of security and predictability which the 
contemporary, late modern culture is very reluctant to provide. In this 
sense, the ontology of reflexive modernity — as the last chapter of 
this work attempts to describe — may be subsumed within the pat‑
tern of escalating autonomy in which every single agent is capable of 
inventing his/her identity since from the onset they are all embedded 
in a reality where pre ‑existent structural constraints of class, gender, 
nationality have imploded (or at least some intellectual provocateurs 
have claimed so). In this situation, the transformation towards moder‑
nity constitutes a deeply traumatic process. It postulates the essential 
as well as all ‑pervading change which shatters the well ‑entrenched 
3 Sztompka, “The Trauma of Social Change. A Case of Postcommunist Socie‑
ties,” in Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, eds. J.C. Alexander et al. (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004), p. 157.
4 See Giddens, Modernity and Self ‑Identity, pp. 36—42.
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foundations of ontological security, namely, systems of traditional 
values and beliefs, firmly grounded role expectations (for instance 
within a family structure) and the pre ‑conceived trajectories of personal 
development indicating the existence of “normal” biographies. In this 
context, the cultural discourse of trauma refers to, as Sztompka teaches 
us, the universal sense of “cultural disorganisation and accompanying 
disorientation”5 experienced mostly in the axiological as well as norma‑
tive elements of culture.
The domain of culture, consequently, manifests itself as a fragile 
ontological construction which is deeply susceptible to the shattering 
effect of generalised change. This peculiar sensitiveness to the impact 
of traumatic change, however, is not surprising. Culture is, first and 
foremost, the realm of continuity and reproduction, the sphere of 
identity formation, as well as the depository of heritage and tradition. 
In this sense — to translate it into the nomenclature of theatrical 
framework — culture becomes the domain of remembering, rather 
than forgetting, in which the textual (structural) foundations may serve 
as a sort of secure haven. Cultural traumas bring dissolution to this 
textual order of remembering and recollection. In this sense, trauma 
connotes — one may say — an anomie, an axiological and normative 
chaos in which individuals can no longer dwell upon well ‑established 
patterns of daily routines.
Cultural traumas unveil their destructive potential as far as the 
general readiness to vest trust in the Other is concerned. In this specific 
sense, this discourse becomes truly tantamount to the idea of “great 
disruption,” as Fukuyama aptly calls the axiological transformation 
of modern order.6 The idea of cultural trauma is in this sense closely 
related to the personal propensity to vest trust in the Other as well 
as to the general capability of constructing stable trust cultures.7 It 
is argued, then, that cultural traumas may be perceived through the 
prism of a “prevailing syndrome of distrust” which manifests itself 
by the erosion of trust towards individuals and social institutions 
indicating the general lack of “social rootedness,” a secure milieu of 
close interpersonal or systemic bonds.
Social change is compatible with trust, but only if it proceeds 
gradually, regularly, predictably, in a slow rhythm and con‑
sistent direction. […] Instability undermines the existential 
5 Sztompka, “The Trauma of Social Change,” p. 164.
6 See Fukuyama, The Great Disruption. Human Nature and the Reconstruction of 
Social Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).
7 Sztompka, “The Trauma of Social Change,” p. 166.
173Conclusions
fabric of social life. People are suddenly faced with a totally 
overhauled social order: reshaped groups, new associations, 
institutions, regimes. Old habits, routines, and accustomed 
patterns of action are no longer adequate. Feelings of 
estrangement, insecurity and uneasiness arise. Everyday 
conduct, as well as longer life perspectives, lose their fixity 
and rootedness. Everything suddenly looks possible, nothing 
is excluded, and hence nothing can be certainly predicted. 
[…] No wonder permanently changing, “post ‑traditional” 
societies are so ripe with distrust.8
In this essentially traumatic environment, trusting relations are left 
behind in a structural void. The morphogenesis of modern trust cul‑
tures, to put it otherwise, does not assume a form of inter ‑generational 
reproduction organised on the basis of stable coordinates constituting 
the cornerstone of everyday experiences. It is the world of fluids which 
defies any attempts to render it a more stable and predictable form.
In the context of the “liquid modernity,” axiological and normative 
spheres of culture assume features of the narrative of social trauma, the 
all ‑pervading notion of anxiety and being out ‑of ‑place experienced in 
the wake of sudden and all ‑encompassing changes. In a way, cultural 
traumas provide individuals with a new signification system which 
becomes a constructive way of adaptation to novel circumstances of 
actions. One may suggest, consequently, that deeply traumatic experi‑
ences may be, at the end of the day, positive in a way that they enable 
the formation of new collective identities, trans ‑personal narratives 
that help to constitute novel “discursive coalitions”9 aimed at cop‑
ing with the experienced (or estimated) adversity of change. From 
this perspective, one cannot really address the realm of late modern 
society as a socio ‑cultural framework based upon the complete an‑
nihilation of trust cultures. What we experience nowadays, then, is 
rather a peculiar agential environment of trust in which the readiness 
to vest trust in the Other is no longer mediated (or facilitated) by the 
existence of solid and unquestionable frameworks of axiological and 
normative descent.
8 Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p. 123.
9 Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 31.
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Pomiędzy sceną a tekstem  
Podmiotowość i struktura w analizie zmiany kulturowej  
z perspektywy zaufania i niepewności
St reszczen ie
Publikacja stanowi interdyscyplinarny projekt łączący w sobie teorie kulturo‑
znawcze, socjologiczne, politologiczne i filozoficzne oraz zmierzający do przedstawienia 
dynamiki zmian społeczno‑kulturowych z punktu widzenia zaufania i niepewności. 
Przyjmując tezę, że zaufanie jest sposobem na radzenie sobie z niepewną i ryzykowną 
przyszłością, praca ta opiera się na założeniu, że omawiane pojęcia służą zobrazowaniu 
stopnia zadomowienia się jednostki w zmieniających się strukturach i systemach 
społecznych, ekonomicznych i kulturowych. W ten sposób niniejsza publikacja 
wychodzi poza ramy tych teorii modernizacji, które zmianę społeczną przedstawiają 
przede wszystkim z perspektywy strukturalno‑systemowej, uwzględniającej przemiany 
instytucji politycznych, administracyjnych (struktur biurokratycznych) lub ekonomic‑
znych. Praca ta jest zatem próbą nakreślenia dynamiki procesów zmiany kulturowej, 
a zwłaszcza jej normatywnych, aksjologicznych i symbolicznych aspektów. Książka jest 
adresowana przede wszystkim do osób zainteresowanych problematyką kształtowania 
się społecznych zasobów zaufania (kapitału społecznego) oraz powstawania kul‑
turowych mechanizmów wzmacniających lub osłabiających skłonność jednostek do 
przybierania postawy uogólnionej ufności. 
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Zwischen der Bühne und dem Text  
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Zusammen fassu ng
Die Publikation ist ein interdisziplinäres Projekt, das kulturkundliche, soziologische, 
politologische und philosophische Theorien vereint und bezweckt, die ganze Dynamik 
der sozialkulturellen Wandlungen von dem Vertrauen und der Unsicherheit her zu 
schildern. Angenommen, dass das Vertrauen eine Methode ist, mit der ungewissen und 
risikoreichen Zukunft zurechtzukommen, stützt sich der Verfasser auf die These, dass 
vorliegende Begriffe dazu dienen, die Anpassung des Menschen an die sich verändern‑
den sozialen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Strukturen und Systemen darzustellen. 
So sprengt das Buch den Rahmen der Modernisierungstheorien, welche den sozialen 
Wandel vor allem aus der strukturell‑systemhaften Perspektive betrachten, d.i. alle 
Wandlungen im Bereich der politischen, administrativen (bürokratische Strukturen) 
oder wirtschaftlichen Institutionen in Rücksicht nehmen. Der Verfasser versucht, die 
Dynamik der Prozesse des Kulturwandels, und besonders dessen normativer, axiolo‑
gischer und symbolischer Aspekte zu schildern. Das Buch richtet sich vor allem an 
die Personen, die sich für die Entwicklung des gesellschaftlichen Vertrauensbestandes 
(Gemeinschaftskapitals) und für die Entstehung der Kulturmechanismen interessieren, 
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